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 The Americans had been trying to link Saddam to the 9/11 attacks; but 
 the British knew the evidence was flimsy or non-existent. Dearlove 
 warned the meeting that "the intelligence and facts were being fixed 
 around the policy". 
  
 It was clear from Dearlove's brief visit that the US administration's 
 attitude would compound the legal difficulties for Britain. The US had 
 no patience with the United Nations and little inclination to ensure 
 an invasion was backed by the security council, he said. 
  
 Nor did the Americans seem very interested in what might happen in the 
 aftermath of military action. Yet, as Boyce then reported, events were 
 already moving swiftly. 
  
 "CDS (chief of the defence staff) said that military planners would 
 brief (Donald) Rumsfeld (US defence secretary) on 3 August and Bush on 
 4 August." 
  
 The US invasion plans centred around two options. One was a full-blown 
 reprise of the 1991 Gulf war, a steady and obvious build-up of troops 
 over several months, followed by a large-scale invasion. 
  
 The other was a "running start". Seizing on an Iraqi casus belli, US 
 and RAF patrols over the southern no-fly zone would knock out the 
 Iraqi air defences. Allied special forces would then carry out a 
 series of small-scale operations in tandem with the Iraqi opposition, 
 with more forces joining the battle as they arrived, eventually 
 toppling Saddam's regime. 
  
 The "running start" was, said Boyce, "a hazardous option". 
  
 In either case the US saw three options for British involvement. The 
 first allowed the use of the bases in Diego Garcia and Cyprus and 
 three squadrons of special forces; the second added RAF aircraft and 
 Royal Navy ships; the third threw in 40,000 ground troops "perhaps 
 with a discrete role in northern Iraq entering from Turkey". 
  
 At the least the US saw the use of British bases as "critical", which 
 posed immediate legal problems. And Hoon said the US had already begun 
 "spikes of activity" to put pressure on the regime. 
  
 AMID all this talk of military might and invasion plans, one awkward 
 voice spoke up. Straw warned that, though Bush had made up his mind on 
 military action, the case for it was "thin". He was not thinking in 
 purely legal terms. 
  
 A few weeks later the government would paint Saddam as an imminent 
 threat to the Middle East and the world. But that morning in private 
 Straw said: "Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD 
 capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran." 
  
 It was a key point. If Saddam was not an immediate threat, could war 
 be justified legally? The attorney-general made his position clear, 
 telling the meeting that "the desire for regime change was not a legal 
 base for military action". 
  
 Right from the outset, the minutes reveal, the government's legal 
 adviser had grave doubts about Blair's plans; he would only finally 
 conclude unequivocally that war was legal three days before the 
 invasion, by which time tens of thousands of troops were already on 
 the borders of Iraq. 
  
 There were three possible legal bases for military action, said 
 Goldsmith. Self-defence, intervention to end an humanitarian crisis 
 and a resolution from the UN Security Council. 
  
 Neither of the first two options was a possibility with Iraq; it had 
 to be a UN resolution. But relying, as some hoped they could, on an 
 existing UN resolution, would be "difficult". 
  
 Despite voicing concerns, Straw was not standing in the way of war. It 
 was he who suggested a solution: they should force Saddam into a 
 corner where he would give them a clear reason for war. 
  
 "We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in 
 the UN weapons inspectors," he said. 
  
 If he refused, or the weapons inspectors found WMD, there would be 
 good cause for war. "This would also help with the legal justification 
 for the use of force," said Straw. 
  
 |From the minutes, it seems as if Blair seized on the idea as a way of 
 reconciling the US drive towards invasion and Britain's need for a 
 legal excuse. 
  
 "The prime minister said that it would make a big difference 
 politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN 
 inspectors," record the minutes. "Regime change and WMD were linked in 
 the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD . . . If 
 the political context were right, people would support regime change." 
  
 Blair would subsequently portray the key issue to parliament and the 
 people as the threat of WMD; and weeks later he would produce the now 
 notorious "sexed up" dossier detailing Iraq's suspected nuclear, 
 biological and chemical weapons programmes. 
  
 But in the meeting Blair said: "The two key issues are whether the 
 military plan works and whether we have the political strategy to give 
 the military plan the space to work." 
  
 Hoon said that if the prime minister wanted to send in the troops, he 
 would have to decide early. The defence chiefs were pressing to be 
 allowed to buy large amounts of equipment as "urgent operational 
 requirements". They had been prevented from preparing for war, partly 
 by Blair's insistence that there could be no publicly visible 
 preparations that might inflame splits in his party, partly by the 
 fact there was no authorisation to spend any money. 
  
 The meeting concluded that they should plan for the UK taking part in 
 any military action. Boyce would send Blair full details; Blair would 
 come back with a decision about money; and Straw would send Blair the 
 background on the UN inspectors and "discreetly work up the ultimatum 
 to Saddam". 
  
 The final note of the minutes, says: "We must not ignore the legal 
 issues: the attorney-general would consider legal advice with (Foreign 
 Office/Ministry of Defence) legal advisers." 
  
 It was a prophetic warning. 
  
 Also seen by The Sunday Times is the Foreign Office opinion on the 
 possible legal bases for war. Marked "Confidential", it runs to eight 
 pages and casts doubt on the possibility of reviving the authority to 
 use force from earlier UN resolutions. "Reliance on it now would be 
 unlikely to receive any support," it says. 
  
 Foreign Office lawyers were consistently doubtful of the legality of 
 war and one deputy legal director, Elizabeth Wilmshurst, ultimately 
 resigned because she believed the conflict was a "crime of 
 aggression". 
  
 The Foreign Office briefing on the legal aspects was made available 
 for the Downing Street meeting on July 23. Ten days ago, when Blair 
 was interviewed by the BBC's Jeremy Paxman, the prime minister was 
 asked repeatedly whether he had seen that advice. 
  
 "No," said Blair. "I had the attorney-general's advice to guide me." 
  
 But as the July 23 documents show, the attorney-general's view was, 
 until the last minute, also riven with doubts. 
  
 Three years on, it and the questionable legality of the war are still 
 hanging round Blair's neck like an albatross. 
  
 Copyright 2005 Times Newspapers Ltd. 
  
 ============================== Article no. 3 ============================== 
  
 http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/politics/story.jsp?story=634698 
  
 Blair saw legal caveats a year before invasion 
  
 Mr Blair has always maintained he was not aware of any ambiguity in 
 his legal right to go to war. But today we reveal that he saw Foreign 
 Office caveats a year before the Attorney General's infamous advice 
 that has put his reputation in the balance this week. Raymond Whitaker 
 reports 
  
 Independent (London) 
 01 May 2005 
  
 The advice to Tony Blair was stark. "A legal justification for 
  
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