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|    Iran encourages citizens    |
|    29 Jun 25 09:14:00    |
      TZUTC: -0500       MSGID: 1209.consprcy@1:2320/105 2cc68680       PID: Synchronet 3.20a-Linux master/acc19483f Apr 26 202 GCC 12.2.0       TID: SBBSecho 3.20-Linux master/acc19483f Apr 26 2024 23:04 GCC 12.2.0       BBSID: CAPCITY2       CHRS: ASCII 1       Iran encourages citizens to use a messaging app previously flagged as a state       surveillance tool              Date:       Mon, 23 Jun 2025 16:13:59 +0000              Description:       Iran-developed application, Bale Messenger was found to lack end-to-end       encryption and share users' sensitive data with the app server. Experts warn       against their use.              FULL STORY              As Iran enters the fifth day of a near-total communication blackout,        officials are reportedly encouraging citizens to turn to a domestic messaging       app to stay in touch with their families outside the country.               Fars News Agency which is managed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps       shared a tweet on Friday, June 20, saying that foreign users, as well as       locals, can now use the Bale app to communicate with relatives and friends       during the internet outage.               There's a problem, though: security researchers have previously flagged Bale       (or Baleh) Messenger as a state surveillance tool. Not only did they find        that it lacked end-to-end encryption protections, but that it also has       censorship and surveillance capabilities.              The risks of Bale Messenger              Reportedly developed by a company with ties to the National Bank of Iran,        Bale (which means Yes in Persian) is an instant messaging application that       includes voice-over-IP features, a social media platform, and even banking       services.               Bale claims to use end-to-end encryption (E2EE) to ensure users chats remain       private.               According to data coming from the Iranian Minister of Communications and       Information Technology, Bale had 16.5 million monthly active users as of May       2023.               Considering its growing popularity, security researchers at the Open       Technology Fund decided to verify the claims of Bale and two other Iranian       messaging apps (Eitaa and Rubika) with a security audit . The tests were       carried out in December 2023 and October 2024 and uncovered several privacy       and security vulnerabilities.              Do you know?              Iranian authorities enforced heavy internet restrictions       against popular Western apps following the country's 2022 massive protests .       This has likely led to a spike in usage of Bale and other Iran-developed       applications.               For starters, auditors confirmed that all three apps employed different forms       of client-server encryption, but none had E2EE protections enabled, despite       government claims.               Specifically Bale was found using "one form of encryption that could be        easily reversed in the context of encrypting a users credit card data"       according to the audit.               All apps could reportedly exchange messages with each other, too, through a       backend process called Message Exchange Bus (MXB), which auditors confirmed       was a state-owned service.               This meant that the app server "could potentially view plaintext messages due       to the lack of E2EE in any of the apps".               Researchers also found evidence of "unexpected transmission of private data".               Crucially, when users click on URLs shared via messages, they appear to be       redirected to the applications backend server.               "This would effectively allow the servers to monitor which websites are        viewed by users within the app," researchers explained, deeming the tactic "a       mechanism for censorship and surveillance".               The Bale app was also found to share users location data with the app server       during authentication.              What experts are saying               Researchers at the Open Technology Fund concluded their security audit by       suggesting opting for more secure messaging apps that actually employ E2EE.       These include Signal (which also offers anti-censorship proxy servers ),       Session, and Wire.               Iranian Information Security Analyst and womens rights advocate Azam Jangrevi       also raised concerns following Friday's statement from the Iranian       authorities. Iran's regime has cut internet access, leaving millions       disconnected from loved ones abroad. Officials push the "Baleh" app,long       flagged by activists as insecure and a tool for state surveillance.              Jangrevi told TechRadar: "The app, tied to the National Bank of Iran, has       raised red flags due to potential spyware embedded within its code. Key       concerns include unauthorized surveillance, remote device access, and        metadata collection especially targeting individuals with political or social       influence.               "With those risks, analysts urge citizens to avoid Baleh for sensitive       communication. Instead, they suggest turning to encrypted services like        Signal or WhatsApp (via secure VPNs ), though connection quality varies."              Iran's internet blackout              Iran has been suffering a near-total internet blackout since June 18, 2025,       impacting citizens' ability to communicate and access information.               Internet connectivity was briefly restored on Saturday (June 21) "when       residents could exchange messages with the outside world," internet watchdog       NetBlocks reported , before collapsing again in the evening.               The latest data from Sunday (see image above) shows that the country remains       largely "offline."               "At 72 hours, diminished telecoms continue to impact the public's ability to       stay informed and in touch with loved ones," NetBlocks noted .               It's in this context that Iranians were also asked to delete WhatsApp from       their smartphones, with officials fearing the app may be used as a source of       strategic information for its opponent in the current conflict.               A series of government-imposed restrictions also began on June 13 and sparked       a surge of VPN demand across Iran that reached peaks of over 700% increase.               Authorities, however, appear to be targeting VPN usage with some of the best       VPN apps now reportedly not working at all times.              ======================================================================       Link to news story:       https://www.techradar.com/vpn/vpn-privacy-security/iran-encourages-citizens-to       -use-a-messaging-app-previously-flagged-as-a-state-surveillance-tool              $$       --- SBBSecho 3.20-Linux        * Origin: capitolcityonline.net * Telnet/SSH:2022/HTTP (1:2320/105)       SEEN-BY: 105/81 106/201 128/187 129/14 305 153/7715 154/110 218/700       SEEN-BY: 226/30 227/114 229/110 111 114 206 300 307 317 400 426 428       SEEN-BY: 229/470 664 700 705 266/512 291/111 320/219 322/757 342/200       SEEN-BY: 396/45 460/58 712/848 902/26 2320/0 105 304 3634/12 5075/35       PATH: 2320/105 229/426           |
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