TZUTC: -0800   
   MSGID: 7261.binkd@1:103/705 22615d86   
   REPLY: 2:5030/1997@fidonet 5dfbf8b7   
   PID: Synchronet 3.17c-Linux  Dec 12 2019 GCC 6.3.0   
   TID: SBBSecho 3.10-Linux r3.148 Dec 12 2019 GCC 6.3.0   
   COLS: 80   
   CHRS: CP437 2   
   NOTE: FSEditor.js v1.103   
     Re: BINKP over TLS   
     By: Alexey Fayans to Rob Swindell on Fri Dec 20 2019 01:24 am   
      
    >  >> 2. For any kind of TLS something must be decided on certificate   
    >  >> authority.   
    >  RS> Nope. Self-signed certificates provide privacy via TLS just fine.   
    >  RS> A CA is only needed if you're going to use TLS for trust. If you're   
    >  RS> only using TLS for privacy, then a CA-signed certificate is not   
    >  RS> needed.   
    >   
    > The whole sentence is wrong. CA is required to make sure that the   
    > certificate provided by server was not replaced by an attacker during MitM   
    > attack. With self-signed certificate you can never tell that you are   
    > connecting to the real system, unless you know a CA pubkey used to sign that   
    > self-signed certificate. That's kinda basic stuff.   
      
   True, if you're concerned about active MitM attacks (not just pa   
   sive-snooping). But if you're concerned about active MitM attacks, then you   
   don't want to use STARTTLS either.   
      
                                               digital man   
      
   Synchronet "Real Fact" #94:   
   Synchronet v3.15b was released in October of 2011 (5 years after v3.14a).   
   Norco, CA WX: 65.0øF, 24.0% humidity, 1 mph ESE wind, 0.00 inches rain/24hrs   
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