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>>>>>>>>> *DISPLAY CLEARLY* / *SUN'S* *BRIGHTNESS*: "In the first
>>>>>>>>> (mathematical) class of antinomy, the falsity of the
>>>>>>>>> presupposition consisted in the following: that something self-
>>>>>>>>> contradictory (namely, appearance as a thing in itself) (eg:
>>>>>>>>> #136 - yán (顔): FACIAL APPEARANCE / [#60, #76] | #207 - qù
>>>>>>>>> (去): TO ABANDON; TO GIVE UP / [#31, #45, #65, #66]) would be
>>>>>>>>> represented as being unifiable in a concept. But regarding the
>>>>>>>>> second, namely the dynamical, class of antinomy, the falsity of
>>>>>>>>> the presupposition consists in this: that something that is
>>>>>>>>> unifiable is represented as contradictory; consequently, while
>>>>>>>>> in the first case both of the mutually opposing assertions were
>>>>>>>>> false, here on the contrary the assertions, which are set in
>>>>>>>>> opposition to one another through mere misunderstanding, can
>>>>>>>>> both be true.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Specifically, mathematical combination necessarily presupposes
>>>>>>>>> the homogeneity of the things combined (in the concept of
>>>>>>>>> magnitude), but dynamical connection does not require this at
>>>>>>>>> all. If it is a question of the magnitude of something
>>>>>>>>> extended, all parts must be homogeneous among themselves and
>>>>>>>>> with the whole; in contrast, in the connection of cause and
>>>>>>>>> effect homogeneity can indeed be found, but is not necessary;
>>>>>>>>> for the concept of causality (whereby through one thing,
>>>>>>>>> something completely different from it is posited) at least
>>>>>>>>> does not require it.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> If the objects of the sensible world were taken for things in
>>>>>>>>> themselves, and the previously stated natural laws for laws of
>>>>>>>>> things in themselves, contradiction would be inevitable. In the
>>>>>>>>> same way, if the subject of freedom were represented, like the
>>>>>>>>> other objects, as a mere appearance, contradiction could again
>>>>>>>>> not be avoided, for the same thing would be simultaneously
>>>>>>>>> affirmed and denied of the same object in the same sense. But
>>>>>>>>> if natural necessity is referred only to appearances and
>>>>>>>>> freedom only to things in themselves, then no contradiction
>>>>>>>>> arises if both kinds of causality are assumed or conceded
>>>>>>>>> equally, however difficult or impossible it may be to make
>>>>>>>>> causality of the latter kind conceivable.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Within appearance, every effect is an event, or something that
>>>>>>>>> happens in time; the effect must, in accordance with the
>>>>>>>>> universal law of nature, be preceded by a determination of the
>>>>>>>>> causality of its cause (a state of the cause), from which the
>>>>>>>>> effect follows in accordance with a constant law. But this
>>>>>>>>> determination of the cause to causality must also be something
>>>>>>>>> that occurs or takes place; the cause must have begun to act,
>>>>>>>>> for otherwise no sequence in time could be thought between it
>>>>>>>>> and the effect. [IDEA #344] Both the effect and the causality
>>>>>>>>> of the cause would have always existed. Therefore the
>>>>>>>>> determination of the cause to act must also have arisen among
>>>>>>>>> the appearances, and so it must, like its effect, be an event,
>>>>>>>>> which again must have its cause, and so on, and hence natural
>>>>>>>>> necessity must be the condition in accordance with which
>>>>>>>>> efficient causes are determined. Should, by contrast, freedom
>>>>>>>>> be a property of certain causes of appearances, then that
>>>>>>>>> freedom must, in relation to the appearances as events, be a
>>>>>>>>> faculty of starting those events from itself (sponte -
>>>>>>>>> spontaneous), i.e., without the causality of the cause itself
>>>>>>>>> having to begin, and hence without need for any other ground to
>>>>>>>>> determine its beginning. But then the cause, as to its
>>>>>>>>> causality, would not have to be subject to temporal
>>>>>>>>> determinations of its state, i.e., would not have to be
>>>>>>>>> appearance at all, i.e., would have to be taken for a thing in
>>>>>>>>> itself, and only the effects would have to be taken for
>>>>>>>>> appearances.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> NOTE: The idea of freedom has its place solely in the relation
>>>>>>>>> of the *INTELLECTUAL* (des Intellektuellen), as cause, to the
>>>>>>>>> appearance, as effect. Therefore we cannot bestow freedom upon
>>>>>>>>> matter, in consideration of the unceasing activity by which it
>>>>>>>>> fills its space, even though this activity occurs through an
>>>>>>>>> inner principle. We can just as little find any concept of
>>>>>>>>> freedom to fit a purely intelligible being, e.g., God, insofar
>>>>>>>>> as his action is immanent. For his action, although independent
>>>>>>>>> of causes determining it from outside, nevertheless is
>>>>>>>>> determined in his eternal reason, hence in the divine nature.
>>>>>>>>> Only if something should begin through an action, hence the
>>>>>>>>> effect be found in the time series, and so in the sensible
>>>>>>>>> world (e.g., the beginning of the world), does the question
>>>>>>>>> arise of whether the causality of the cause must itself also
>>>>>>>>> have a beginning, or whether the cause can originate an effect
>>>>>>>>> without its causality itself having a beginning. In the first
>>>>>>>>> case the concept of this causality is a concept of natural
>>>>>>>>> necessity, in the second of freedom. From this the reader will
>>>>>>>>> see that, since I have explained freedom as the faculty to
>>>>>>>>> begin an event by oneself, I have exactly hit that concept
>>>>>>>>> which is the problem of metaphysics.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> If this sort of influence of intelligible beings on appearances
>>>>>>>>> can be thought without contradiction, then natural necessity
>>>>>>>>> will indeed attach to every connection of cause and effect in
>>>>>>>>> the sensible world, and yet that cause which is itself not an
>>>>>>>>> appearance (though it underlies appearance) will still be
>>>>>>>>> entitled to freedom, and therefore nature and freedom will be
>>>>>>>>> attributable without contradiction to the very same thing, but
>>>>>>>>> in different respects, in the one case as appearance, in the
>>>>>>>>> other as a thing in itself. We have in us a faculty that not
>>>>>>>>> only stands in connection with its subjectively determining
>>>>>>>>> grounds, which are the natural causes of its [IDEA #345]
>>>>>>>>> actions – and thus far is the faculty of a being which itself
>>>>>>>>> belongs to appearances – but that also is related to objective
>>>>>>>>> grounds that are mere ideas, insofar as these ideas can
>>>>>>>>> determine this faculty, a connection that is expressed by ought.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> This faculty is called reason, and insofar as we are
>>>>>>>>> considering a being (the human being) solely as regards this
>>>>>>>>> objectively determinable reason, this being cannot be
>>>>>>>>> considered as a being of the senses; rather, the aforesaid
>>>>>>>>> property is the property of a thing in itself, and the
>>>>>>>>> possibility of that property – namely, how the ought, which has
>>>>>>>>> never yet happened, can determine the activity of this being
>>>>>>>>> and can be the cause of actions whose effect is an appearance

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