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>>>> By conveying the DUALISTIC GENDERED AND FLUID ASPECT OF AUTONOMY
>>>> with our #174 - COEFFICIENT (median) PARADIGM we are challenging
>>>> entrenched dogmatic assumptions.
>>>>
>>>> Thus this DYNAMIC EQUILIBRIUM FUSION STASIS as #174 - CYBERNETIC
>>>> SYSTEM / ANTHROPOMORPHIC PRINCIPLE which is the self focus of  #273
>>>> - SYNCRETIC PROGRESSION (#208 - EVALUATE / EXPRESS + #65 - INNER
>>>> (內)) is also a vEVENT grounding relative to temporality which is
>>>> requisite for consciousness--appreciate I am making quite the
>>>> statement as postulate for further informal research.
>>>>
>>>> #67 #54 #47
>>>> #70 #68 #48
>>>> #03 #05 #07
>>>>
>>>> #1092 = [#364 - ENQUIRY, #312 - CONTRADICTION, #416 (#405 + #9 -
>>>> BRANCHING OUT) - ORTHOLOGY: #143 - ONTIC GROUNDING + #273 -
>>>> SYNCRETIC PROGRESSION (#208 - EVALUATE / EXPRESS + #65 - INNER (內))]
>>>>
>>>> IMMANUEL KANT PROLEGOMENA (1783) COMMENTARY ON SECTION #53 -
>>>> INCREASING EVIDENCE, GAINING INSIGHT; I-CHING: H13 - FELLOWSHIP,
>>>> COMPANIONSHIP, CONCORDING PEOPLE, FELLOWSHIP WITH MEN, GATHERING
>>>> MEN; TETRA: 53 - ETERNITY (YUNG) AS MARGIN IDEA #343 = #207 - rèn
>>>> (軔): *TO* *BRAKE* + #136 - zhāo (昭): *DISPLAY CLEARLY* / *SUN'S*
>>>> *BRIGHTNESS*: "In the first (mathematical) class of antinomy, the
>>>> falsity of the presupposition consisted in the following: that
>>>> something self- contradictory (namely, appearance as a thing in
>>>> itself) (eg: #136 - yán (顔): FACIAL APPEARANCE / [#60, #76] | #207
>>>> - qù (去): TO ABANDON; TO GIVE UP / [#31, #45, #65, #66]) would be
>>>> represented as being unifiable in a concept. But regarding the
>>>> second, namely the dynamical, class of antinomy, the falsity of the
>>>> presupposition consists in this: that something that is unifiable is
>>>> represented as contradictory; consequently, while in the first case
>>>> both of the mutually opposing assertions were false, here on the
>>>> contrary the assertions, which are set in opposition to one another
>>>> through mere misunderstanding, can both be true.
>>>>
>>>> Specifically, mathematical combination necessarily presupposes the
>>>> homogeneity of the things combined (in the concept of magnitude),
>>>> but dynamical connection does not require this at all. If it is a
>>>> question of the magnitude of something extended, all parts must be
>>>> homogeneous among themselves and with the whole; in contrast, in the
>>>> connection of cause and effect homogeneity can indeed be found, but
>>>> is not necessary; for the concept of causality (whereby through one
>>>> thing, something completely different from it is posited) at least
>>>> does not require it.
>>>>
>>>> If the objects of the sensible world were taken for things in
>>>> themselves, and the previously stated natural laws for laws of
>>>> things in themselves, contradiction would be inevitable. In the same
>>>> way, if the subject of freedom were represented, like the other
>>>> objects, as a mere appearance, contradiction could again not be
>>>> avoided, for the same thing would be simultaneously affirmed and
>>>> denied of the same object in the same sense. But if natural
>>>> necessity is referred only to appearances and freedom only to things
>>>> in themselves, then no contradiction arises if both kinds of
>>>> causality are assumed or conceded equally, however difficult or
>>>> impossible it may be to make causality of the latter kind conceivable.
>>>>
>>>> Within appearance, every effect is an event, or something that
>>>> happens in time; the effect must, in accordance with the universal
>>>> law of nature, be preceded by a determination of the causality of
>>>> its cause (a state of the cause), from which the effect follows in
>>>> accordance with a constant law. But this determination of the cause
>>>> to causality must also be something that occurs or takes place; the
>>>> cause must have begun to act, for otherwise no sequence in time
>>>> could be thought between it and the effect. [IDEA #344] Both the
>>>> effect and the causality of the cause would have always existed.
>>>> Therefore the determination of the cause to act must also have
>>>> arisen among the appearances, and so it must, like its effect, be an
>>>> event, which again must have its cause, and so on, and hence natural
>>>> necessity must be the condition in accordance with which efficient
>>>> causes are determined. Should, by contrast, freedom be a property of
>>>> certain causes of appearances, then that freedom must, in relation
>>>> to the appearances as events, be a faculty of starting those events
>>>> from itself (sponte - spontaneous), i.e., without the causality of
>>>> the cause itself having to begin, and hence without need for any
>>>> other ground to determine its beginning. But then the cause, as to
>>>> its causality, would not have to be subject to temporal
>>>> determinations of its state, i.e., would not have to be appearance
>>>> at all, i.e., would have to be taken for a thing in itself, and only
>>>> the effects would have to be taken for appearances.
>>>>
>>>> NOTE: The idea of freedom has its place solely in the relation of
>>>> the *INTELLECTUAL* (des Intellektuellen), as cause, to the
>>>> appearance, as effect. Therefore we cannot bestow freedom upon
>>>> matter, in consideration of the unceasing activity by which it fills
>>>> its space, even though this activity occurs through an inner
>>>> principle. We can just as little find any concept of freedom to fit
>>>> a purely intelligible being, e.g., God, insofar as his action is
>>>> immanent. For his action, although independent of causes determining
>>>> it from outside, nevertheless is determined in his eternal reason,
>>>> hence in the divine nature. Only if something should begin through
>>>> an action, hence the effect be found in the time series, and so in
>>>> the sensible world (e.g., the beginning of the world), does the
>>>> question arise of whether the causality of the cause must itself
>>>> also have a beginning, or whether the cause can originate an effect
>>>> without its causality itself having a beginning. In the first case
>>>> the concept of this causality is a concept of natural necessity, in
>>>> the second of freedom. From this the reader will see that, since I
>>>> have explained freedom as the faculty to begin an event by oneself,
>>>> I have exactly hit that concept which is the problem of metaphysics.
>>>>
>>>> If this sort of influence of intelligible beings on appearances can
>>>> be thought without contradiction, then natural necessity will indeed
>>>> attach to every connection of cause and effect in the sensible
>>>> world, and yet that cause which is itself not an appearance (though
>>>> it underlies appearance) will still be entitled to freedom, and
>>>> therefore nature and freedom will be attributable without
>>>> contradiction to the very same thing, but in different respects, in
>>>> the one case as appearance, in the other as a thing in itself. We
>>>> have in us a faculty that not only stands in connection with its
>>>> subjectively determining grounds, which are the natural causes of
>>>> its [IDEA #345] actions – and thus far is the faculty of a being
>>>> which itself belongs to appearances – but that also is related to
>>>> objective grounds that are mere ideas, insofar as these ideas can

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