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   CONSPRCY      How big is your tinfoil hat?      2,445 messages   

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   Message 1,872 of 2,445   
   Mike Powell to All   
   New subsea cable project   
   26 Oct 25 09:12:39   
   
   TZUTC: -0500   
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   FORMAT: flowed   
   The end of VPN in Eastern Europe? This massive new subsea cable project looks   
   to bypass Russia entirely - so is this a new age for Internet safety   
      
   Date:   
   Sat, 25 Oct 2025 15:36:00 +0000   
      
   Description:   
   Kardesa project seeks safer routes for global data, but true digital   
   independence remains tangled in geopolitics and regional instability.   
      
   FULL STORY   
   A new undersea cable project is set to link Bulgaria, Georgia, Turkey, and   
   Ukraine without passing through Russian waters.    
      
   The new Kardesa route, expected to begin construction in 2027, would    
   establish a new digital corridor between Europe and Asia, one that avoids the   
   political and physical vulnerabilities of existing systems.    
      
   Currently, the Submarine Cable Map shows only one cable crossing the Black    
   Sea between Georgia and Bulgaria, with others connecting nearby states but   
   still touching routes influenced by Moscow.   
      
   Security beneath the waves    
      
   The Kardesa line could therefore change regional internet routing by    
   providing a more direct and independent link, at a time when the security of   
   global data transfer remains uncertain.    
      
   Recent incidents in the Red Sea have revealed how fragile undersea networks   
   can be, after several cables were disrupted and global traffic slowed between   
   Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.    
      
   The idea behind Kardesa, and other projects such as Metas planned   
   50,000-kilometer global cable , is to ensure that when one path fails or is   
   sabotaged, another can maintain service.    
      
   Some call this route diversity, and it is quickly becoming a strategic   
   priority rather than a technical one.    
      
   Countries are now investing in systems that can detect or deter sabotage.   
   Germanys AP Sensing developed sonar-based monitoring tools to identify   
   interference.    
      
   For more security, NATO has started using drones to patrol maritime routes   
   that host vital infrastructure.    
      
   Even so, the claim that bypassing Russia automatically makes the internet   
   safer invites skepticism.    
      
   Routing changes might avoid one geopolitical hotspot but expose others.   
   Ukraine, through which part of the Kardesa cable will pass, remains a zone of   
   uncertainty.    
      
   The plan to run the cable only through internationally recognized safe areas   
   might limit risk but cannot remove it entirely.    
      
   Likewise, avoiding Russia does not protect against cyber intrusion or remote   
   interference with signal infrastructure.    
      
   As with digital privacy tools such as the best VPN or secure router ,    
   physical safeguards offer only part of a complex solution.    
      
   If this new connection succeeds, it could mark a shift in how Europe and its   
   partners view online independence.    
      
   Via Tom's Hardware    
      
   ======================================================================   
   Link to news story:   
   https://www.techradar.com/pro/the-end-of-vpn-in-eastern-europe-this-massive-ne   
   w-subsea-cable-project-looks-to-bypass-russia-entirely-so-is-this-a-new-age-fo   
   r-internet-safety   
      
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