[continued from previous message] 
  
 it indicates that we've got a big job to do. 
  
 But I think that underneath opinion is changing. On the surface I agree at 
 the moment, no, it isn't. But underneath people are beginning to see it 
 change. Now my own view is that if we were able to revive the Palestinian 
 process that would be a huge part of persuading opinion that the one issue 
 where even quite moderate Muslims just feel frustration and anger - that we 
 were dealing with it now. 
  
 .I know from the Israeli point of view how frustrating it is to be told, 
 you know, this is an issue that in the interest of the world has got to be 
 solved... and you worry in Israel that maybe our interests get sacrificed in 
 the course of finding a solution. I hope that I've done enough to prove that 
 I will never sacrifice the security of Israel in that way. But I do 
 genuinely believe that our job has got to be to build that alliance of 
 moderation and empower the moderate Muslims and Arab voices. 
  
 Q. We are concerned that even you cannot evoke from the Palestinian side - 
 now that the Hamas has won power and Abu Mazen is merely a figurehead, 
 having lost the election to them - even you can't evoke a negotiating 
 partner, just when an Israeli government, however bruised and battered, is 
 ready to relinquish the vast bulk of the territories... 
  
 A. That's absolutely right and I understand that. One of the things I've 
 been discussing here - because this has been a very strong sentiment of mine 
 for a long time - is that what should have happened on disengagement from 
 Gaza is this: Everyone should have come into Gaza, built a strong 
 institutional capability and governing capacity, with the economic 
 reconstruction, and then say, 'right - the disengagement from Gaza is the 
 beginning, now let's move to the next stage.' 
  
 I'm sure that is what should have happened. And it didn't. And the fact that 
 it didn't means that there is in my view a need for the international 
 community to support in a far stronger and more effective way capacity on 
 the Palestinian side. 
  
 Otherwise there are two alternatives: What happens is that either we try to 
 reinvigorate the process but it never really happens... you agree to 
 documents but they're never really operationalized; or alternatively what 
 happens is that - and I think this is a reason why it is very much in the 
 strategic interests of Israel to try to make progress - is that you can end 
 up with a sort of semi-state on the Palestinian state, full of militias and 
 gangs and trouble. 
  
 Q. But the Hamas government rejects the conditions of the Quartet, despite 
 the economic and diplomatic boycott and military pressure? 
  
 A. Yes, well I think there is a lot of pressure coming now from the 
 Palestinian people. This refusal to accept at least the basis of the Quartet 
 principles is holding back the Palestinian people. And after all, how can we 
 possibly negotiate with a government about a two-state solution if they 
 don't accept the existence of the other state? 
  
 Q. Is it pie-in-the-sky to see the beefed-up UNIFIL as something of a 
 precedent for involvement in the Palestinian question later? 
  
 A. Only in this way: Not that you'd replicate that type of force or anything 
 like that, but I think that it does indicate that sometimes what happens is 
 not that moderates don't want to do the right thing - but that they don't 
 have the capacity to do it. I am quite sure that Prime Minister Siniora 
 never wanted a situation where Resolution 1559 was never implemented. He 
 wasn't able to do it. Interestingly, with Resolution 1701 he may be able to 
 do it. I think in the same way we can transfer the analogy to this extent: 
 That's why you need real international support on the Palestinian side. I 
 think that is in the interest of the Palestinians and of the Israelis as 
 well. Obviously these are things we'll now discuss, because I think you'll 
 find now a great churn of activity but we need to make sure that out of it 
 comes something that is applicable. 
  
 Q. Regarding Iran, do you agree with the comparisons to the 1930s that we 
 often read about? 
  
 A. When you have the President of a country as powerful as Iran say those 
 things, it may be very foolish of us to assume he doesn't mean them. And 
 when he's also trying to acquire a nuclear weapon, then I think the warning 
 signs are pretty clear... I think for a president of a country to say they 
 want to wipe another country off the face of the earth and at the same time 
 he's trying to acquire a nuclear weapons capability - if we don't get 
 worried about that, future historians will raise a few questions about us 
 and about our judgment. 
  
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