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|    CONSPRCY    |    How big is your tinfoil hat?    |    2,445 messages    |
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|    Message 1,901 of 2,445    |
|    Mike Powell to All    |
|    Claude can be tricked int    |
|    01 Nov 25 09:46:22    |
      TZUTC: -0500       MSGID: 1658.consprcy@1:2320/105 2d6b59b8       PID: Synchronet 3.21a-Linux master/123f2d28a Jul 12 2025 GCC 12.2.0       TID: SBBSecho 3.28-Linux master/123f2d28a Jul 12 2025 GCC 12.2.0       BBSID: CAPCITY2       CHRS: ASCII 1       FORMAT: flowed       Claude can be tricked into sending your private company data to hackers - all       it takes is some kind words              Date:       Fri, 31 Oct 2025 18:28:00 +0000              Description:       An attacker can manipulate Claude via prompt injection to exfiltrate user data              FULL STORY              Claude one of the more popular AI tools out there, carries a vulnerability       which allows threat actors to exfiltrate private user data, experts have       warned.               Cybersecurity researcher Johann Rehberger, AKA Wunderwuzzi, who recently        wrote an in-depth report on his findings, finding at the heart of the problem       is Claudes Code Interpreter, a sandboxed environment that lets AI write and       run code (for example, to analyze data or generate files) directly within a       conversation.               Recently, Code Interpreter gained the ability to make network requests, which       allows it to connect to the internet and, for example, download software       packages.              Keeping an eye on Claude               By default, Anthropics Claude is supposed to access only safe domains like       GitHub or PyPI, but among the approved domains is api.anthropic.com (the same       API Claude itself uses), which opened the door for exploitation.               Wunderwuzzi showed he was able to trick Claude into reading private user        data, save that data inside the sandbox, and upload it to his Anthropic       account using his own API key, via Claudes Files API.               In other words, even though the network access seems restricted, the attacker       can manipulate the model via prompt injection to exfiltrate user data. The       exploit could transfer up to 30 MB per file, and multiple files could be       uploaded.               Wunderwuzzi disclosed his findings to Anthropic via HackerOne, and even        though the company initially classified it as a model safety issue, not a       security vulnerability, it later acknowledged that such exfiltration bugs are       in scope for reporting. At first, Anthropic said users should monitor Claude       while using the feature and stop it if you see it using or accessing data       unexpectedly.               A subsequent update said: Anthropic has confirmed that data exfiltration       vulnerabilities such as this one are in-scope for reporting, and this issue       should not have been closed as out-of-scope, he said in the report. There was       a process hiccup they will work on addressing.               His suggestion to Anthropic is to limit Claudes network communications to the       users own account only, and users should monitor Claudes activity closely or       disable network access if concerned.                Via The Register               ======================================================================       Link to news story:       https://www.techradar.com/pro/security/claude-can-be-tricked-into-sending-your       -private-company-data-to-hackers-all-it-takes-is-some-kind-words              $$       --- SBBSecho 3.28-Linux        * Origin: capitolcityonline.net * Telnet/SSH:2022/HTTP (1:2320/105)       SEEN-BY: 105/81 106/201 128/187 129/14 305 153/7715 154/110 218/700       SEEN-BY: 226/30 227/114 229/110 206 300 307 317 400 426 428 470 664       SEEN-BY: 229/700 705 266/512 291/111 320/219 322/757 342/200 396/45       SEEN-BY: 460/58 633/280 712/848 902/26 2320/0 105 304 3634/12 5075/35       PATH: 2320/105 229/426           |
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