Recently located, or relocated, this. It's from the Center for   
    American Progress. Jan 28, 2004.   
      
    ...   
      
    *A chronology of how the Bush Administration repeatedly and   
    deliberately refused to listen to intelligence agencies that   
    said its case for war was weak   
      
      
    Former weapons inspector David Kay now says Iraq probably did   
    not have WMD before the war, a major blow to the Bush   
    Administration which used the WMD argument as the rationale for   
    war. Unfortunately, Kay and the Administration are now   
    attempting to shift the blame for misleading America onto the   
    intelligence community. But a review of the facts shows the   
    intelligence community repeatedly warned the Bush Administration   
    about the weakness of its case, but was circumvented,   
    overruled, and ignored. The following is year-by-year timeline   
    of those warnings.   
      
    In 2001 and before, intelligence agencies noted that Saddam   
    Hussein was effectively contained after the Gulf War. In fact,   
    former weapons   
      
    ...   
      
    *_OCTOBER 8, 1997 – IAEA SAYS IRAQ FREE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS:_*   
    "As reported in detail in the progress report dated 8 October   
    1997�?and based on all credible information available to date,   
    the IAEA's verification activities in Iraq, have resulted in the   
    evolution of a technically coherent picture of Iraq's   
    clandestine nuclear programme. These verification activities   
    have revealed no indications that Iraq had achieved its   
    programme objective of producing nuclear weapons or that Iraq   
    had produced more than a few grams of weapon-usable nuclear   
      
    ...   
      
    *_FEBRUARY 23 & 24, 2001 – COLIN POWELL SAYS IRAQ IS   
    CONTAINED:_* "I think we ought to declare [the containment   
    policy] a success. We have   
    ...   
    *_SEPTEMBER 16, 2001 – CHENEY ACKNOWLEDGES IRAQ IS   
    CONTAINED:_* Vice President Dick Cheney said that "Saddam   
    Hussein is bottled up" – a   
      
    ...   
      
    *_SEPTEMBER 2001 – WHITE HOUSE CREATES OFFICE TO CIRCUMVENT   
    INTEL AGENCIES:_* The Pentagon creates the Office of Special   
    Plans "in order to find evidence of what Wolfowitz and his boss,   
    Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, believed to be true-that   
    Saddam Hussein had close ties to Al Qaeda, and that Iraq had an   
    enormous arsenal of chemical, biological, and possibly even   
    nuclear weapons that threatened the region   
    ...   
    Throughout 2002, the CIA, DIA, Department of Energy and United   
    Nations all warned the Bush Administration that its selective   
    use of intelligence was painting a weak WMD case. Those warnings   
    were repeatedly ignored.   
      
    *_JANUARY, 2002 – TENET DOES NOT MENTION IRAQ IN NUCLEAR   
    THREAT REPORT:_* "In CIA Director George Tenet's January 2002   
    review of global weapons-technology proliferation, he did not   
    even mention a nuclear threat from Iraq, though he did warn of   
    ...   
      
    *__FEBRUARY 6, 2002 – CIA SAYS IRAQ HAS NOT PROVIDED WMD TO   
    TERRORISTS:__* "The Central Intelligence Agency has no evidence   
    that Iraq has engaged in terrorist operations against the   
    United States in nearly a decade, and the agency is also   
    convinced that President Saddam Hussein has not provided   
    chemical or biological weapons to Al Qaeda or related terrorist   
    groups, according to several American intelligence   
      
    ...   
      
    *_APRIL 15, 2002 – WOLFOWITZ ANGERED AT CIA FOR NOT   
    UNDERMINING U.N. REPORT:_* After receiving a CIA report that   
    concluded that Hans Blix had conducted inspections of Iraq's   
    declared nuclear power plants "fully within the parameters he   
    could operate" when Blix was head of the international agency   
    responsible for these inspections prior to the Gulf War, a   
    report indicated that "Wolfowitz ‘hit the ceiling’ because   
    the CIA failed to provide sufficient ammunition to undermine   
    Blix and, by   
      
    ...   
      
    *_SUMMER, 2002 – CIA WARNINGS TO WHITE HOUSE EXPOSED:_* "In   
    the late summer of 2002, Sen. Graham had requested from Tenet   
    an analysis of the Iraqi threat. According to knowledgeable   
    sources, he received a 25-page classified response reflecting   
    the balanced view that had prevailed earlier among the   
    intelligence agencies--noting, for example, that evidence of an   
    Iraqi nuclear program or a link to Al Qaeda was inconclusive.   
      
    ...   
      
    *_SEPTEMBER, 2002 – DIA TELLS WHITE HOUSE NO EVIDENCE OF   
    CHEMICAL WEAPONS:_* "An unclassified excerpt of a 2002 Defense   
    Intelligence Agency study on Iraq's chemical warfare program in   
    which it stated that there is ‘no reliable information on   
    whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical weapons, or   
      
    ...   
      
    *_SEPTEMBER 20, 2002 – DEPT. OF ENERGY TELLS WHITE HOUSE OF   
    NUKE DOUBTS:_* "Doubts about the quality of some of the   
    evidence that the United States is using to make its case that   
    *Iraq* is trying to build a nuclear bomb emerged Thursday. While   
    National Security Adviser Condi Rice stated on 9/8 that imported   
    aluminum tubes ‘are only really suited for nuclear weapons   
    programs, centrifuge programs’ a growing number of experts say   
    that the administration has not presented convincing evidence   
    that the tubes were intended for use in uranium enrichment   
    rather than for artillery rocket tubes or other uses. Former   
      
    ...   
      
    *_OCTOBER 2002 – CIA DIRECTLY WARNS WHITE HOUSE_*: "The CIA   
    sent two memos to the White House in October voicing strong   
    doubts about a claim President Bush made three months later in   
    the State of the Union address that Iraq was trying to buy   
    nuclear materials in Africa."   
      
    ...   
      
    *_OCTOBER 2002 — STATE DEPT. WARNS WHITE HOUSE ON NUKE   
    CHARGES_*: The State Department’s Intelligence and Research   
    Department dissented from the conclusion in the National   
    Intelligence Estimate on Iraq’s WMD capabilities that Iraq was   
    reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.   
      
    ...   
      
    *_OCTOBER 2002 – AIR FORCE WARNS WHITE HOUSE: "_*The   
    government organization most knowledgeable about the United   
    States' UAV program -- the Air Force's National Air and Space   
    Intelligence Center -- had sharply disputed the notion that   
    Iraq's UAVs were being designed as attack weapons" – a WMD   
    claim President Bush used in his October 7   
      
    ...   
      
    Instead of listening to the repeated warnings from the   
    intelligence community, intelligence officials say the White   
    House instead pressured them to conform their reports to fit a   
    pre-determined policy. Meanwhile, more evidence from   
    international institutions poured in that the White House’s   
    claims were not well-grounded.   
      
    *_LATE 2002-EARLY 2003 – CHENEY PRESSURES CIA TO CHANGE   
    INTELLIGENCE:_* "Vice President Dick Cheney's repeated trips to   
    CIA headquarters in the run-up to the war for unusual,   
    face-to-face sessions with intelligence analysts poring over   
    Iraqi data. The pressure on the intelligence community to   
    document the administration's claims that the Iraqi regime had   
    ties to al-Qaida and was pursuing a nuclear weapons capacity was   
    ‘unremitting,’ said former CIA counterterrorism chief Vince   
    Cannistraro,   
      
    ...   
      
    *_JANUARY, 2003 – STATE DEPT. INTEL BUREAU REITERATE WARNING   
    TO POWELL:_* "The Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR),   
    the State Department's in-house analysis unit, and nuclear   
    experts at the Department of Energy are understood to have   
    explicitly warned Secretary of State Colin Powell during the   
    preparation of his speech that the evidence was questionable.   
    The Bureau reiterated to Mr. Powell during the preparation of   
    his February speech that its analysts were not persuaded that   
    the aluminum tubes the Administration was citing could be used   
    in centrifuges to enrich uranium." [Source: Financial Times,   
    7/30/03]   
      
    *_FEBRUARY 14, 2003 – UN WARNS WHITE HOUSE THAT NO WMD HAVE   
    BEEN FOUND:_* "In their third progress report since U.N.   
    Security Council Resolution 1441 was passed in November,   
    inspectors told the council they had not found any weapons of   
    mass destruction." Weapons inspector Hans   
      
    ...   
      
    *_FEBRUARY 15, 2003 – IAEA WARNS WHITE HOUSE NO NUCLEAR   
    EVIDENCE:_* The head of the IAEA told the U.N. in February that   
    "We have to date found no evidence of ongoing prohibited nuclear   
    or nuclear-related activities in Iraq." The IAEA examined "2,000   
    pages of documents seized Jan. 16   
      
    ...   
      
    *_FEBURARY 24, 2003 – CIA WARNS WHITE HOUSE ‘NO DIRECT   
    EVIDENCE’ OF WMD:_* "A CIA report on proliferation released   
    this week says the intelligence community has no ‘direct   
    evidence’ that Iraq has succeeded in reconstituting its   
    biological, chemical, nuclear or long-range missile programs in   
    the two years since U.N. weapons inspectors left and   
      
    ...   
      
    *_MARCH 7, 2003 – IAEA REITERATES TO WHITE HOUSE NO EVIDENCE   
    OF NUKES:_* IAEA Director Mohamed ElBaradei said nuclear experts   
    have found "no indication" that Iraq has tried to import   
    high-strength aluminum tubes or specialized ring magnets for   
    centrifuge enrichment of uranium. For months, American officials   
    had "cited Iraq's importation of these tubes as evidence that   
    Mr. Hussein's scientists have been seeking to develop a nuclear   
    capability." ElBaradei also noted said "the IAEA has concluded,   
    with the concurrence of outside experts, that documents which   
    formed the basis for the [President Bush’s assertion] of   
    recent uranium transactions between Iraq and Niger are in fact   
    not authentic." When   
      
    ...   
      
    *_MAY 30, 2003 – INTEL PROFESSIONALS ADMIT THEY WERE   
    PRESSURED:_* "A growing number of U.S. national security   
    professionals are accusing the Bush administration of slanting   
    the facts and hijacking the $30 billion intelligence apparatus   
    to justify its rush to war in Iraq . A key target is a   
    four-person Pentagon team that reviewed material gathered by   
    other intelligence outfits for any missed bits that might have   
    tied Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to banned weapons or   
    terrorist groups. This team, self-mockingly called the Cabal,   
    'cherry-picked the intelligence stream' in a bid to portray Iraq   
    as an imminent threat, said Patrick Lang, a official at the   
    Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The DIA was   
      
    ...   
      
    *_JUNE 6, 2003 – INTELLIGENCE HISTORIAN SAYS INTEL WAS   
    HYPED:_* "The CIA bowed to Bush administration pressure to hype   
    the threat of Saddam Hussein's weapons programs ahead of the   
    U.S.-led war in Iraq , a leading   
      
    ...   
      
      
   BOB KLAHN bob.klahn@sev.org   http://home.toltbbs.com/bobklahn   
      
   ... Inadequate levels of confusion detected, Please obfuscate further...   
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