From: nilknocgeo@earthlink.net   
      
   "Adam H. Kerman"  wrote in message   
   news:lt3ap3$tkg$1@news.albasani.net...   
   > The disaster in Lac Magentic was caused by train MMA-002, operated by an   
   > engineer without conductor, on Montreal, Maine, & Atlantic Railway running   
   > away after being left unattended in Nantes. The train consist was 72 tank   
   > cars and a buffer car (which protects the engine crew from disaster caused   
   > by dangerous goods). There were five locomotives in the engine consist,   
   > with a VB car (special-purpose caboose) behind the lead locomotive with   
   > equipment for locomotive remote control. The engineer applied hand brakes   
   > on 7 cars in total and shut down trailing locomotives, including 2   
   > equipped   
   > with auto-start that are not required to be shut down for fuel   
   > conservation   
   > purposes as they shut off on their own eventually. The hand brake test was   
   > performed without releasing the independent brakes (parking brakes) on the   
   > locomotives, but this was a downgrade and it's not entirely clear if this   
   > was a rules violation. Nonetheless, with independent brakes applied, it   
   > didn't produce an adequate test of hand brakes.   
   >   
   > Point 16, if I'm understanding it correctly, indicates why the engineer   
   > thought the hand brakes were holding the consist after he performed the   
   > roll test. It's clear that despite the engineer's long experience, he   
   > was never trained adequately in calculating the number of hand brakes to   
   > set nor what constitutes an adequate test of hand brakes. On page 127,   
   > the point is made that MM&A's use of single person train operation   
   > implementation didn't include training in adequate train securement. The   
   > engineer must perform the conductor's duties as well as his own, and   
   > apparently securing the train falls more heavily on the conductor portion   
   > of this job. There was no mention if he first hired on at CP as a   
   > conductor.   
   >   
   > A few points of interest from the Lac Magentic report:   
   >   
   > 1) The fire department shut down of the locomotive was done under railroad   
   > direction, a fact I'm very glad to hear. Never read that in any of the   
   > local or foreign stories I read of the disaster. Both the fuel line   
   > valve was closed, to stop the fire, and the electrical breakers were   
   > opened, to prevent a spark from igniting fuel. Unfortunately, MMA sent   
   > a track foreman who wouldn't have a locomotive operating background and   
   > didn't tell him to start another locomotive to keep the compressor going   
   > to maintain air pressure in the air brake system. Normally, a penalty   
   > brake application (dumping the air in all brake cylinders in the entire   
   > train) would have occurred, except that the reset safety control (RSC)   
   > was improperly wired so that this would not happen.   
   >   
   > 2) The engineer was rules qualified and not violating hours of service.   
   > Montreal, Maine & Atlantic Railway is ex-CP trackage; MM&A is the   
   > second short line to own it. The engineer had hired on to CP in 1980,   
   > so he had plenty of experience.   
   >   
   > 3) Railroad industry assumes train crews are capable of exerting 125 lbs   
   > of force on the brake wheel, but tests reveal that 80 to 100 lbs of force   
   > is more typical.   
   >   
   > 4) Applying hand brakes on the locomotive is not assumed to be capable   
   > of holding in place any additional cars. A new FRA standard applicable to   
   > locomotives placed in service after January 4, 2004, requires the hand   
   > brake to be capable of holding the locomotive in place on a 3% grade, a   
   > net braking ratio of 10%. Generally, locomotive hand brakes met this   
   > standard anyway prior to the effective date.   
   >   
   > 5) Applying the locomotive's hand brakes doesn't typically apply all   
   > brake shoes. 2 of 12 brake shoes is typical, the way this model GE   
   > locomotive   
   > was designed.   
   >   
   > 6) MM&A, as former CP territory, continued to use CP's General Operating   
   > Instructions. It also refers to MM&A's General Special Instructions (GSIs)   
   > and Safety Rules, without clarifying that these are additional documents   
   > to those taken from CP.   
   >   
   > 7) Applicable number of handbrakes to apply uses a 10% of the number of   
   > cars in the consist (72 in this case) plus 2. Setting hand brakes on the   
   > locomotives counts toward the minimum. Hand brakes are required to be set   
   > on the locomotive. Under this formula, 9 were to be set.   
   >   
   > 8) The grade at Nantes, where the train was parked, is .92%. From the   
   > summary of rules given, assuming the consist holds for the hand brake   
   > test,   
   > it doesn't appear that there was a requirement to set more than 9.   
   > However,   
   > with 13 PSI automatic brake application to stop the train, 15 to 20   
   > hand brakes should have been set, and without any air brakes, 18 to 26   
   > air brakes should have been set. Interestingly, because of the wear on   
   > the brake shoes on the locomotives' brakes, the engineer would have needed   
   > to set between 12 and 18 brakes if just done on the cars.   
   >   
   > 9) Emergency brakes are applied with a complete dump of air. However, when   
   > the air bleeds off slowly, and gets below 40 PSI, an emergency brake   
   > application is no longer possible.   
   >   
   > 10) It took about an hour before the brake pressure fell to the point at   
   > which   
   > the independent brakes (parking brakes) in the locomotive no longer held.   
   >   
   > 11) The sense and braking unit (SBU), a device connected to the rear of   
   > the train attached to the brake line that can apply emergency brakes,   
   > wasn't sufficient to apply emergency brakes in trains longer than 5   
   > cars. By the time the device noted that the train had started to move,   
   > brake pressure had dropped to 29 PSI.   
   >   
   > 12) In a test train with engine shut off, it took 1 hr 35 minutes before   
   > air pressure dropped to 27 PSI, which is the pressure at which the train   
   > started to roll. But the train's locomotive took 1 hr 6 minutes to drop   
   > pressure to 27 PSI. Not ideal but not outrageous given the age of the   
   > parts.   
   >   
   > 13) The quick release brake (QRB) valve on the second locomotive in the   
   > four locomotive engine consist failed. Typically, on a locomotive so   
   > equipped, it opens to dump the air in the cylinder when the hand brake   
   > is tightened when opened with the brake chain. The valve was worn and   
   > damaged and, er, repaired in a non- standard manner (not explained).   
   > Unless   
   > the air in the cylinder is dumped, the shoe isn't applied with the hand   
   > brake. MM&A issued an instruction specific to these locomotives that the   
   > crew member must listen for the air to be exhausted, otherwise the valve   
   > must be operated manually, but the engineer wasn't aware of the memo.   
   >   
   > 14) Brake shoe testing of the locomotives indicated that some were worn to   
   > through the lining to the backing plate. They can tell from wheel blueing   
   > and lining wear that the independent brakes (parking brakes) had been   
   > applying most of the braking force for the train. Finally, not all the   
   > wheels showed full tread blueing nor brake shoe lining wear, indicating   
   > that the hand brakes had not been, or could not be, applied securely.   
   >   
   > 15) 146,700 pounds retarding brake force was required to keep the   
   > consist parked. The calculations are on page 27 if you care to read them.   
   >   
   > 16) Hand brakes are to be applied after full release of air brakes,   
   > except that it's not possible to fully release air brakes when the train   
   > is stopped on a grade. So the 13 PSI automatic brake application at   
   > Nantes (where the consist was parked) resulted in hand brake forces   
   > 40% higher than without air brakes. Page 38   
   >   
   > 17) Reset safety controls (RSCs) are features of locomotives manufactured   
   > since 1986. The 3 pre-1986 GE locomotives were retrofitted with them   
   > by a previous owner. RSCs incorporate the dead man's switch feature,   
   > but also apply a penalty brake application in the event of opening the   
   > breaker or shutting off the main electrical power. There's no requirement   
   > that the penalty brake application function work with power loss, so   
   > it's not required that this be tested for in the shop. Wiring of this   
   > device was inconsistent among the three locomotives and the penalty brake   
   > application didn't necessarily occur as it was supposed to. In fact, 5   
   > other GE locomotives owned by MM&A had inconsistent wiring problems. In   
   > one of the locomotives in the engine consist, RSC was wired directly to   
   > the battery and therefore remained powered even though the main electrical   
   > power was shut off.   
   >   
   > Now, penalty brake application dumps the air in the cylinder, but I don't   
   > understand how long the brake shoe is held in place. It's not an   
   > indefinite application of brake force like a properly set hand brake,   
   > right?   
   >   
   > 18) Pages 29-31 and 113 discuss the serious problems with the lead   
   > locomotive and temporary and improper maintenance peformed on it. The   
   > temporary repairs were explained by MM&A having no spare locomotives and   
   > an increase in traffic due to oil trains. Gee, you'd think they could   
   > have rented one so they'd have had time to perform proper maintenance. The   
   > locomotive remained in service despite problems being reported. The most   
   > serious maintenance issue was the shop "repairing" an oil leak at a cam   
   > bearing bore by overtightening the mounting bolt. After the disaster,   
   > testing revealed that the bearing had fractured.   
      
   Would CP  have abandoned this line had the oil business it now has?  I doubt   
   it.  Further, this shows the problems of running a railroad with a series of   
   cut-rate owners who pay not much attention to safety.  Short lines handling   
   dangerous cargo result in some real issues.   
      
   --- SoupGate/W32 v1.03   
    * Origin: LiveWire BBS -=*=- UseNet FTN Gateway (1:2320/1)