Subject: soc.history.war.vietnam FAQ: Australian Involvement (3/3)
Supersedes: <602154825@panix3.panix.com>
Date: 15 Mar 1996 04:58:23 -0500
References: <603155571@panix3.panix.com> <603155574@panix3.panix.com>
Summary: This FAQ is the third of three parts dealing with the Australian
     participation in the Vietnam War.  This section is the second part
     dealing with the political issues.

Archive-Name: vietnam/australia/part3
Posting-Frequency: monthly (15th)

Frequently Asked Questions: soc.history.war.vietnam

Copyright 1996 by Brian Ross.  Permission to use this document is expressly
     given for use in Usenet newsgroup discussions and any other
     educational purpose, as long as the source is clearly identified and
     there is no fee.  All other rights are reserved.

The FAQs on the Australian involvement in Vietnam were written by Brian
Ross. There are three sections, the first covering military involvement and
the last two dealing with political issues.

--- This is the continuation of the article in soc.history.war.vietnam FAQ:
Australian Involvement (2/3) ---


     The Labor party, once more consigned to the opposition benches in
Parliament, pointed out that Australia was not bound in any way to help
Malaysia, Australia being only committed to the defence of Malaya under the
ANZAM agreement.   They would have preferred a formal treaty between the
two states as to what sort of commitment that Australia was to make to
Malaysian defence.   This was however defeated in parliament along party
lines when it went to the vote.

     Although the confrontation consisted of counterinsurgency operations
in North Borneo, the Government was worried about a direct attack by
Indonesia against Australian territory, in particular New Guinea.   When in
may 1964 Sukarno called upon "21 million volunteers" to crush Malaysia, and
his Government told Australia not to interfere in what was basically an
Asian problem, warning that if Australia did become involved then the
responsibility would be Australia's alone.22

     After this was announced there followed a discussion on 21 April 1964
in Parliament, as to whether an attack by Indonesians on Australian troops
in Borneo would activate the terms of the ANZUS agreement, leading to the
involvement of America.   After criticism from the opposition leader Arthur
Calwell, who' said that, "America does not believe that its commitment does
include the protection of Australia troops already in Malaya".23

     The Prime Minister, Robert Menzies replied that while the letter of
ANZUS does not cover Australia troops stationed abroad, the intent did.  
He suggested that,

     "The United States of America did not even withdraw its
      support for Malaysia.   It has recognised Malaysia, and
      it wants Malaysia to be maintained...  [but] That when
      it came to the immediate defence of Malaysia this was
      perhaps primarily a Commonwealth responsibility."24

     Despite the brave words the government was worried. It feared the
possibility of the confrontation escalating and that as its troops were
already in contact with the Indonesians in North Borneo, that the United
States would not come to its aid "25

     With defence becoming more of important in the thinking of the
Government, selective compulsory conscription was introduced before
Parliament on 10 November 1964.26 This was to increase the Army to an
effective strength of 37,000. The reason being given was a lack of
sufficient volunteers, due to a period of full employment and economic
expansion in the civil sector.   This build up of the Army was required
for, Menzies said,

      our deteriorating strategic: situation.   We expect
      a continuing requirement to make our forces available 
      for cold war and counterinsurgency tasks.   We must
      have forces ready as an immediate contribution should 
      hostilities occur.27

     The small Australia Army was over-extended by its commitments both in
Malaya and Borneo and the result was that only two Battalions to defend
Australia.   The Army was also committed to providing "advisers" as part of
an aid package to the Government of South Vietnam in its war against
Communist insurgents and this was stretching its limited resources to the
maximum.   Obviously more manpower was required if a credible defence was
to be mounted against the threat of Indonesian aggression and the only way
that could be achieved was through conscription.

     Then it was announced that Australian combat troops in the form of one
infantry Battalion, with supporting elements, would be committed to the war
in South Vietnam, on 29 April 1965.   The Govt.   was criticised by the
Opposition as well as by a strong vocal middle-class minority which could
not be dismissed as Communist or pro- Communist in their views.

     This vocal minority was made up of numerous dignitaries, including
Bishops of various denominations, who were extremely critical of the
policies of the rapidly changing South Vietnamese Governments.   They
believed that the Australian Government should seek a negotiated settlement
of the conflict, rather than sending more military aid.28

     As a result of this decision Australian conscripts would, for the
first time serve outside Australia or its territories and north of the
Equator.   This had not even occurred in World War II, and it particularly
incensed the Opposition leader who held to the ALP's longstanding
opposition to conscription for service not in the direct defence of
Australia.29

     This initial commitment of an Infantry Battalion quickly grew to
become a Task Force (or Brigade ) of three or four Battalions with
supporting units of Armour, Engineers, Artillery and Logistic support, as
well as RAAF units flying Canberra's and helicopters and also naval units.  
The tasks of these units quickly changed, from guarding and defensive ones
to offensive operations against the Vietnamese Communists.   At its height
the Australian commitment to Vietnam reached 8,000 men in 1968-69.

     Australia's involvement in Vietnam was prompted by three main factors. 
Perhaps most important of these was a very poor perception by the
Government of world affairs at that time.   Throughout the late fifties and
sixties Australian diplomatic circles were firmly convinced of a subversive
"Communist Threat" outside Australia.   This threat, initially directed by
Moscow, and later by Beijing, dominated Australian diplomatic thought for
approximately fifteen years.

     It had though, roots which went much further back than that.   As
Frank Cain mentions,30 the members of the coalition government gained
anti-Communist convictions well before the second world war.   He suggests
that the "the road to Vietnam was not only paved with anti-radical and
anti-communist rhetoric and actions but that the non-Labor forces came to
be prisoners of such rhetoric."31

     As a consequences of their repeated successes in federal elections,
they were convinced of the appropriateness of these policies.   In fact
when they failed to "kick the Communist can" as they did in 1961, the
coalition nearly lost office.   As a consequence the anti- Communist policy
of the government under Menzies became electorally self-rewarding and they
sought to use it where ever possible.   This does not deny that they were
not totally convinced for the best of reasons but that they also managed to
convince the electorate that Communism must be opposed where ever possible

     As Cain suggests, when Menzies made his statement suggesting that "the
takeover of South Vietnam would be a direct military threat to
Australia,"32 the anti-Communist convictions developed over the previous
five years were now convincing them to intervene and this action led
Australia into the "quagmire of the Vietnamese civil war."33

     Even after the departure of Menzies in 1965, the ideological crusade
to which the Coalition was committed carried it to greater electoral
victories.   In the 1966 election Harold Holt's government was returned by
an even greater majority by an electorate who believed in the necessity to
remain in Vietnam.

     However as the middle-class became more convinced about the dangers of
their sons being conscripted to fight overseas in Vietnam, they switched
their vote to the Labour Party in response.   It was ironic that the
coalition by using anti-Communist rhetoric to maintain electoral support
now lost office by not taking note of it in the election which led to their
defeat in 1972.

     The coalition government's doubts about Indonesia's political
alignment had been reinforced over the years by the acceptance of large
quantities of military and civil aid by Jarkata from initially Moscow, and
then later Beijing. While in retrospect it is obvious that Sukarno was
playing the East off against the West in an effort to gain what he wanted,
it raised fears in Canberra that Sukarno was increasingly coming under the
control of the local Communist members of his government.   This was
further reinforced when Sukarno threatened to nationalise the three major
oil companies operating in Indonesia (Shell, Caltex and Stanvac) which
represented over $US500 million in investment.34 This fear of a Indonesia
becoming a Communist country on Australia's doorstep further reinforced the
already rigid anti-communist stance of the coalition's leaders.35

     This perception of an aggressive Communist threat in Asia prompted
Australian foreign Policy planners to support American policies in Asia
almost completely blind to the realities of the situation facing them.  
The war in Vietnam was not perceived as a local rebellion or civil war,
caused by discontent, or even as a war of "national liberation" from the
last vestiges of colonial rule as it perhaps should have been.   Instead,
it was perceived by the then Minister for External Affairs, Paul Hasluck',
as he related in his policy speech on 23 March 1965, as a conflict where,
"the application of the methods of and doctrines of Communist Guerrilla
warfare first evolved in China and then successfully in North Vietnam."36
In his judgement the South Vietnamese were not dealing simply with a
situation of local unrest, but with a "large scale campaign of
assassination and terrorism", the direction of which was coming from
"outside".37

     This "outside" direction was perceived most definitely as from
Beijing.   Gregory Clark suggests that this perception of Chinese
aggression was carried to the point of "Sinophobia".38 He relates the story
of how Hasluck visited Moscow in October 1964.   He was seeking to enlist
Soviet aid in preventing the success of this perceived Chinese aggression
in Vietnam.   Needless to say the Soviets turned the discussion to things
of more interest and use to them.39

     This fear of Communist aggression was not, only confined to the
Ministry of External Affairs.   The Prime Minister, Sir Robert Menzies,
said in his policy speech on 29April 1965 that,

      the takeover of South Vietnam would be a direct
      military threat to Australia and all the countries of
      South and South-East Asia.   It must be seen as a part
      of a thrust by Communist China between the Indian and
      Pacific Oceans.40

     The fear of this Communist aggression was founded upon what was
referred to as the "Domino Theory" by its exponents.   Unless this
aggressive action by China was stopped in Vietnam, ran the theory, then
after Vietnam had fallen, the surrounding countries would follow, just like
a row of Dominoes.   These countries, which tended to be neutral in their
outlook, favouring neither east or west, might become embroiled in another
war like Vietnam, or they might defect to the Communist line.   It was
feared that this "domino" action would eventually lead to Australia's
shores and then the policy of forward defence would mean Darwin instead of
Vietnam.

     While it was in confrontation with Indonesia the government had the
added fear that, as Renouf suggests, "Indonesian success with confrontation
could lead to a reverse Domino Theory - from south to north - with
Singapore, a strategically placed island, being an early victim,"41 and
with Australia being perhaps the next target.

     Perhaps more significant than this as to why Australia became involved
in the Vietnam War, was the Government's policy of relying on "great and
powerful friends" for Australia's defence.   The Government was afraid that
if the problems with Indonesia came to armed conflict then Australia would
be abandoned by America and Britain.   The response of its two major
allies, Great Britain and the United States, to the problems of West New
Guinea and to a lesser extent Borneo, had convinced the government that
they did not share Australia's deep concern about Indonesia. The United
States was unwilling to support Australia's stand with anything more
substantial than words.

     Both Britain and the United States had seen it against their interests
to provoke Indonesia, who commanded considerable power amongst other third
world countries and because of the large amounts of investment both
countries had tied up there.   They feared the danger of Sukarno
nationalising their interests without compensation.42

     In addition when Australia had asked the United States for , an
unequivocal commitment under the ANZUS treaty, that it was willing to
guarantee Australia's defence in case things with Indonesia blew up first
over Dutch West New Guinea and then later/ in Borneo.   While Pemberton
suggests that in Washington's mind it was fully committed to Australia, in
Canberra the lack of a public sign or declaration to that effect weighed
heavily on Menzies's mind.43

     So it was that Australia was seeking a method by which America could
be "locked into" the defence of both Asia and in particular Australia,
against this feared Communist Aggression.   The opportunity presented
itself when America proposed that Australia provide more advisers and some
air and naval aid to Vietnam.44  Australia however seized upon the chance
to offer troops, particularly with the expansion of the Army to meet "a
continuing requirement for cold war and counter- insurgency tasks".45 
While William Bundy, the Assistant Secretary of State for SE Asia, noted
the offer of troops, he was more hopeful of receiving advisers instead. As
America at this time was not willing to commit her own troops to Vietnam.

     As Sexton suggests, this would seem to indicate that the Australians
believed the Americans were not taking a tough enough line.   They had
allowed political events, both at home and abroad to influence their
actions.   The Australians believed that the Americans needed their resolve
stiffened.46

     So it was that Australia offered the use of ground troops on 18
December 1964.   Although the announcement that this offer had been
received and accepted by both the Americans and the Parliament until 29
April 1965. Although, as Sexton points out, the request that Menzies
referred to in Parliament was not received by the Australian Government's
representatives in Saigon until that very day had to be almost forced out
of the South Vietnamese government.47

     Talks on the matter had taken place well before this date, on 22
April, between the Australian and the Americans. This announcement came
before an American decision to commit ground troops had occurred.   So it
was that at Australian insistence, Australian troops were committed to take
part in the Vietnam War not, as was always stated, on the basis of an
American request.48

     So it can be seen from these short accounts that Indonesia's policy of
Confrontation over West New Guinea and Malaysia was a major contributing
factor in the Australian Government wishing to become involved in a war far
from Australian shores.   Other factors that contributed to this wish to
become involved in an Asian war were the fear of the Domino theory, the
seeming lack of American commitment to the defence of Asian and Australia
in particular, and the fear of a perceived threat of Communist

     As both Sexton, and Cooksey, point out, Australia was not happy with
the United States' performance over the West New Guinea and Borneo affairs,
so in an effort to build up a "credit of goodwill" with America that could
be drawn upon in time of need it would seem that Australia decided to enter
the Vietnam war.49  There is an old American political adage that says "not
what you have done for me, but what have you done for me lately"? So
Australia became involved to show the Americans that if we were willing to
help them, they would then perhaps be willing to help us if it ever came to
the point of war with Indonesia.

----------------------------------------
ENDNOTES

1 p.70, Pemberton, G., All the Way, Australia's Road to
Vietnam, Allen E; Unwin, Sydney, 1987.
2 p.71, Pemberton, G., All the War, Australia's road to
Vietnam.
3 p.24, Wiesbrod, H., 'Sir Garfield Barwick and Dutch New
Guinea, Australian Quarterly, June 1967.
4 p.628, 'Policy Speech on External Affairs', Commonwealth
Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 9 March
1950.
5 p.881-2, Current Notes, Vo1.28, November 1957.
6 quoted p.26, Wiesbrod, H., 'Sir Garfield Barwick and Dutch
New Guinea'.
7 pp.76-9, Pemberton, G., All the Way.
8 pp.80-1, Ibid.
9 p.29, ibid.
10 p.80, ibid.
11 P.99, Pemberton, G., All the Way.
12 p.428, Renouf, A., The Frightened Country, Macmillan,
Melbourne, 1979.
13 idem.
14 p.889, 'Ministerial Statement on West New Guinea, ' ,
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of
Representatives, 15 March 1962.
15 pp.1151-1161, 'Debate on International Affairs' ,
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of
Representatives, 21 April 1962.
16 Wiesbrod, H., 'Sir Garfield Barwick and Dutch New Guinea,
Australian Quarterly, June 1967.
17 p.30, Ibid.
18 p.21, Current Notes, Vo1.33, No.  3, 1962.
19 p.431, Renouf A., The Frightened Country.
20 pp.431-2, Renouf, A., The Frightened Country.
21 p.436, ibid.
22 p.157, Andrews, E.  M., A History of Australia's Foreign
Policy: from dependence to i n dependence , Longman Cheshire
, Melbourne, 1979.
23 p.1279, 'Debate on International Affairs', Commonwealth
Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 21 April
1964.
24 p.2718 `Defence Review Debate' , Commonwealth
Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 10 November
1964.
25 pp.174-5, Pemberton, G., All the Way.
26 p.2718 `Defence Review Debate' , Commonwealth
Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 10 November
1964.
27 p.2718, 'Defence Review Debate' , Commonwealth
Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 10 November
1964.
28 p.113, Watt, A., Vietnam, An Australian Analysis, F.  W.
Cheshire, Melbourne, 1983.
29 p.114, Watt, A., Vietnam, An Australian Analysis.
30 Cain, F.,`Australia's road to Vietnam - Non-Labour and
Anti-Communism 1920-1966', original manuscript supplied by
the author
31.p.1, ibid.
32 pp.1060, `Vietnam - Ministerial Statement', Commonwealth
Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 29 April
1965.
33 p.161 Cain F., `Australia's road to Vietnam - Non-Labour
and Anti-Communism 1920-1966'.
34 p.178, Pemberton, G., All the Way.
35 pp.436-7, Renouf, A., The Frightened Country.
36 p.2381 'Debate on International Affairs', Commonwealth
Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 23 March
1965.
37 ibid.
38 pp.19-20, Clarke, G., 'Vietnam, China and the Foreign
Affairs Debate in Australia, a personal account', in King,
P., (Ed.  ), Australia's Vietnam, Allen g Unwin, Sydney,
1983.
39 ibid.
40 pp.1060-1, "Vietnam - Ministerial Statement', Commonwealth
Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 29 April
1965.
41 p.436, Renouf, A., The Frightened Country.
42 p.99, Pemberton, G., All the Way.
43 p.188, Pemberton, G., All the Way.
44 p.61, Sexton, M., War for the Asking, Australia's Vietnam
Secrets, Penguin Books, Ringwood, 1981.
45 p.2718, `Defence Review Debate' , Commonwealth
Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 10 November
1964.
46 p.69, Sexton, M., War for the Asking.
47 pp.140-145r Sexton M., War for the asking.
48 pp.165-171, Sexton, M., War for the Asking
49 p.47, Cooksey, R., 'Assumptions of Australia's Vietnam
Policy', World Review, October 1966.

----------------------------------------
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources:
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of
Representatives.

Current Notes, Vo1.28, November 1957

Secondary Sources:
Andrews, E.M., A History of Australia's Foreign Policy: from
dependence to i n dependence , Longman Cheshire , Melbourne,
1979.

Cain, F.,`Australia's road to Vietnam - Non-Labour and Anti-
Communism 1920-1966', original manuscript supplied by the
author

Clarke, G., 'Vietnam, China and the Foreign Affairs Debate
in Australia, a personal account', in King, P., (Ed.),
Australia's Vietnam, Allen g Unwin, Sydney, 1983.

Cooksey, R., 'Assumptions of Australia's Vietnam Policy',
World Review, October 1966.

Renouf, A., The Frightened Country, Macmillan, Melbourne,
1979.

Pemberton, G., All the Way, Australia's Road to Vietnam,
Allen E; Unwin, Sydney, 1987.

Sexton, M., War for the Asking, Australia's Vietnam Secrets,
Penguin Books, Ringwood, 1981.

Watt, A., Vietnam, An Australian Analysis, F.  W.  Cheshire,
Melbourne, 1983.

Wiesbrod, H., 'Sir Garfield Barwick and Dutch New Guinea,
Australian Quarterly, June 1967.
_______________________________

- -Brian Ross------------------------------------------------------
              "For I will work the work in your days which ye will 
not believe, though it be told to you"
------------------------------------------Habakkuk, 7th Century BC- 

