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   "Its not about security, its about control"  How EU governments want to   
   encrypt their own comms, but break our private chats   
      
   Date: Sat, 25 Oct 2025 05:00:00 +0000   
      
   Description:   
   Attending the 2025 Matrix conference made me think of the dual vision on   
   encryption, dividing governments and citizens. I spoke to attendees to find   
   out what they make of it.   
      
   FULL STORY   
   Data sovereignty. Communication security. Strong encryption. These are the   
   words I heard the most in my day at the Matrix Conference in Strasbourg last   
   week.    
      
   An event organized by the creators of Matrix , an open-source protocol that   
   developers can use to build decentralized and secure messaging applications,   
   showcased multiple iterations of how organizations have used this federated   
   system.    
      
   It was especially interesting to see that, while there are some examples of   
   Matrix-based apps for everyday users, most of those harnessing the power of   
   this protocol are governments.    
      
   These include Germany , where Matrix has been used to encrypt the   
   communications of the government, armed forces, and healthcare system; and   
   France , where, starting from last September, all public officials are   
   required to use the Matrix-based Tchap app instead of Signal or WhatsApp.    
      
   Even more staggering, perhaps, was seeing representatives for the IT   
   department of the European Commission talking on stage about how they are   
   trialing Matrix to replace Signal and secure their own communications.    
      
   Yes, the European Commission, the same body that proposed to weaken people's   
   private chats with an encryption backdoor, with the infamous Child Sexual   
   Abuse Regulation (CSAR) bill known as Chat Control . And France is among the   
   12 countries supporting the proposal, according to the latest data .    
      
   All of this struck me  European governments clearly understand how crucial   
   encryption is to preserve privacy and security. Yet, these crucial factors    
   for their own communications seem to be something that citizens will have to   
   make peace with and lose in the name of the common good.    
      
   I couldn't help but think about this dual vision on encryption, and how   
   unbalanced it felt. But, what do the people working to secure government and   
   organizations' communications make of all of this? I was on a mission to find   
   out.   
      
   Encryption is under attack -- but only for citizens   
      
   End-to-end encryption (E2EE) is the technology that applications like the    
   best VPN and messaging services use to scramble data into an unreadable form   
   to prevent unauthorized access. A guarantee that our online communications   
   will stay private between us and who we are talking to.    
      
   In the wake of ever-larger and frequent cyberattacks  think of the Salt   
   Typhoon in the US  encryption has become crucial to shield everyone's   
   security, whether that's ID theft, scams, or national security risks. Even    
   the FBI urged all Americans to turn to encrypted chats .    
      
   Law enforcement, however, often sees this layer of protection as an obstacle   
   to their investigations, pushing for "lawful access" to encrypted data as a   
   way to combat hideous crimes like terrorism or child abuse.    
      
   That's exactly where legislation proposals like Chat Control and ProtectEU in   
   the European bloc, or the Online Safety Act in the UK, come from.    
      
   Yet, people working with encryption know that these solutions are flawed. Do   
   you know? (Image credit: Getty Images) In a last-minute development, the EU   
   Council postponed the vote on Chat Control that was set for October 14, 2025,   
   after Germany joined the opposition. Digital rights campaigners aren't ready   
   to celebrate yet, with the proposal expected to come back on the lawmakers'   
   table in December.    
      
   "It makes perfect sense that some folks are pushing to undermine encryption,   
   but it makes no sense at all that that would be a good thing for society,"    
   the Co-Founder of Matrix, Matthew Hodgson, told me.    
      
   As Hodgson (and many other experts I've been talking to) explained, thinking   
   of being able to create a backdoor into encryption that only authorities can   
   access is naive and technically impossible.    
      
   Once this entry point is there, everyone will be able to exploit it. Period.    
      
   Naivety might only be one side of the story, though. According to the CEO and   
   Co-Founder of Denmark-based Meedio , Runi Hammer, governments know well what   
   they are doing.    
      
   "This is the dual usage problem  when governments say everybody needs to do   
   something, they usually mean everybody else."    
      
   We're just attacking something that is not the root of the problem    
    - Julie Ripa, Product Manager of Tchap, DINUM   
      
   Runi Hammer hit the nail on the head, here. The Danish proposal of Chat   
   Control  the latest iteration of the bill  excludes all government and   
   military accounts for mandatory scanning of private and encrypted chats in    
   the lookout for child sexual abuse material (CSAM).    
      
   "They know we need encryption to have safe and secure communications. But why   
   can't I have a safe and secure conversation with my friends without having   
   Chat Control's scanning? I don't think that the cause justifies the means;   
   it's too intrusive," said Hammer.    
      
   On a more balanced view is Julie Ripa, the Product Manager of Tchap within    
   the French government agency for digital services (DINUM). She points out    
   that there is a stark difference in the need for secure and encrypted   
   communication between governments and citizens.    
      
   Yet, "We shouldn't break privacy for any reason. There will always be some   
   drug dealers, even though we control the data. I'm not sure that creating    
   back doors will solve any problem. We're just attacking something that is not   
   the root of the problem."   
      
   Beyond the encryption conundrum   
      
   On a technical level, experts all agree that an encryption backdoor cannot   
   guarantee the same level of online security and privacy we have now.    
      
   Is then time to redefine what we mean when we talk about privacy?    
      
   This is what's probably needed, according to Rocket.Chat 's Strategic    
   Advisor, Christian Calcagni. "We need to have a new definition of private   
   communication, and that's a big debate. Encryption or no encryption, what   
   could be the way?"    
      
   Calcagni is, nonetheless, very critical of the current push to break   
   encryption.    
      
   He told me: "Why should the government know what I think or what I'm sharing   
   on a personal level? We shouldn't focus only on encryption or not encryption,   
   but on what that means for our privacy, our intimacy."    
      
   The Founder and CEO of Rocket.Chat, Gabriel Engel, however, has no doubts. An   
   encryption backdoor isn't about security; it's about control.    
      
   He told me: "Governments want to know what's going on and be able to monitor   
   their citizens, while wanting the opposite for themselves. It's going to be a   
   never-ending battle for citizens to keep their privacy rights and to hold   
   their own data." If not an encryption backdoor, then what?    
      
   Virtually everyone I interacted with during the conference was outspoken    
   about their opposition to Chat Control-like proposals.    
      
   However, the issues motivating lawmakers' approach  terrorism, drug dealing,   
   child abuse  are undoubtedly serious crimes that need to be dealt with. So,    
   if not weakening encryption, what's the right fix?    
      
   According to Hodgson, who is also the Co-founder and CEO of the Matrix-based   
   Element , a solution could be developing a better infrastructure that, while   
   remaining privacy-preserving, could allow society to self-police.    
      
   He told me: "The thing we need to build is not mass surveillance. But we, the   
   people here at the Matrix conference, need to do a much better job of   
   providing the trust and safety tools needed to report and flag these crimes   
   when they happen on the platform. I wish Matrix were better funded to build   
   this alternative."   
      
   On my way out of the conference, I left with some unanswered questions, but   
   also a certainty  technology and politics are moving on two parallel lines,   
   struggling to find a meeting point.    
      
   On one side, the tech tells lawmakers that building a backdoor that can   
   preserve security and privacy is an impossible task. Yet, the political    
   agenda keeps pushing through with this ill-conceived idea against all odds.    
      
   The challenge now is finding a way to bridge this discrepancy between the   
   privacy and security we deserve with the data usability that law enforcement   
   requires.    
      
   We are still far from it, but it's a mission we need to pursue. After all, as   
   Hammer from Meedio told me: "This is about our right, our freedom, our right   
   to communicate freely with each other. Mass surveillance is not the way   
   forward for a world that becomes even more digitalized."   
   ======================================================================   
   Link to news story:   
   https://www.techradar.com/vpn/vpn-privacy-security/its-not-about-security-its-   
   about-control-how-eu-governments-want-to-encrypt-their-own-comms-but-break-our   
   -private-chats   
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