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|    Message 2,019 of 2,445    |
|    Mike Powell to All    |
|    Iranian hackers target Is    |
|    04 Dec 25 10:25:14    |
      TZUTC: -0500       MSGID: 1776.consprcy@1:2320/105 2d96e4ca       PID: Synchronet 3.21a-Linux master/123f2d28a Jul 12 2025 GCC 12.2.0       TID: SBBSecho 3.28-Linux master/123f2d28a Jul 12 2025 GCC 12.2.0       BBSID: CAPCITY2       CHRS: ASCII 1       FORMAT: flowed       Iranian hacker group deploys malicious Snake game to target Egyptian and       Israeli critical infrastructure              Date:       Wed, 03 Dec 2025 16:44:00 +0000              Description:       MuddyWater has deployed more sophisticated techniques and malware in a string       of attacks targeting Israel and Egypt.              FULL STORY              An Iranian-aligned hacking group tracked as 'MuddyWater' has dramatically       shifted tactics in attacks against Israeli and Egyptian critical       infrastructure.                Previous campaigns by the group, observed by ESET Research, were       characteristically noisy in their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs)       making them easily detectable.               However, the group has begun employing a new backdoor deployed via the Fooder       loader, which often disguises itself as the classic Snake game.              MuddyVipers, snakes, and ladders              The attacks have typically targeted Israeli telecommunications, governmental,       and oil and energy sectors. In this campaign, MuddyWater began by        distributing spearphishing emails with PDF attachments linking to free remote       monitoring and management (RMM) software, with the install files hosted on       OneHub, Egnyte, Mega, and other free file hosting services.               Rather than installing legitimate RMM software, the files instead install       loaders through which attackers can deploy backdoors. In the attacks observed       by ESET, a newly identified loader known as Fooder deploys the MuddyViper       backdoor.               Fooder has a unique characteristic - it often masquerades as the Snake game.       This technique is more than just a disguise, as the core logic of Snake       provides the loader with a custom delay function, allowing it to hide its        true function from analysis.               The MuddyViper backdoor is also previously unobserved. Written in the C/C++       programming language, MuddyViper is capable of collecting system information,       downloading and uploading files, executing files and shell commands, and       stealing Windows credentials and browser data by displaying a fake Windows       Security dialog.              The MuddyWater campaign targeted 17 organizations in Israel across a range of       sectors including engineering, local government, manufacturing, technology,       transportation, utilities, and universities. The group also targeted an       Egyptian organization in the tech sector.               For greater insight into the MuddyWater campaign, as well as indicators of       compromise, take a look at ESETs ' MuddyWater: Snakes by the riverbank '       research (in the article link below).              ======================================================================       Link to news story:       https://www.techradar.com/pro/security/iranian-hacker-group-deploys-malicious-       snake-game-to-target-egyptian-and-israeli-critical-infrastructure              $$       --- SBBSecho 3.28-Linux        * Origin: capitolcityonline.net * Telnet/SSH:2022/HTTP (1:2320/105)       SEEN-BY: 105/81 106/201 128/187 129/14 305 153/7715 154/110 218/700       SEEN-BY: 226/30 227/114 229/110 134 206 300 307 317 400 426 428 470       SEEN-BY: 229/664 700 705 266/512 291/111 320/219 322/757 342/200 396/45       SEEN-BY: 460/58 633/280 712/848 902/26 2320/0 105 304 3634/12 5075/35       PATH: 2320/105 229/426           |
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