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   PID: hpt/lnx 1.9.0-cur 2019-01-08   
   TID: hpt/lnx 1.9.0-cur 2019-01-08   
    What math can teach us about standing up to bullies    
    Game theory study shows that being uncooperative gives weaker parties the   
   upper hand    
      
     Date:   
         June 27, 2023   
     Source:   
         Dartmouth College   
     Summary:   
         New research from Dartmouth takes a fresh look at game theory   
         to show that being uncooperative can help people on the weaker   
         side of a power dynamic achieve a more equal outcome -- and even   
         inflict some loss on their abusive counterpart. The findings   
         can be applied to help equalize the balance of power in labor   
         negotiations, international relations and everyday interactions,   
         as well as integrate cooperation into interconnected AI systems   
         such as driverless cars.   
      
      
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   FULL STORY   
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   In a time of income inequality and ruthless politics, people with   
   outsized power or an unrelenting willingness to browbeat others often   
   seem to come out ahead.   
      
   New research from Dartmouth, however, shows that being uncooperative   
   can help people on the weaker side of the power dynamic achieve a more   
   equal outcome - - and even inflict some loss on their abusive counterpart.   
      
   The findings provide a tool based in game theory -- the field of   
   mathematics focused on optimizing competitive strategies -- that could be   
   applied to help equalize the balance of power in labor negotiations or   
   international relations and could even be used to integrate cooperation   
   into interconnected artificial intelligence systems such as driverless   
   cars.   
      
   Published in the latest issue of the journalPNAS Nexus,the study takes   
   a fresh look at what are known in game theory as "zero-determinant   
   strategies" developed by renowned scientists William Press, now at   
   the University of Texas at Austin, and the late Freeman Dyson at the   
   Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey.   
      
   Zero-determinant strategies dictate that "extortionists" control   
   situations to their advantage by becoming less and less cooperative --   
   though just cooperative enough to keep the other party engaged -- and by   
   never being the first to concede when there's a stalemate. Theoretically,   
   they will always outperform their opponent by demanding and receiving   
   a larger share of what's at stake.   
      
   But the Dartmouth paper uses mathematical models of interactions to   
   uncover an "Achilles heel" to these seemingly uncrackable scenarios,   
   said senior author Feng Fu, an associate professor of mathematics. Fu   
   and first author Xingru Chen, who received her Ph.D. in mathematics from   
   Dartmouth in 2021, discovered an "unbending strategy" in which resistance   
   to being steamrolled not only causes an extortionist to ultimately lose   
   more than their opponent but can result in a more equal outcome as the   
   overbearing party compromises in a scramble to get the best payoff.   
      
   "Unbending players who choose not to be extorted can resist by refusing   
   to fully cooperate. They also give up part of their own payoff, but   
   the extortioner loses even more," said Chen, who is now an assistant   
   professor at the Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications.   
      
   "Our work shows that when an extortioner is faced with an unbending   
   player, their best response is to offer a fair split, thereby guaranteeing   
   an equal payoff for both parties," she said. "In other words, fairness   
   and cooperation can be cultivated and enforced by unbending players."   
   These scenarios frequently play out in the real world, Fu said. Labor   
   relations provide a poignant model. A large corporation can strong-arm   
   suppliers and producers such as farmworkers to accept lower prices   
   for their effort by threatening to replace them and cut them off from   
   a lucrative market. But a strike or protest can turn the balance of   
   power back toward the workers' favor and result in more fairness and   
   cooperation, such as when a labor union wins some concessions from   
   an employer.   
      
   While the power dynamic in these scenarios is never equal, Fu said,   
   his and Chen's work shows that unbending players can reap benefits by   
   defecting from time to time and sabotaging what extortioners are truly   
   after -- the highest payoff for themselves.   
      
   "The practical insight from our work is for weaker parties to be unbending   
   and resist being the first to compromise, thereby transforming the   
   interaction into an ultimatum game in which extortioners are incentivized   
   to be fairer and more cooperative to avoid 'lose-lose' situations,"   
   Fu said.   
      
   "Consider the dynamics of power between dominant entities such as   
   Donald Trump and the lack of unbending from the Republican Party, or,   
   on the other hand, the military and political resistance to Russia's   
   invasion of Ukraine that has helped counteract incredible asymmetry," he   
   said. "These results can be applied to real-world situations, from social   
   equity and fair pay to developing systems that promote cooperation among   
   AI agents, such as autonomous driving."  Chen and Fu's paper expands   
   the theoretical understanding of zero-determinant interactions while   
   also outlining how the outsized power of extortioners can be checked,   
   said mathematician Christian Hilbe, leader of the Dynamics of Social   
   Behavior research group at the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary   
   Biology in Germany "Among the technical contributions, they stress   
   that even extortioners can be outperformed in some games. I don't think   
   that has been fully appreciated by the community before," said Hilbe,   
   who was not involved in the study but is familiar with it. "Among the   
   conceptual insights, I like the idea of unbending strategies, behaviors   
   that encourage an extortionate player to eventually settle at a fairer   
   outcome."  Behavioral research involving human participants has shown   
   that extortioners may constitute a significant portion of our everyday   
   interactions, said Hilbe, who published a 2016 paper in the journal   
   PLOS ONE reporting just that. He also co-authored a 2014 study in Nature   
   Communications that found people playing against a computerized opponent   
   strongly resisted when the computer engaged in threatening conduct,   
   even when it reduced their own payout.   
      
   "The empirical evidence to date suggests that people do engage in these   
   extortionate behaviors, especially in asymmetric situations, and that   
   the extorted party often tries to resist it, which is then costly to   
   both parties," Hilbe said.   
      
       * RELATED_TOPICS   
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       * RELATED_TERMS   
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   ==========================================================================   
   Story Source: Materials provided by Dartmouth_College. Original written   
   by Morgan Kelly.   
      
   Note: Content may be edited for style and length.   
      
      
   ==========================================================================   
   Journal Reference:   
      1. Xingru Chen, Feng Fu. Outlearning extortioners: unbending   
      strategies can   
         foster reciprocal fairness and cooperation. PNAS Nexus, 2023; 2   
         (6) DOI: 10.1093/pnasnexus/pgad176   
   ==========================================================================   
      
   Link to news story:   
   https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2023/06/230627123108.htm   
      
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