MSGID: 2:5030/1997@fidonet 5dfcc965   
   REPLY: 7261.binkd@1:103/705 22615d86   
   CHRS: CP866 2   
   TZUTC: 0300   
   TID: FastEcho 1.46.1 43272   
   Hello Rob!   
      
   On Thu, 19 Dec 2019 at 15:43 -0800, you wrote to me:   
      
    >> The whole sentence is wrong. CA is required to make sure that the   
    >> certificate provided by server was not replaced by an attacker   
    >> during MitM attack. With self-signed certificate you can never tell   
    >> that you are connecting to the real system, unless you know a CA   
    >> pubkey used to sign that self-signed certificate. That's kinda   
    >> basic stuff.   
    RS> True, if you're concerned about active MitM attacks (not just   
    RS> passive-snooping).   
      
   Isn't it your main argument against STARTTLS?   
      
    RS> But if you're concerned about active MitM attacks,   
    RS> then you don't want to use STARTTLS either.   
      
   Why not? It is perfectly mitigated and I explained that a few times already.   
   You gotta stop looking back at old SMTP implementation that wasn't designed   
   against active MitM attacks in the first place.   
      
      
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