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|    Message 994 of 2,155    |
|    Khelair to S/370    |
|    Re: Rise of the Dark Nets    |
|    22 Aug 13 14:07:12    |
      S/> So any good tips on this subject? Are we safe from the NSA with SSH v2?       S/> SSL? General thoughts?               Well, here are my thoughts on the matter... I've been watching the crypto       scene, particular PKI, pretty closely since about 1994, when Zimmerman released       PGP 2.3a. Lately I've been in debate with a close friend, hell, he's pretty       much my best friend, as well as the fact that he was back in that day & age,       too, about the same matters. We differ in views on the whole matter a bit, but       I'll detail each side of our debate-- the guy has a few IQ points on me, AND       he's a software dev who is doing github projects regarding implementation of       strong crypto and darknet solutions on ARM (7?) processors right now.        Basically he's trying to create small, cheap solutions that make it easy for       anyone to expand the tor network at the same time that he's working on finding       a more effective dark- & mesh-net solution.        (see https://www.philzimmermann.com/EN/background/index.html )        In 1991, Philip Zimmerman began releasing PGP onto the internet, at this       time I believe it was primarily distributed on usenet. I think it was at the       time that he released 2.3a that the federal government (not sure which bureau,       almost certainly the FBI or NSA) decided to press charges on him for exporting       cryptographic software. At this point the claim was made (pretty sure it still       stands) that certain public key encryption algorithms were a 'munition', and       illegal for private ownership in the USA.        Not long after, the NSA patented the RSAREF algorithm for public key       encryption and declared it legal for public usage. As a result, my view ever       since has been that the NSA has a serious problem cracking the original 2.3a       algorithm; if the mathematical analysis of that algorithm is correct (and       mathematicians as well as software peeps concerned with privacy have been       pouring over it ever since), it is a real bitch to brute force. Of course,       this always leaves open the waterboarding avenue of attack in order to get you       to give up your passphrase. Due to the number of operations required to crack       this algorithm it is still highly unlikely that even a massive amount of       computing power can, within the space of many months to dozens of years,       depending on key size, brute force that ciphertext.        This is where my opinion is different than my friend's. His view of this       matter is that, after the protracted legal battle which was dropped in 1996       against Zimmerman, the NSA decided that sending up a flag about which       algorithms they can't crack was a bad idea, so they've been silent ever since.        He makes a good point that the amount of crypto, mathematics, and software       geeks that have been pouring over this software for over 20 years have never       turned up anything, including the 'back door' that I suggested might exist       within the patented RSAREF algorithm. For those who are seriously paranoid       like myself, there is an option that hides the fact that you're using the       old PGP 2.3a algorithm called pgp26ui, found as pgp26uis and pgp26uix as the       archive base names online. This version will allow you to use any algorithm up       to the ones that PGP 2.6 implemented, including the 2.3a one; you can specify       how you want the ascii armor file or binary ciphertext file specified as a       bogus version to fool anybody who takes a superficial look at the ciphertext.        Of course this probably doesn't stand up to detailed analysis.        For what it's worth, I'd feel [hypothetically] comfortable using this       algorithm to encrypt data for myself or someone else to decrypt later probably       for at least the next 10 years, barring implementation of any sort of quantum       computing device to crack public key cryptography. Also, for information on       how hard it is to break some other algorithms, take a look at distributed.net's       results on using distributed computing power to crack RC5 encryption, even at a       remarkably small relative keyspace ( http://tinyurl.com/mpn7ur2 ).        As far as SSL, I've read some articles lately that talk about what it truly       protects and what it does not. While it provides relative security compared to       plaintext, I wouldn't rely on it for much of anything.        SSH I'm a little bit more confident about, but not nearly as much as I used       to be. I'm pretty sure that with the smaller keyspaces that are so common in       these algorithms that they wouldn't handle any real amount of brute force       attempt, at least if implemented against a small subset of the streamed data,       as opposed to everything sent in a massive session. These last two opinions       are not really justified by a large amount of armchair research, not compared       to the opinions I have on PGP's algorithm.        I do believe that Blowfish and Twofish, when implemented in the streams of       some of these other protocols, may be used to increase probable security. I've       heard very good things about them from people that know a hell of a lot more       about compsci than I do.        Um... Trying to think about what else I might be able to offer in the way       of opinions... I guess I haven't researched many transparent disk image file       encryption protocols like LUKS or the one that OpenBSD uses very much, although       I rely on them. :P I'll have to make a point to be doing that soon here, I       guess. I did study up a bit on OS/X's Tiger and Jaguar versions about their       disk & sparseimage encryption when I realized that I'd forgotten a passphrase       for a whole trove of data that I'd had to keep encrypted from the military.        Still haven't found a decent way into that, and I haven't stumbled across       anybody else that's gotten into that kind of stuff very easily, either. :|        Pretty sure the idea I had to try it was going to rely on brute forcing the       password, which, with the insane passphrases that I use, would've taken years       at least.        So anyway, that's what I've got for now. :) Hope it's helpful.              -The opinions expressed are not necessarily an advocation of any of the       aforementioned ideologies, concepts, or actions. We still have the freedom of       speech, for now, and I enjoy using it in a satirical or ficticious manner to       amuse myself-              "In times of universal deceit, telling the truth will be a       revolutionary act." -- George Orwell                     ---        þ Synchronet þ Tinfoil Tetrahedron : telnet bismaninfo.hopto.org 8023 :       http:8080        * Origin: Time Warp of the Future BBS - Home of League 10 (1:340/400)    |
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