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   The UK is bringing in digital IDs. Heres how to stop them becoming   
   surveillance tools   
      
   Date:   
   Mon, 17 Nov 2025 15:11:24 +0000   
      
   Description:   
   Without clear legal and technical safeguards, digital IDs risk shifting from   
   convenience to control.   
      
   FULL STORY   
      
   Everyday life already depends on proving who we are, from applying to jobs,   
   renting homes, accessing financial services or travelling abroad.    
      
   An improvement to this system is a welcome change when done correctly, making   
   everyday interactions smoother for people and businesses alike.    
      
   That is the promise of Digital identity , but its success will depend on   
   whether it will deliver those benefits of convenience without creating new   
   risks of data misuse or surveillance in a way to install control across both   
   online and offline.    
      
   The UKs newly proposed BritCard risks repeating old mistakes, scrapped in    
   2006 for being intrusive, ineffective and enormously expensive.    
      
   Putting everyones ID data in one interconnected place creates a single,   
   attractive target with greatly increased exposure unlike physical IDs which    
   is harder to access at scale.    
      
   You also make it easier for the system to be repurposed. Data gathered for    
   one reason is often pressed into service for another reason- a tool built for   
   convenience can become an instrument of control without the correct systems    
   in place.   
      
   An efficiency boosting ID or all-purpose surveillance?    
      
   Digital identification is already required in everyday life. KYC for banking,   
   credit checks, passports for travel, visas, and National Insurance numbers.   
   What BritCard proposes is different.    
      
   By merging these functions into a single digital ID, the government could    
   link systems that operate in isolation and promise greater convenience and   
   efficiency. However, whether it is the goal or not, can also feature   
   full-spectrum tracking of peoples movements and interactions both online and   
   offline.    
      
   Recent public reaction shows how contentious this is.    
      
   Almost three million people have already signed a petition demanding the   
   government scrap the plan, warning its implementation is a step towards   
   excessive monitoring and digital control or building a switchlever to   
   Orwellian surveillance that could be misused in ways similar to Chinas social   
   credit infrastructure .    
      
   That concern is not unfounded even if not the intention. Privacy researchers   
   note that some Digital ID architectures include phone home features:   
   background functions that report when or where ID credentials are used.    
      
   Even when intended for security or interoperability, this capability risks   
   turning verification into quiet tracking if left unchecked.    
      
   Without clear safeguards, the ability to restrict access to movement and   
   payments, or linking behavior across services could be knowingly or   
   unknowingly built into its architecture.   
      
   Lessons from digital ID around the world   
      
   Digital ID can deliver real benefits when built with the right safeguards,    
   the challenge is ensuring they enhance trust rather than centralize control.   
   Centralized databases must be limited to the minimum necessary information.    
      
   The law must set clear limits on who can use the data and why. Without tight   
   legal and technical safeguards, centralized systems are both surveillance   
   tools and hacker magnets.    
      
   Estonia, often held up as a model, suffered a breach in 2021 that exposed   
   almost one million peoples identity records, including voting, banking and   
   medical records that forced a lockdown on all online services.    
      
   Even advanced systems fail if the architecture concentrates risk. Despite its   
   breach, it has still built seamless e-governance and secure digital    
   signatures because of this technology, its digital ID has enabled citizens to   
   file taxes in minutes, sign contracts remotely, and access nearly all public   
   services online.    
      
   Switzerland, after being rejected in 2021, only secured public support for    
   its national digital ID recently by introducing stronger safeguards and   
   clearer governance. The new voluntary system is issued by the federal   
   government and stores data on users devices rather than in a central    
   database.    
      
   It uses selective disclosure to share only what is necessary, relying on   
   open-source code that can be publicly audited, and includes a national trust   
   registry to keep issuers accountable. These safeguards put citizens at the   
   center that turned a rejected system into one the public placed its    
   confidence in by vote.   
      
   The architecture that decides between convenience and control   
      
   So how do we stop them becoming surveillance tools? The starting point is a   
   privacy-first architecture based on signed, verifiable data. In practical   
   terms this means credentials that are issued by trusted authorities, held by   
   individuals, and presented selectively.    
      
   Instead of sharing entire identification documents each time, digital ID   
   systems can verify specific information through digitally signed   
   confirmations. For example, a person could confirm they meet certain criteria   
   such as being over 18 or having the right to work without revealing every   
   detail on their ID.    
      
   The verification happens securely between trusted parties, and the underlying   
   data remains protected. The person stays in control of when and where their   
   information is used, and the verifier receives only what is relevant to that   
   interaction.    
      
   For example, a venue checks that you are over 18 without learning your full   
   date of birth, and an employer verifies your right to work without storing a   
   copy of your passport in their database.    
      
   This approach, known as self-sovereign identity (SSI), allows people and   
   institutions to prove facts about themselves without exposing the data behind   
   them. It creates systems that are secure, comparable across borders, and   
   privacy-preserving.    
      
   For governments, SSI could underpin a digital ID framework that strengthens   
   trust and efficiency without enabling mass surveillance, just like   
   Switzerland.    
      
   Digital ID is inevitable. Whether it becomes the backbone of a trusted    
   digital economy or the framework for total surveillance depends on what we   
   build now.    
      
   If the UK chooses a privacy -first model, it can maximize efficiencies,   
   delivering speed and security without surrendering control. If it doesnt, we   
   risk hard-coding a switchlever to Orwellian surveillance into everyday life,   
   efficient, permanent, and impossible to unwind once turned on.    
      
    This article was produced as part of TechRadarPro's Expert Insights channel   
   where we feature the best and brightest minds in the technology industry   
   today. The views expressed here are those of the author and are not   
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   Link to news story:   
   https://www.techradar.com/pro/the-uk-is-bringing-in-digital-ids-heres-how-to-s   
   top-them-becoming-surveillance-tools   
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