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|    Mike Powell to All    |
|    Chinese hackers use Googl    |
|    30 May 25 09:21:00    |
      TZUTC: -0500       MSGID: 1164.consprcy@1:2320/105 2c9efad9       PID: Synchronet 3.20a-Linux master/acc19483f Apr 26 202 GCC 12.2.0       TID: SBBSecho 3.20-Linux master/acc19483f Apr 26 2024 23:04 GCC 12.2.0       BBSID: CAPCITY2       CHRS: ASCII 1       Chinese hackers use Google Calendar in stealthy new attack              Date:       Thu, 29 May 2025 15:07:00 +0000              Description:       Google Calendar was used as part of the C2 infrastructure, so users should       take care.              FULL STORY              Chinese state-sponsored hackers known as APT41 have been seen abusing Google       Calendar in their newest attacks, using it as part of the C2 infrastructure.               Googles Threat Intelligence Group (TIG) recently discovered the technique,       dismantled the setup, and introduced changes to prevent similar attacks in        the future.               The attack starts from a previously compromised government website - TIG did       not explain how the site was compromised, but said it was used to host a .ZIP       archive. This archive is then shared, through phishing emails, with potential       targets.              Reading the calendar               Inside the ZIP are three files: a DLL and executable files posing as JPGs,        and a Windows shortcut file (LNK) posing as a PDF document.               When the victim tries to open the fake PDF, it runs the shortcut which, in       turn, activates the DLL.               This file, in turn, decrypts and launches the third file, which is the       malicious payload dubbed ToughProgress.               The malware then reads additional instructions shared in two specific events       in Google Calendar. The commands are found either in the description field,        or hidden events.               To share the results, the malware would create a new zero minute calendar       event on May 30, and share the data, encrypted, in the calendar event       description.               Since the malware is never actually installed on the disk, and since the C2       communication happens via a legitimate Google service, most security products       will have trouble spotting the attack, Google suggests.               To tackle the threat, TIG developed custom detection signatures to identify       and block APT41s malware. It also took down associated Workspace accounts and       calendar entries. Furthermore, the team updated file detections and added       malicious domains and URLs to the Google Safe Browsing blocklist.               Google also confirmed that at least a few companies were targeted: In       partnership with Mandiant Consulting, GTIG notified the compromised       organizations, it said.               We provided the notified organizations with a sample of TOUGHPROGRESS network       traffic logs, and information about the threat actor, to aid with detection       and incident response.               It did not say how many companies were affected.                Via BleepingComputer              ======================================================================       Link to news story:       https://www.techradar.com/pro/security/chinese-hackers-use-google-calendar-in-       stealthy-new-attack              $$       --- SBBSecho 3.20-Linux        * Origin: capitolcityonline.net * Telnet/SSH:2022/HTTP (1:2320/105)       SEEN-BY: 105/81 106/201 128/187 129/14 305 153/7715 154/110 218/700       SEEN-BY: 226/30 227/114 229/110 111 114 206 300 307 317 400 426 428       SEEN-BY: 229/470 664 700 705 266/512 291/111 320/219 322/757 342/200       SEEN-BY: 396/45 460/58 712/848 902/26 2320/0 105 3634/12 5075/35       PATH: 2320/105 229/426           |
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