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>>>>>>>>>> relative to temporality which is requisite for consciousness--
>>>>>>>>>> appreciate I am making quite the statement as postulate for
>>>>>>>>>> further informal research.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> #67 #54 #47
>>>>>>>>>> #70 #68 #48
>>>>>>>>>> #03 #05 #07
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> #1092 = [#364 - ENQUIRY, #312 - CONTRADICTION, #416 (#405 + #9
>>>>>>>>>> - BRANCHING OUT) - ORTHOLOGY: #143 - ONTIC GROUNDING + #273 -
>>>>>>>>>> SYNCRETIC PROGRESSION (#208 - EVALUATE / EXPRESS + #65 - INNER
>>>>>>>>>> (內))]
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> IMMANUEL KANT PROLEGOMENA (1783) COMMENTARY ON SECTION #53 -
>>>>>>>>>> INCREASING EVIDENCE, GAINING INSIGHT; I-CHING: H13 -
>>>>>>>>>> FELLOWSHIP, COMPANIONSHIP, CONCORDING PEOPLE, FELLOWSHIP WITH
>>>>>>>>>> MEN, GATHERING MEN; TETRA: 53 - ETERNITY (YUNG) AS MARGIN IDEA
>>>>>>>>>> #343 = #207 - rèn (軔): *TO* *BRAKE* + #136 - zhāo (昭):
>>>>>>>>>> *DISPLAY CLEARLY* / *SUN'S* *BRIGHTNESS*: "In the first
>>>>>>>>>> (mathematical) class of antinomy, the falsity of the
>>>>>>>>>> presupposition consisted in the following: that something
>>>>>>>>>> self- contradictory (namely, appearance as a thing in itself)
>>>>>>>>>> (eg: #136 - yán (顔): FACIAL APPEARANCE / [#60, #76] | #207 -
>>>>>>>>>> qù (去): TO ABANDON; TO GIVE UP / [#31, #45, #65, #66]) would
>>>>>>>>>> be represented as being unifiable in a concept. But regarding
>>>>>>>>>> the second, namely the dynamical, class of antinomy, the
>>>>>>>>>> falsity of the presupposition consists in this: that something
>>>>>>>>>> that is unifiable is represented as contradictory;
>>>>>>>>>> consequently, while in the first case both of the mutually
>>>>>>>>>> opposing assertions were false, here on the contrary the
>>>>>>>>>> assertions, which are set in opposition to one another through
>>>>>>>>>> mere misunderstanding, can both be true.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Specifically, mathematical combination necessarily presupposes
>>>>>>>>>> the homogeneity of the things combined (in the concept of
>>>>>>>>>> magnitude), but dynamical connection does not require this at
>>>>>>>>>> all. If it is a question of the magnitude of something
>>>>>>>>>> extended, all parts must be homogeneous among themselves and
>>>>>>>>>> with the whole; in contrast, in the connection of cause and
>>>>>>>>>> effect homogeneity can indeed be found, but is not necessary;
>>>>>>>>>> for the concept of causality (whereby through one thing,
>>>>>>>>>> something completely different from it is posited) at least
>>>>>>>>>> does not require it.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> If the objects of the sensible world were taken for things in
>>>>>>>>>> themselves, and the previously stated natural laws for laws of
>>>>>>>>>> things in themselves, contradiction would be inevitable. In
>>>>>>>>>> the same way, if the subject of freedom were represented, like
>>>>>>>>>> the other objects, as a mere appearance, contradiction could
>>>>>>>>>> again not be avoided, for the same thing would be
>>>>>>>>>> simultaneously affirmed and denied of the same object in the
>>>>>>>>>> same sense. But if natural necessity is referred only to
>>>>>>>>>> appearances and freedom only to things in themselves, then no
>>>>>>>>>> contradiction arises if both kinds of causality are assumed or
>>>>>>>>>> conceded equally, however difficult or impossible it may be to
>>>>>>>>>> make causality of the latter kind conceivable.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Within appearance, every effect is an event, or something that
>>>>>>>>>> happens in time; the effect must, in accordance with the
>>>>>>>>>> universal law of nature, be preceded by a determination of the
>>>>>>>>>> causality of its cause (a state of the cause), from which the
>>>>>>>>>> effect follows in accordance with a constant law. But this
>>>>>>>>>> determination of the cause to causality must also be something
>>>>>>>>>> that occurs or takes place; the cause must have begun to act,
>>>>>>>>>> for otherwise no sequence in time could be thought between it
>>>>>>>>>> and the effect. [IDEA #344] Both the effect and the causality
>>>>>>>>>> of the cause would have always existed. Therefore the
>>>>>>>>>> determination of the cause to act must also have arisen among
>>>>>>>>>> the appearances, and so it must, like its effect, be an event,
>>>>>>>>>> which again must have its cause, and so on, and hence natural
>>>>>>>>>> necessity must be the condition in accordance with which
>>>>>>>>>> efficient causes are determined. Should, by contrast, freedom
>>>>>>>>>> be a property of certain causes of appearances, then that
>>>>>>>>>> freedom must, in relation to the appearances as events, be a
>>>>>>>>>> faculty of starting those events from itself (sponte -
>>>>>>>>>> spontaneous), i.e., without the causality of the cause itself
>>>>>>>>>> having to begin, and hence without need for any other ground
>>>>>>>>>> to determine its beginning. But then the cause, as to its
>>>>>>>>>> causality, would not have to be subject to temporal
>>>>>>>>>> determinations of its state, i.e., would not have to be
>>>>>>>>>> appearance at all, i.e., would have to be taken for a thing in
>>>>>>>>>> itself, and only the effects would have to be taken for
>>>>>>>>>> appearances.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> NOTE: The idea of freedom has its place solely in the relation
>>>>>>>>>> of the *INTELLECTUAL* (des Intellektuellen), as cause, to the
>>>>>>>>>> appearance, as effect. Therefore we cannot bestow freedom upon
>>>>>>>>>> matter, in consideration of the unceasing activity by which it
>>>>>>>>>> fills its space, even though this activity occurs through an
>>>>>>>>>> inner principle. We can just as little find any concept of
>>>>>>>>>> freedom to fit a purely intelligible being, e.g., God, insofar
>>>>>>>>>> as his action is immanent. For his action, although
>>>>>>>>>> independent of causes determining it from outside,
>>>>>>>>>> nevertheless is determined in his eternal reason, hence in the
>>>>>>>>>> divine nature. Only if something should begin through an
>>>>>>>>>> action, hence the effect be found in the time series, and so
>>>>>>>>>> in the sensible world (e.g., the beginning of the world), does
>>>>>>>>>> the question arise of whether the causality of the cause must
>>>>>>>>>> itself also have a beginning, or whether the cause can
>>>>>>>>>> originate an effect without its causality itself having a
>>>>>>>>>> beginning. In the first case the concept of this causality is
>>>>>>>>>> a concept of natural necessity, in the second of freedom. From
>>>>>>>>>> this the reader will see that, since I have explained freedom
>>>>>>>>>> as the faculty to begin an event by oneself, I have exactly
>>>>>>>>>> hit that concept which is the problem of metaphysics.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> If this sort of influence of intelligible beings on
>>>>>>>>>> appearances can be thought without contradiction, then natural
>>>>>>>>>> necessity will indeed attach to every connection of cause and
>>>>>>>>>> effect in the sensible world, and yet that cause which is
>>>>>>>>>> itself not an appearance (though it underlies appearance) will
>>>>>>>>>> still be entitled to freedom, and therefore nature and freedom
>>>>>>>>>> will be attributable without contradiction to the very same
>>>>>>>>>> thing, but in different respects, in the one case as
>>>>>>>>>> appearance, in the other as a thing in itself. We have in us a
>>>>>>>>>> faculty that not only stands in connection with its

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