TZUTC: -0500   
   MSGID: 1703.consprcy@1:2320/105 2d7b1fcc   
   PID: Synchronet 3.21a-Linux master/123f2d28a Jul 12 2025 GCC 12.2.0   
   TID: SBBSecho 3.28-Linux master/123f2d28a Jul 12 2025 GCC 12.2.0   
   BBSID: CAPCITY2   
   CHRS: ASCII 1   
   FORMAT: flowed   
   "This is a political deception"  New Chat Control convinces lawmakers, but    
   not privacy experts yet   
      
   Date:   
   Wed, 12 Nov 2025 15:53:00 +0000   
      
   Description:   
   The EU Council seems to agree to the new CSAM scanning compromise "without   
   further changes." Here's all we know.   
      
   FULL STORY   
      
   It's official, a revised version of the CSAM scanning proposal is back on the   
   EU lawmakers' table  and is keeping privacy experts worried.    
      
   The Law Enforcement Working Party met again this morning (November 12) in the   
   EU Council to discuss what's been deemed by critics the Chat Control bill.    
      
   This follows a meeting the group held on November 5, and comes as the Denmark   
   Presidency put forward a new compromise after withdrawing mandatory chat   
   scanning.    
      
   As reported by Netzpolitik , the latest Child Sexual Abuse Regulation (CSAR)   
   proposal was received with broad support during the November 5 meeting,   
   "without any dissenting votes" nor further changes needed.    
      
   The new text , which removes all provisions on detection obligations included   
   in the bill and makes CSAM scanning voluntary, seems to be the winning path    
   to finally find an agreement after over three years of trying.    
      
   Privacy experts and technologists aren't quite on board, though, with   
   long-standing Chat Control critic and digital rights jurist, Patrick Breyer,   
   deeming the proposal "a political deception of the highest order."   
      
   Chat Control -- what's changing and what are the risk   
      
   As per the latest version of the text , messaging service providers won't be   
   forced to scan all URLs, pictures, and videos shared by users, but rather   
   choose to perform voluntary CSAM scanning.    
      
   There's a catch, though. Article 4 will include a possible "mitigation   
   measure" that could be applied to high-risk services to require them to take   
   "all appropriate risk mitigation measures."    
      
   According to Breyer, such a loophole could make the removal of detection   
   obligations "worthless" by negating their voluntary nature. He said: "Even   
   client-side scanning (CSS) on our smartphones could soon become mandatory     
   the end of secure encryption ."    
      
   Breaking encryption, the tech that security software like the best VPNs ,   
   Signal, and WhatsApp use to secure our private communications, has been the   
   strongest argument against the proposal so far.   
      
   Breyer also warns that the new compromise goes further than the discarded   
   proposal, passing from AI-powered monitoring targeting shared multimedia to   
   the scanning of private chat texts and metadata, too.    
      
   "The public is being played for fools," warns Breyer. "Following loud public   
   protests, several member states, including Germany, the Netherlands, Poland,   
   and Austria, said No to indiscriminate Chat Control. Now its coming back   
   through the back door."    
      
   Breyer is far from being the only one expressing concerns. German-based   
   encrypted email provider, Tuta , is also raising the alarm.    
      
   "Hummelgaard doesn't understand that no means no," the provider writes on X.    
      
   To understand the next steps, we now need to wait and see what the outcomes   
   from today's meeting look like.    
      
   ======================================================================   
   Link to news story:   
   https://www.techradar.com/vpn/vpn-privacy-security/this-is-a-political-decepti   
   on-new-chat-control-convinces-lawmakers-but-not-privacy-experts-yet   
      
   $$   
   --- SBBSecho 3.28-Linux   
    * Origin: capitolcityonline.net * Telnet/SSH:2022/HTTP (1:2320/105)   
   SEEN-BY: 105/81 106/201 128/187 129/14 305 153/7715 154/110 218/700   
   SEEN-BY: 226/30 227/114 229/110 206 300 307 317 400 426 428 470 664   
   SEEN-BY: 229/700 705 266/512 291/111 320/219 322/757 342/200 396/45   
   SEEN-BY: 460/58 633/280 712/848 902/26 2320/0 105 304 3634/12 5075/35   
   PATH: 2320/105 229/426