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|    Message 826 of 845    |
|    August Abolins to All    |
|    openpgp.js vulnerability    |
|    25 May 25 11:30:00    |
      MSGID: 2:221/1.58@fidonet 20c5124b       PID: OpenXP/5.0.64 (Win32)       CHRS: ASCII 1       TZUTC: -0400       Best to patch up!              There is a CVE-2025-47934 issued for the openpgp.js issue        mentioned a few days ago.              People using Mailvelop, Flowcrypt, Mymail-crypt, UDC,        Encrypt.to, PGP Anywhere, passbolt ..should be wary.              Protonmali seems to be using one of the openpgp.js packages out        there too, but I cannot confirm which one.              ""Proton Mail uses version 3.0 of OpenPGPjs. This version,        released in March 2018, includes improvements that enable full        interoperability with PGP and allows for better overall        functionality, as outlined by Proton." ..that's their        statement from 2018.              So.. does Protonmail use this one..       https://github.com/ProtonMail/gopenpgp ?              Or this one..       https://Github.com/openpgpjs/openpgpjs ..has 6.1.0.                     "In technical terms, the vulnerability arises because       OpenPGP.js fails to correctly associate the extracted message       data with its actual signature during verification. This       oversight allows attackers to manipulate the content of a       message while retaining a valid signature from a previous,       unrelated message.              "In order to spoof a message," the advisory explains, "the       attacker needs a single valid message signature (inline or       detached) as well as the plaintext data that was legitimately       signed. They can then construct an inline-signed or signed-and-       encrypted message containing any data of their choice, which       will appear as legitimately signed."              "This means a bad actor can reuse a valid signature to forge       new content that appears authentic to the recipient, bypassing       the trust model OpenPGP is built upon.              Mozilla's Response and Patches       In response to these vulnerabilities, Mozilla has issued       security patches for the following versions:              Mozilla Firefox 134       Mozilla Thunderbird 134       Firefox ESR 115.19 and 128.6       Thunderbird ESR 115.19 and 128.6              https://thecyberexpress.com/critical-vulnerabilities-in-mozilla-products/                     --- OpenXP 5.0.64        * Origin: What do you call an excavated pyramid? Unencrypted. (2:221/1.58)       SEEN-BY: 50/22 103/705 105/81 106/201 124/5016 128/187 153/757 7715       SEEN-BY: 154/10 30 110 203/0 218/700 221/1 6 226/30 227/114 229/110       SEEN-BY: 229/114 206 317 400 426 428 470 664 700 705 240/1120 5832       SEEN-BY: 266/512 280/464 5003 5006 291/111 292/854 8125 301/1 310/31       SEEN-BY: 320/219 322/757 341/66 234 342/200 396/45 423/81 120 460/58       SEEN-BY: 460/256 1124 467/888 633/280 712/848 770/1 902/26 5020/400       SEEN-BY: 5020/8912 5054/30 5075/35       PATH: 221/1 280/464 460/58 229/426           |
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