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>> determination of the cause to act must also have arisen among the
>> appearances, and so it must, like its effect, be an event, which again
>> must have its cause, and so on, and hence natural necessity must be
>> the condition in accordance with which efficient causes are
>> determined. Should, by contrast, freedom be a property of certain
>> causes of appearances, then that freedom must, in relation to the
>> appearances as events, be a faculty of starting those events from
>> itself (sponte - spontaneous), i.e., without the causality of the
>> cause itself having to begin, and hence without need for any other
>> ground to determine its beginning. But then the cause, as to its
>> causality, would not have to be subject to temporal determinations of
>> its state, i.e., would not have to be appearance at all, i.e., would
>> have to be taken for a thing in itself, and only the effects would
>> have to be taken for appearances.
>>
>> NOTE: The idea of freedom has its place solely in the relation of the
>> *INTELLECTUAL* (des Intellektuellen), as cause, to the appearance, as
>> effect. Therefore we cannot bestow freedom upon matter, in
>> consideration of the unceasing activity by which it fills its space,
>> even though this activity occurs through an inner principle. We can
>> just as little find any concept of freedom to fit a purely
>> intelligible being, e.g., God, insofar as his action is immanent. For
>> his action, although independent of causes determining it from
>> outside, nevertheless is determined in his eternal reason, hence in
>> the divine nature. Only if something should begin through an action,
>> hence the effect be found in the time series, and so in the sensible
>> world (e.g., the beginning of the world), does the question arise of
>> whether the causality of the cause must itself also have a beginning,
>> or whether the cause can originate an effect without its causality
>> itself having a beginning. In the first case the concept of this
>> causality is a concept of natural necessity, in the second of freedom.
>> From this the reader will see that, since I have explained freedom as
>> the faculty to begin an event by oneself, I have exactly hit that
>> concept which is the problem of metaphysics.
>>
>> If this sort of influence of intelligible beings on appearances can be
>> thought without contradiction, then natural necessity will indeed
>> attach to every connection of cause and effect in the sensible world,
>> and yet that cause which is itself not an appearance (though it
>> underlies appearance) will still be entitled to freedom, and therefore
>> nature and freedom will be attributable without contradiction to the
>> very same thing, but in different respects, in the one case as
>> appearance, in the other as a thing in itself. We have in us a faculty
>> that not only stands in connection with its subjectively determining
>> grounds, which are the natural causes of its [IDEA #345] actions – and
>> thus far is the faculty of a being which itself belongs to appearances
>> – but that also is related to objective grounds that are mere ideas,
>> insofar as these ideas can determine this faculty, a connection that
>> is expressed by ought.
>>
>> This faculty is called reason, and insofar as we are considering a
>> being (the human being) solely as regards this objectively
>> determinable reason, this being cannot be considered as a being of the
>> senses; rather, the aforesaid property is the property of a thing in
>> itself, and the possibility of that property – namely, how the ought,
>> which has never yet happened, can determine the activity of this being
>> and can be the cause of actions whose effect is an appearance in the
>> sensible world – we cannot comprehend at all. Yet the causality of
>> reason with respect to effects in the sensible world would nonetheless
>> be freedom, insofar as objective grounds, which are themselves ideas,
>> are taken to be determining with respect to that causality. For the
>> action of that causality would in that case not depend on any
>> subjective, hence also not on any temporal conditions, and would
>> therefore also not depend on the natural law that serves to determine
>> those conditions, because grounds of reason provide the rule for
>> actions universally, from principles, without influence from the
>> circumstances of time or place.
>>
>> What I adduce here counts only as an example, for intelligibility, and
>> does not belong necessarily to our question, which must be decided
>> from mere concepts independently of properties that we find in the
>> actual world.
>>
>> I can now say without contradiction: all actions of rational beings,
>> insofar as they are appearances (are encountered in some experience or
>> other), are subject to natural necessity; but the very same actions,
>> with respect only to the rational subject and its faculty of acting in
>> accordance with bare reason, are free. What, then, is required for
>> natural necessity? Nothing more than the determinability of every
>> event in the sensible world according to constant laws, and therefore
>> a relation to a cause within appearance; whereby the underlying thing
>> in itself and its causality remain unknown. But I say: the law of
>> nature remains, whether the rational being be a cause of effects in
>> the sensible world through reason and hence through freedom, or
>> whether that being does not determine such effects through rational
>> grounds. For if the first is the case, the action takes place
>> according to maxims whose effect within appearance will always conform
>> to constant laws; if the second is the case, and the action does not
>> take [IDEA #346] place according to principles of reason, then it is
>> subject to the empirical laws of sensibility, and in both cases the
>> effects are connected according to constant laws; but we require
>> nothing more for natural necessity, and indeed know nothing more of
>> it. In the first case, however, reason is the cause of these natural
>> laws and is therefore free, in the second case the effects flow
>> according to mere natural laws of sensibility, because reason
>> exercises no influence on them; but, because of this, reason is not
>> itself determined by sensibility (which is impossible), and it is
>> therefore also free in this case. Therefore freedom does not impede
>> the natural law of appearances, any more than this law interferes with
>> the freedom of the practical use of reason, a use that stands in
>> connection with things in themselves as determining grounds." [pages
>> 93-97]
>>
>> DOLF: "How is the notion of a civil society related to the inherent
>> human disposition of animus / anima and does such dynamic suggest
>> there is an ontic #22 - jié (結): *FORMATIONAL* (circumscribed as
>> bounding) #135 - níng (凝): *CONGEALING* / [#56, #79] concept of
>> facilitated arbitration as #174 - CYBERNETIC SYSTEMIC /
>> ANTHROPOMORPHIC PRINCIPLE which when disordered possesses an
>> attenuated #152 / #174 - yí (疑): *DEFICIENCY* / [#29, #61, #62, #22]
>> that may in a chronic ontological state be regarded as either
>> delinquency or reprobation?"
>>
>> CAN REFUSAL OF COMMUNION BY IRISH CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP PELL ON BOER WAR
>> MEMORIAL DAY / PENTECOST SUNDAY 31 MAY 1998 BE BROUGHT BEFORE THE
>> INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT?
>>

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