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|    RAILFAN    |    Trains, model railroading hobby    |    3,261 messages    |
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|    Message 1,010 of 3,261    |
|    John Albert to Adam H. Kerman    |
|    Re: Why no official report on Lac Megant    |
|    11 Jul 14 22:11:14    |
      From: j.albert@snet.net              On 7/11/14 7:41 PM, Adam H. Kerman wrote:       > Damn. You're suggesting it could be sabotage.              No, not "sabotage" at all.              I'm suggesting that the automatic brake valve in the engine       (which almost certainly had been placed into the application       zone by the engineman) somehow got bumped or placed back to       the "release" position. It may have been by accident, and       perhaps the person who moved the handle didn't even realize       the implications of changing its position.              The train was probably tied down with a substantial service       applicaton of the brakes, perhaps a 15-20lb reduction, maybe       even "full service" (26lbs on a 90lb brake pipe). This would       be readily observable on the event recorder printout on each       engine.              Let's consider that the engine consist was dead, no longer       supplying air to the main reservoirs on the engines. What       happens in that case?              Normally, with MR pressure normal, the automatic brake valve       in "service position" will maintain the brake pipe pressure       (pressure maintaining feature) so that the brake pipe       reduction "holds steady". A 20lb reduction would remain "a       20lb reduction" for as long as the brake valve remained       untouched.              But -- what would happen if the brake pipe pressure began to       leak down (after the engines died)?              As brake pipe pressure lowers, brake cylinder pressure       INCREASES, up to the point of "equalization" (full service).       If the brake pipe continues to leak down (all the way to       zero), this in itself cannot release the brake application       on the cars. The control valves on the cars will only move       to the release position if brake pipe pressure -increases-.              Now, let's deal with the issue that "the car brakes could       leak off".              I believe those type of tank cars have a control valve       mounted on one end of the car, but have truck-mounted brake       cylinders. I can't speculate as to whether the truck-mounted       cylinders are more prone to leakage than a single large       brake cylinder on, say, a boxcar. But I sense that they are       designed to "hold" cylinder pressure for a certain amount of       time with minimal leakage. Otherwise, descending long grades       (where cylinder pressure must be maintained for a while)       would be problematic.               From what I read, roughly an hour transpired between the       time the lead (only running) locomotive was shutdown, and       the train moved. I don't believe enough brake cylinders on       enough cars could have leaked off their pressure within that       time frame to degrade the application to the point where the       train would roll. Even if 10% of the cars had bled down,       that would still have left 60+ cars with substantial brake       pressure to hold the rest.              Also worth mentioning is I don't believe a car cylinder's       leaking down by itself will cause the control valve on that       car to move to the release position. The control valve       should remain in the service position, even if the cylinder       pressure has leaked away. Why could this be important?       Because (if I remember my air brake correctly) when an ABDW       control valve moves to the release position, it uses a       portion of the air stored in the emergency area of the car       reservoir to "propogate" the release to other cars "down the       line" (this is called the "accelerated release feature").       But that only happens when an increase in brake pipe       pressure causes the control valve to move from application       to release.              So, what does this all mean?              1. The loss of brake pipe pressure would not release the       brake application on the train       and       2. Individual "leak offs" of cars in the train would not       cause a release of the brake application, either.              What -might have- caused that release?              The brake pipe pressure would have to INCREASE.       The only way that this will happen is if the automatic brake       valve on the engine is placed back into the release position.              There were several individual freight car brakes applied.       (know that)       There may have been locomotive hand brakes applied. (don't       know that)       And there were certainly air brakes applied on the locomotives.              So how did events transpire?       My theory:              Engineman stopped train with air, perhaps increased       application to full service.       Engineman left locomotive independent brake applied.       Engineman applied car brakes, probably applied locomotive       hand brakes as well.       Engineman leaves train believing it to be secure.              Engine catches fire.       At this point I'm not sure who arrived on the scene first.       Might have been fire personnel, perhaps the other RR       employees (not T&E).              Normally, a locomotive main reservoir is charged to 125-140lbs.       Depending on the particular engine, locomotive brake       cylinder pressure is either 45lbs (two brake shoes per       wheel) or [roughly] 72-78lbs (one brake shoe per wheel).       What this means is, even if the engine dies, there remains a       "residual amount" of air in the main reservoirs for a while,       which slowly begins to deplete. Kill the engine, and the       brakes will still "hold" for a while before MR pressure       drops below 80lbs and the engine brakes begin to weaken.              If the automatic brake handle had remained in the       application position, the train application would have       "held" and the train would not move, even with the loss of       engine brake cylinder pressure. Not in the time span involved.              BUT -- if the train brakes had been released -- even an       "unintentional" or accidental release -- the entire scenario       changes.              The combination of full brake cylinder pressure on the       locomotives + several car hand brakes probably were enough       to keep the train from moving (if I recall, the train was       stopped at a location where there may have been a slight       downgrade, increasing where the engines were standing).              But what if the engines are dead, and MR pressure begins       decreasing?              At some point, the loss of brake cylinder pressure on the       locomotive consist will produce a condition where there no       longer remains "enough brake" to hold the train, and it will       begin to move. We know what happened next.              But again, assuming that the engineman did what [I believe]       any other engineman would do (i.e., leave the train with a       solid air brake application applied), I can't see how the       train could move within the time frame of an hour, even with       the loss of locomotive brake cylinder pressure.... unless....       .... somehow, that automatic application got released (at       the brake valve).              Even with the engines dead, MR pressure would be present       (but declining) for a while. I believe with a full service       application (90lb brake pipe), it would take around 66-67lbs       in the brake pipe to cause the control valves to move to       release. Thus, even with the engines dead, it was still       possible to release the train brakes (for a short time, at       least). We're not talking "hours" here.              This isn't rocket science.       The locomotive event recorders record brake pipe pressure       and locomotive brake cylinder pressure.       I'm not sure if the event recorders on these engines       monitored the actual physical position of the brake valve. I       will guess not, that they only record air pressures on older       #26 equipment. But that would be enough.              Those reading the printouts (or perhaps a screen display) of       the event recorders would have checked these pressures first.       If they did, they probably knew right away "why the train       moved".              But -- again -- the data on those recorders probably reveals       "an event" that "doesn't support the narrative" -- that       "narrative" being that "it was the engineman's fault". I       believe SOMETHING ELSE occurred in the cab AFTER he departed       the scene that became the critical "key" to the disaster       (and not just the fact that the engine caught fire and was       shut down).              I believe the TSB investigators know what that event was,       but don't know how to handle it for public consumption. They       are keeping it "under wraps" for the moment, because to       reveal it might turn the entire scenario of the disaster       cross-lots.              Sorry for the long post.       But that's the way I see it, and that's the way I'm callin' it.              I could be wrong.       But this report should have been out months ago.       What's holding it up?              --- SoupGate/W32 v1.03        * Origin: LiveWire BBS -=*=- UseNet FTN Gateway (1:2320/1)    |
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