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|    Mike Powell to All    |
|    North Korea's WFH espiona    |
|    18 Aug 25 09:35:31    |
      TZUTC: -0500       MSGID: 1375.consprcy@1:2320/105 2d087592       PID: Synchronet 3.21a-Linux master/123f2d28a Jul 12 2025 GCC 12.2.0       TID: SBBSecho 3.28-Linux master/123f2d28a Jul 12 2025 GCC 12.2.0       BBSID: CAPCITY2       CHRS: ASCII 1       FORMAT: flowed       When the insider Is the adversary: North Koreas remote work espionage campaign              Date:       Mon, 18 Aug 2025 10:26:50 +0000              Description:       North Korean operatives landed remote jobs at U.S. companies, no hacking       required.              FULL STORY       ======================================================================              In a revelation that should concern every security leader, the U.S. Justice       Department (DOJ) recently disclosed that over 300 companies, including tech       giants and at least one defense contractor, unknowingly hired North Korean       operatives posing as remote IT workers.               These individuals infiltrated corporate networks not by breaching firewalls        or exploiting zero-days, but by landing jobs through video interviews,       onboarding processes, and legitimate access credentials. Once inside, they       stole sensitive data and funneled millions in earnings back to the Kim        regime, fueling its sanctioned weapons programs.               The campaign is one of the most aggressive, large-scale examples of an        insider threat - a category of risk that arises when individuals within an       organization, whether employees , contractors, or partners, abuse their       authorized access to cause harm.               Unlike external threats that, at least in theory, can be detected and stopped       through technical signatures or perimeter defenses, insider threats operate       from within, often undetected, with full access to sensitive systems and        data.               This North Korean operation wasnt improvised. It was calculated,        professional, and deeply strategic. And it signals a shift in how adversaries       operate: not just breaking in, but blending in.              The Threat You Cant Patch               Unlike external attackers, insider threats - especially those that enter       through HR services - dont trigger alerts at the door. They have keys. They       follow protocols. They attend standups. They do the work, or just enough of       it, while quietly collecting access and evading scrutiny.               Thats what makes this threat so difficult to detect and so devastating when       successful. These operatives didnt brute-force credentials. They werent       scraping dark corners of the internet. They passed interviews by using stolen       or fabricated identities. According to the DOJ, they often relied on American       citizens identities stolen through job boards or phishing. Many even went as       far as using AI-generated content and deepfakes to pass interviews.               Once employed, they didnt need to act suspiciously to gain access. They        simply did what everyone else did: log in via VPN , accessed the codebase,       reviewed Jira tickets, joined Slack channels. They werent intruders. They        were team members.              How Remote Work and AI Changed the Game               What enabled this campaign was a unique combination of evolving workplace       dynamics and readily available AI tools . First, the normalization of remote       work made it plausible to have employees who would never be physically seen        or meet a manager face to face. What might have once been considered an       unusual hire became completely normal in the post-pandemic world.               Second, generative AI gave attackers the tools to mimic fluency, build       impressive resumes, and even generate convincing interview responses. Some       operatives used synthetic video and audio to complete interviews or handle       technical screenings, masking language fluency gaps or cultural tells.               Then came the infrastructure. In some cases, U.S.-based collaborators helped       maintain laptop farms - stacks of employer-issued machines in a single       location controlled by the operatives using KVM switches and VPNs . This        setup ensured that access appeared to originate from within the United        States, helping them slip past geofencing and fraud detection systems.               These werent lone actors. They were part of a coordinated state-sponsored       effort with global infrastructure, deep operational discipline, and a clear       strategic mission: extract value from Western companies to fund North Koreas       sanctioned economy and military ambitions.              A Blind Spot in Detection               The alarming success of this campaign highlights a gap that many        organizations still havent addressed: detecting adversaries who look       legitimate on paper, behave within expected parameters, and dont trip alarms.               Traditional security tools are tuned for external anomalies: port scans,       malware signatures, brute-force attempts. But an insider who joins a company       through standard hiring, logs in during work hours, and accesses systems       they're authorized to use wont trigger those alerts. They arent acting       maliciously in a technical sense - until they are.               Whats needed is not only tighter hiring practices, but also better visibility       into user behavior and environment-wide activity patterns. Security teams        need to be able to distinguish between normal and anomalous behavior even       among valid users.               That means collecting and retaining forensic-grade data - logs from cloud       applications, identity systems, endpoint activity, and remote access       infrastructure - and making it searchable and analyzable at scale. Without a       way to retrospectively investigate how access was used, organizations are       flying blind. They will only know theyve been compromised once the data is       gone, the money is missing, or law enforcement shows up.              From Reactive to Proactive: How to Get Ahead of the Next Campaign              Defending against insider threats like this starts before the first alert. It       requires rethinking onboarding, monitoring, and response.               Companies need to layer behavioral analytics on top of access logs, looking       for subtle indicators: unusual access times, lateral movement into unexpected       systems, usage patterns that dont match the rest of the team. This type of       detection requires models trained in real-world behavior, tuned not for raw       volume but for suspicious variance.               It also means proactively hunting, not waiting for an alert, but actively       asking: what access looks unusual? Where are we seeing employees access       systems they typically dont use? Why is a new hire downloading a volume of       data typically accessed only by team leads? These questions cant be answered       without proper instrumentation. And they cant be answered late.              No Industry Is Immune              This campaign didnt target one sector. It was less about where the operatives       landed and more about how many places they could get into. Thats the hallmark       of a campaign focused on widespread infiltration, long-term persistence, and       maximum value extraction.               The companies that were affected werent necessarily careless. They were       operating in a threat landscape that had shifted beneath them. The attackers       just moved faster.              What This Means Going Forward               The remote workforce isn't going away. Neither is AI. Together, theyve        created both unprecedented flexibility - and unprecedented opportunity for       adversaries. Companies need to adapt.               Insider threats are no longer just about disgruntled employees or careless       contractors. Theyre adversaries with time, resources, and state backing, who       understand our systems, processes, and blind spots better than wed like to       admit.               Protecting from this threat means investing not just in prevention, but in       detection and investigation as well. Because the next adversary isnt knocking       at your firewall. Theyre already logged in.                This article was produced as part of TechRadarPro's Expert Insights channel       where we feature the best and brightest minds in the technology industry       today. The views expressed here are those of the author and are not       necessarily those of TechRadarPro or Future plc. If you are interested in       contributing find out more here:       https://www.techradar.com/news/submit-your-story-to-techradar-pro              ======================================================================       Link to news story:       https://www.techradar.com/pro/when-the-insider-is-the-adversary-north-koreas-r       emote-work-espionage-campaign              $$       --- SBBSecho 3.28-Linux        * Origin: capitolcityonline.net * Telnet/SSH:2022/HTTP (1:2320/105)       SEEN-BY: 105/81 106/201 128/187 129/14 305 153/7715 154/110 218/700       SEEN-BY: 226/30 227/114 229/110 111 114 206 300 307 317 400 426 428       SEEN-BY: 229/470 664 700 705 266/512 291/111 320/219 322/757 342/200       SEEN-BY: 396/45 460/58 712/848 902/26 2320/0 105 304 3634/12 5075/35       PATH: 2320/105 229/426           |
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