[continued from previous message] 
  
 Dialectics, he argues, is a continuous process of transition from one 
 definition into the other. In consequence a one-sided and rigid 
 causality must be replaced by interaction. But he does not even mention 
 the most vital interaction, namely the dialectical relation between 
 subject and object in the historical process, let alone give it the 
 prominence it deserves. Yet without this factor dialectics ceases to be 
 revolutionary, despite attempts (illusory in the last analysis) to 
 retain €fluid€ concepts. For it implies a failure to recognise that in 
 all metaphysics the object remains untouched and unaltered so that 
 thought remains contemplative and fails to become practical; while for 
 the dialectical method the central problem is to change reality. 
  
 If this central function of the theory is disregarded, the virtues of 
 forming €fluid€ concepts become altogether problematic: a purely 
 €scientific€ matter. The theory might then be accepted or rejected in 
 accordance with the prevailing state of science without any modification 
 at all to one€s basic attitudes, to the question of whether or not 
 reality can be changed. Indeed, as the so-called Machists among Marx€s 
 supporters have demonstrated it even reinforces the view that reality 
 with its €obedience to laws , in the sense used by bourgeois, 
 contemplative materialism and the classical economics with which it is 
 so closely bound up, is impenetrable, fatalistic and immutable. That 
 Machism can also give birth to an equally bourgeois voluntarism does not 
 contradict this. Fatalism and voluntarism are only mutually 
 contradictory to an undialectical and unhistorical mind. In the 
 dialectical view of history they prove to be necessarily complementary 
 opposites, intellectual reflexes clearly expressing the antagonisms of 
 capitalist society and the intractability of its problems when conceived 
 in its own terms. 
  
 For this reason all attempts to deepen the dialectical method with the 
 aid of €criticism€ inevitably lead to a more superficial view. For 
 €criticism€ always starts with just this separation between method and 
 reality, between thought and being. And it is just this separation that 
 it holds to be an improvement deserving of every praise for its 
 introduction of true scientific rigour into the crude, uncritical 
 materialism of the Marxian method. Of course, no one denies the right of 
 €criticism€ to do this. But if it does so we must insist that it will be 
 moving counter to the essential spirit of dialectics. 
  
 The statements of Marx and Engels on this point could hardly be more 
 explicit. €Dialectics thereby reduced itself to the science of the 
 general laws of motion € both in the external world and in the thought 
 of man € two sets of laws which are identical in substance€ (Engels). 
 [5] Marx formulated it even more precisely. €In the study of economic 
 categories, as in the case of every historical and social science, it 
 must be borne in mind that ... the categories are therefore but forms of 
 being, conditions of existence ....€ [6] If this meaning of dialectical 
 method is obscured, dialectics must inevitably begin to look like a 
 superfluous additive, a mere ornament of Marxist €sociology€ or 
 €economics€. Even worse, it will appear as an obstacle to the €sober€, 
 €impartial€ study of the €facts€, as an empty construct in whose name 
 Marxism does violence to the facts. 
  
 This objection to dialectical method has been voiced most clearly and 
 cogently by Bernstein, thanks in part to a €freedom from bias€ unclouded 
 by any philosophical knowledge. However, the very real political and 
 economic conclusions he deduces from this desire to liberate method from 
 the €dialectical snares€ of Hegelianism, show clearly where this course 
 leads. They show that it is precisely the dialectic that must be removed 
 if one wishes to found a thorough-going opportunistic theory, a theory 
 of €evolution€ without revolution and of €natural development€ into 
 Socialism without any conflict. 
  
 ** 
  
 2 
  
 We are now faced with the question of the methodological implications of 
 these so-called facts that are idolised throughout the whole of 
 Revisionist literature. To what extent may we look to them to provide 
 guide-lines for the actions of the revolutionary proletariat? It goes 
 without saying that all knowledge starts from the facts. The only 
 question is: which of the data of life are relevant to knowledge and in 
 the context of which method? 
  
 The blinkered empiricist will of course deny that facts can only become 
 facts within the framework of a system € which will vary with the 
 knowledge desired. He believes that every piece of data from economic 
 life, every statistic, every raw event already constitutes an important 
 fact. In so doing he forgets that however simple an enumeration of 
 €facts€ may be, however lacking in commentary, it already implies an 
 €interpretation€. Already at this stage the facts have been comprehended 
 by a theory, a method; they have been wrenched from their living context 
 and fitted into a theory. 
  
 More sophisticated opportunists would readily grant this despite their 
 profound and instinctive dislike of all theory. They seek refuge in the 
 methods of natural science, in the way in which science distills €pure€ 
 facts and places them in the relevant contexts by means of observation, 
 abstraction and experiment. They then oppose this ideal model of 
 knowledge to the forced constructions of the dialectical method. 
  
 If such methods seem plausible at first this is because capitalism tends 
 to produce a social structure that in great measure encourages such 
 views. But for that very reason we need the dialectical method to 
 puncture the social illusion so produced and help us to glimpse the 
 reality underlying it. The €pure€ facts of the natural sciences arise 
 when a phenomenon of the real world is placed (in thought or in reality) 
 into an environment where its laws can be inspected without outside 
 interference. This process is reinforced by reducing the phenomena to 
 their purely quantitative essence. to their expression in numbers and 
 numerical relations. 
  
 Opportunists always fail to recognise that it is in the nature of 
 capitalism to process phenomena in this way. Marx gives an incisive 
 account [7] of such a €process of abstraction€ in the case of labour, 
 but he does not omit to point out with equal vigour that he is dealing 
 with a historical peculiarity of capitalist society. 
  
 €Thus the most general abstractions commonly appear where there is the 
 highest concrete development, where one feature appears to be shared by 
 many, and to be common to all. Then it cannot be thought of any longer 
 in one particular form.€ 
  
 But this tendency in capitalism goes even further. The fetishistic 
 character of economic forms, the reification of all human relations, the 
 constant expansion and extension of the division of labour which 
 subjects the process of production to an abstract, rational analysis, 
 without regard to the human potentialities and abilities of the 
 immediate producers, all these things transform the phenomena of society 
 and with them the way in which they are perceived. In this way arise the 
 €isolated€ facts, €isolated€ complexes of facts, separate, specialist 
 disciplines (economics, law, etc.) whose very appearance seems to have 
 done much to pave the way for such scientific methods. It thus appears 
 extraordinarily €scientific€ to think out the tendencies implicit in the 
  
 [continued in next message] 
  
 --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05 
  * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)