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 think the nuclear deal would have other quid pro quos and would most 
 certainly constrain India's independent foreign policy. The press in 
 India specifically buzzed about the plan to separate the Indian nuclear 
 facilities into military and civil categories. The atomic energy 
 establishment drew a bright line around the breeder reactor facilities, 
 publicly expressing opposition to their inclusion in the civil list. 
 The scientists prevailed: listed are 22 sites (existing, or under 
 construction). Fourteen sites are to be under international safeguards 
 and the other eight are off limits. The breeders are included in the 
 latter. 
  
 As important as they are, the arguments put forward by the 
 non-proliferation activists -- and I agree with many of them -- and the 
 debate on nuclear weapons generally were largely a side show. Contrary 
 to conventional wisdom, the NPT regime is not immune to manipulations. 
 The double standard practiced by its guarantors, particularly the 
 neglected obligation under Article VI to move steadily toward nuclear 
 disarmament, produces the supreme irony that a country like India, so 
 often a critic of the double standard, is benefiting from such 
 hypocrisy. To be sure, the Bush administration did respond to the 
 non-proliferation concerns by claiming that the agreement will help 
 bring India closer to the NPT regime and by pointing out that India had 
 a very good record on non-proliferation. The nonproliferation lobbyists 
 had some initial success in getting the attention of key leaders in the 
 Congress, such as Sen. Richard Lugar, who chairs the Foreign Relations 
 Committee, and Sen. Joseph Biden, the ranking Democrat. There was an 
 abrupt turnaround toward the end, however. Ultimately, the 
 non-proliferation lobby could not match the well-funded effort by the 
 business associations, the Indian embassy, and the political action 
 committees formed by wealthy Indian Americans. 
  
 The Lobbying Effort 
  
 While senior administration officials, such as Secretary of State 
 Condoleezza Rice and Under Secretary Nicholas Burns, did the heavy 
 lifting in public, the real action was elsewhere. In Washington, the 
 Indian government mounted a multi-faceted lobbying campaign, expending 
 large sums of money -- e.g., $1.3 million on two lobbying firms -- with 
 the aim of pushing the deal through Congress. One of the firms it hired 
 is Barbour, Griffith, and Rogers, which is headed by Robert Blackwill 
 - -- a former U.S. ambassador to India. 
  
 There were other significant players. These include business lobbies 
 like the Confederation of Indian Industries and the U.S.-India Business 
 Council, and ethnic-based lobbies such as the U.S. India Political 
 Action Committee (USINPAC) and the U.S.-India Friendship Council. The 
 powerful Israeli lobby worked less conspicuously, but made its 
 substantial network available to the relative neophytes in the embassy 
 and the Indian lobbies. The American Jewish Committee expressed its 
 strong support for the deal by sending a letter to influential 
 lawmakers. Collectively, they launched a massive lobbying effort by 
 blanketing Capitol Hill with receptions, meetings and briefings, and 
 the like. The lobbyists worked energetically to highlight the 
 commercial potential for the U.S. nuclear industry to participate in 
 the projected build-up of nuclear power in India. They also sponsored 
 numerous trips to India by the American lawmakers and their staff. 
  
 That there is much more at stake behind the nuclear deal is evident 
 from the importance assigned to it by the business leaders in both 
 countries. For example, the U.S.-India Business Council hired Patton 
 Boggs, reportedly one of the most expensive lobbying firms in 
 Washington, for an undisclosed sum, to push the deal. On the Indian 
 side, the Confederation of Indian Industries is said to have been one 
 of the top international organizations paying for congressional travel 
 between 2000 and 2005, spending some $538,000. 
  
 Stumping for the deal and soliciting support from the U.S. business 
 community was none other than Dr. Montek Singh Ahluwalia, the Deputy 
 Chairman of India's Planning Commission and a close confidant of Prime 
 Minister Singh. They are not related, but both are World Bank alums. In 
 his enthusiasm to woo U.S. business, Dr. Ahluwalia reportedly said that 
 any opening up of the trade would give the United States a "terrific 
 advantage." And referring to a recent order placed by Air India for 68 
 aircraft from Boeing, he predicted that "the Air India deal is only one 
 example. There will be many others." According to newspaper reports, 
 the U.S.-India Business Council thought that American business could 
 get a considerable portion of the $20-40 billion that India is planning 
 to spend by 2020. It would also open the door for large-scale sale of 
 military hardware to India. For example, Lockheed Martin could get a 
 contract between $4 billion and $9 billion to supply 126 fighter planes 
 India is planning to buy soon. As if on cue, the New York Times said 
 that the Bush administration is organizing a business delegation to 
 India this fall that is "potentially the largest such mission ever to a 
 single country." 
  
 Nuclear Power and India's Energy Future 
  
 To sustain its economic expansion, India needs new energy sources. The 
 total electricity generation capacity of India is about 111 gigawatts 
 (GW). Of this, only 2.5 percent is nuclear, while thermal is 70 and 
 hydro 26 percent. According to a recently published draft report on 
 energy policy, India's power generation capacity would have to increase 
 five to seven times by 2031 to about 800 GW in order to maintain a 
 growth rate of 8 percent. The present installed nuclear capacity is 3.3 
 GW, which is projected to grow three fold -- to a little over 10 GW by 
 2012 -- and double again to 20 GW by 2020. At 1,000 megawatts per 
 plant, this projects to about 40 new plants in the next quarter century 
 - -- music to the American nuclear industry, which has had no new orders 
 in the U.S. for 30 years. 
  
 What is an appropriate and sustainable energy policy for India? It 
 needs more energy to meet the basic needs of its population, large 
 segments of which do not have access to electricity nearly sixty years 
 after gaining independence. Even if a 20-fold increase takes place in 
 India's nuclear power capacity, the contribution of nuclear energy to 
 India's energy mix is expected to be at best 5-6 percent by 2031-2032. 
  
 To put things in perspective, an astounding 40 percent or more of the 
 generated electrical power is lost from the transmission and 
 distribution networks for the country as a whole -- a large part due to 
 theft. Dr. A. Gopalakrishnan, former Chair of India's Atomic Energy 
 Regulatory Board, has questioned the Indian government's premise of 
 promoting the deal primarily to enhance the country's energy security. 
 In addition to these serious doubts about appropriateness, there is the 
 peculiar ground shift in U. S. policy toward Pakistan. Only a few years 
 ago South Asia was described as the most dangerous place on earth. With 
 this loose rendering of global nuclear rules, wouldn't stability in the 
 subcontinent be jeopardized? In the bonhomie created after the approval 
 of the deal in principle by the U.S. House of Representatives on July 
 26, 2006, by an overwhelming majority, there has been little discussion 
 of such substantive issues. Business interests and the allure of 
  
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 --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05 
  * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)