[continued from previous message] 
  
 administration which I heard in Washington on this point.' 
  
 Taft remains adamant that 1441 gave the US and Britain a legitimate 
 trigger for the use of force. 'We were drafting the resolution having 
 in mind that we might not get another one and we wanted, in the event 
 of non-compliance [by Iraq], to allow our policy-makers to be in a 
 position to do what they needed to do,' he said. 'There was an 
 enormous fight. A draft resolution was tabled stating that the 
 Security Council would have to take further action and this was not 
 accepted.' 
  
 Taft is convinced that Goldsmith's final advice to Blair was correct 
 under international law. 'I am still right there. The use of force was 
 entirely lawful and authorised by the Security Council.' 
  
 THhe anger of defence officials 
  
 By the end of February 2003, more than 50,000 British troops had been 
 sent to northern Kuwait preparing for an assault on Iraq if the order 
 was given. 
  
 While the military strategy was going according to plan, back in the 
 Ministry of Defence HQ, Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, the then Chief of 
 Defence Staff, was growing increasingly impatient. Aware of the 
 political debate raging on the legality of the war, he told the Prime 
 Minister he would need 'black and white' legal cover before he ordered 
 the troops in. 
  
 As The Observer revealed last March, it was Boyce's fears that 
 soldiers might face prosecution for war crimes before the 
 International Criminal Court that led to his demands for an 
 'unequivocal' two-line note from the Attorney General giving him the 
 green light. 
  
 Boyce's clear demand for this unambiguous statement was transmitted to 
 Goldsmith through the Prime Minister. Boyce's stance has emerged as a 
 key factor in pushing Goldsmith to reconsider his final advice, which 
 was presented to the Cabinet on 17 March and which removed many of his 
 caveats in the 7 March document. 
  
 In an interview with The Observer, Boyce said: 'My requirement for 
 legal "top cover" didn't start on 7 March; it started from the time we 
 were getting troops in the area at the back end of February. It was 
 obvious already there was quite a heavy debate going on that lent an 
 air of uncertainty to our troops. 
  
 'My concern was that the troops should feel absolutely confident that 
 what they were doing was absolutely black and white legally. So, well 
 before 7 March, I made it clear to the Prime Minister that before we 
 went in we would require legal top cover.' 
  
 Boyce said he never saw Goldsmith's 13-page full legal opinion of 7 
 March. 'I didn't see it ... it was not copied to me. My concerns 
 weren't aroused or sparked by that, but by general concern. 
  
 'What the Attorney General didn't say was that it was illegal. It had 
 caveats in it ... and some time between producing that piece of work 
 on 7 March and his ultimate instruction or advice to Cabinet and 
 Parliament and to me ... whatever things that were required to remove 
 the caveats or to consider them to be not so important, I am not privy 
 to. At the end of the day, he provided me with the unequivocal 
 black-and-white advice that it was legal for us to go in.' 
  
 Yet in a remarkable admission, when asked if he believed he had 
 finally received the necessary legal cover to protect him from a 
 prosecution before the ICC, Boyce replies: ' No - I think I have done 
 as best I can do. I have always been troubled by the ICC. Although I 
 was reassured at the time when it [the decision to sign up to the ICC] 
 was going through Whitehall about five years ago, I was patted on the 
 head and told, don't worry: on the day it will be fine. I don't have 
 100 percent confidence in that.' 
  
 Goldsmith himself warned explicitly of the danger in his 7 March 
 advice that such an attempted prosecution was a possibility. He 
 stated: 'We cannot absolutely rule out that some state strongly 
 opposed to military action might try to bring such a case. It is also 
 possible that CND may try to bring further action to stop military 
 action in the domestic courts. Two further possibilities are an 
 attempted prosecution for murder on the grounds that the military 
 action is unlawful and an attempted prosecution for the crime of 
 aggression.' 
  
 Boyce reveals for the first time that part of his motive for insisting 
 on legal assurance was to ensure that, should he or his soldiers face 
 prosecution for the war, then his political masters would also be 
 called to account. He said: 'My concerns were that, if my soldiers 
 went to jail and I did, some other people would go with me - and 
 that's what I had. I had a perfectly unambiguous black-and-white 
 statement saying it would be legal to operate if we had to.' 
  
 Asked whether he meant by 'other people' Lord Goldsmith and Tony Blair 
 he replied: 'Too bloody right!' 
  
 'I wanted to make sure we had this anchor that has been signed by the 
 government law officer to show that at least we were operating under 
 legal advice. It may not stop us from being charged, but, by God, it 
 would make sure other people were brought in the frame as well.' 
  
 Blair's dark week 
  
 For nearly five million Britons, polling day came early this year. The 
 ballot boxes may not open until 5 May, but the postal votes on which 
 many of Labour's most marginal seats will be decided began dropping on 
 to doormats last weekend. And somebody was ready for them. 
  
 Beneath the headline 'The proof Blair was told war could be illegal', 
 last week's Mail on Sunday detailed the long-suspected, but never 
 before confirmed, reservations and caveats of the Attorney General. 
 The paper did not have the document itself, but had been read out 
 enough authentic detail for Goldsmith to issue a statement admitting 
 it was genuine.The Government's best kept secret was out - just as 
 postal voters' pens were poised over their ballot papers. 
  
 Straw was hauled on to the Today programme on Monday for what one 
 colleague called a 'painful' performance defending the legality of the 
 war. For Straw personally, already struggling with an angry Muslim 
 vote in his Blackburn constituency, it was the worst possible time to 
 be thrust into an argument over Iraq. 
  
 The week stumbled from bad to worse. On Tuesday, it was announced that 
 Brian Sedgemore, a veteran Labour MP, was defecting to the Lib Dems. 
 The result was Tuesday's damning headlines, with Sedgemore accusing 
 Blair of 'stomach-turning lies' over the war. It was the final 
 encouragement Tory leader Michael Howard's team needed: the next 
 morning, they launched their own poster accusing Blair of lying to go 
 to war, and asking what else he might lie about to get re-elected. 
  
 Blair was in the middle of an interview for Sky on Wednesday, 
 insisting he did not tell lies, when Channel 4 News began reporting an 
 altogether more interesting story. It was another leak of the war 
 advice: crucially, this time it and the Guardian had a copy of 
 Goldsmith's summary - albeit handwritten to disguise the source. The 
 crucial part of the document the government had fought for two years 
 to conceal was now posted on a newspaper website for all to see. 
  
 Labour ministers are unanimous in blaming the Tories for having 
 somehow orchestrated the first leak, even though Tory aides insist 
 that is 'pure paranoia'. 
  
 It was the second hit that really lit the fuse. The Trade and Industry 
 Secretary, Patricia Hewitt, watching the news at home, shot to her 
 computer to download the document she had never been shown - despite 
 being in the cabinet. By the following morning, John Prescott, the 
  
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  * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)