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 Times on August 26, that the Union Bank of Switzerland had cut off 
 relationships with Iran and that other financial institutions might not 
 want to be bankers for a country which had nuclear bomb ambitions and 
 supported Hezbollah. 
  
 Whether international banks or the economics ministries of European nations 
 currently doing business with Iran will be swayed by this moralistic 
 argument is questionable. France and Germany each currently export forty to 
 fifty billion dollars worth of goods to Iran annually and, of course, are 
 as reliant as anyone else for oil on the world's second largest producer of 
 petroleum. Even as pundits talked of the dire political consequences of 
 Iran's refusal to submit to the European demands, economists raised the 
 possibility of world oil prices soaring past $100 per barrel if no 
 compromise was reached. Italy, a country thoroughly disillusioned with US 
 Middle East policy and now rapidly pulling its troops out of Iraq, just 
 this past weekend demanded that it be made a party to the EU talks with 
 Iran to make sure that its own considerable economic interests there are 
 protected. 
  
 As to the "eventual war" with Iran predicted, and apparently even desired 
 by the Post, it is true that the Bush administration continues to maintain 
 that the unilateral military option "remains on the table." However, there 
 are clear signs that while use of that option was a strong probability back 
 last spring when the EU issued its ultimatum to Tehran and in July when 
 Resolution 1696 was passed by the Security Council Iranian diplomacy, 
 insufficiently reported on in the US press, has been enormously successful 
 both in the Islamic world broadly and in the Middle East, producing near 
 total opposition to the EU (read US) position. In addition, the war in Iraq 
 has so drained American ground force capabilities as to make very dubious 
 any successful attack against Iran by US forces alone or even with the 
 assistance of the only possible ally, Israel. This does not mean that US 
 air and naval power could not, as in Iraq, quickly eliminate Iran's very 
 limited air and armor forces. But, as in Iraq, Iran has the capacity and, 
 apparently, the will, as it showed in its 1980s war with Iraq, to employ 
 irregular infantry to great effect. According to Pentagon sources most 
 senior Army and Marine Corps officers are arguing strongly against any 
 military attack on Iran regardless of the outcome of the sanctions dispute. 
 (Some Air Force senior officers, according to the same sources, however, 
 appear eager to launch their bunkerbusters in another display of shock and 
 awe, believing somehow that this time, despite the historical lessons 
 showing the contrary, strategic bombing will win the day.) 
  
 Former CIA Middle East specialist Ray Close, however, is among those who 
 argue that Bush and his neo-con allies will not be swayed by logic. 
 Sometime prior to leaving office in 2009-after the inevitable international 
 compromise over Iran's nuclear program, the UN's refusal to impose punitive 
 sanctions on Iran, the unwillingness of the EU countries (with the possible 
 exception of the UK) to accept the US position-a frustrated Bush will 
 launch massive air attacks on Iran, possibly with Israeli participation, 
 ostensibly designed to destroy that country's oh-so-dangerous nuclear power 
 installations before they can be used against us. 
  
 The result of such action, Close concludes, will be utterly to the 
 disadvantage of the United States, not only in the Middle East and the 
 Islamic World, but globally. However, Close sees Bush as a maniac, who 
 believes such an outcome is preferable to the personal humiliation that 
 acceptance of a diplomatic solution he openly opposes would be. 
  
 On the other hand, more and more analysts are concluding that the 
 forthcoming negotiations with Iran will produce successful compromise. As 
 noted above, Iran has played its diplomatic cards well over the past few 
 months. The New York Times, and Washington Post and the large majority of 
 the American public which takes its opinions from them may, as the most 
 recent Angus-Reid poll shows, fervently believe that Iran has or is busy 
 making nuclear weapons However, the rest of the world, including such old 
 Iranian foes as Saudi Arabia and, ironically, most western intelligence 
 agencies, their credibility in tatters since 2003, accept the fact that 
 there is no substantial evidence to prove it. 
  
 A good brief summary of the way the situation might well play out is 
 provided by Trevor Royal, diplomatic editor of Australia's Sunday Herald in 
 his August 27th column, "Negotiated nuclear settlement a possibility." 
 Iran, he says, "may well be interested in a negotiated settlement. This 
 will be sold [to the Iranian and world publics] not so much as a climb-down 
 but as the introduction of some much-needed common sense, which will spike 
 US threats to push for sanctions. The most likely outcome is that Iran will 
 accept the [EU] offer in principle but question the small print in an 
 ettempt to win concessions. For example, they are desperate to have 
 international support for producing nuclear energy and they need the 
 technology, but before they do anything they require guarantees." When 
 Royal says "before they do anything they require guarantees" he obviously 
 refers to the EU demand for suspension of uranium enrichment, and he cites 
 Mark Fitzpatrick of the UK's International Institute for Strategic Studies 
 on the question of whether suspension in some form will occur early or 
 later on in the forthcoming negotiations. 
  
 >From the perspective of this writer it seems very likely that a negotiated 
 agreement will take something like the following form. Russia, currently 
 Iran's major nuclear energy supply source, involved in the building of at 
 least one nuclear energy plant in Iran, has long offered to construct a 
 nuclear fuel plant for Iran on Russian soil with its production going 
 exclusively for the Iranian nuclear power program if Iran gives up its own 
 attempts at fuel production. Iran has rejected this on grounds of its NPT 
 right to produce fuel and on the pragmatic argument that it cannot risk 
 having to rely entirely on a foreign supplier, even one as ostensibly 
 friendly as Russia. Moreover, Iran has argued that, by turning over nuclear 
 fuel supply to a foreign power (or powers) and abandoning its own efforts, 
 its ability to advance scientifically will be thwarted, relegating it 
 permanently to second class scientific status. This is something, Tehran 
 declares, represents a European and US policy to keep Islamic nations 
 subordinate and technically underdeveloped. 
  
 However, it is clear, and Iran grudgingly accepts this, that it cannot 
 within any reasonable period of time develop the uranium enrichment 
 capacity to fuel its power plants on its own. Therefore, Iran will probably 
 agree to the establishment of the Russian-proposed fuel plant provided that 
 Iranian scientists and technicians form a significant part of the 
 management and staff. Moreover, Iran will also insist that such an 
 arrangement does not cancel its NPT right to pursue nuclear fuel research 
 and development on its own. This would mean that, under IAEA supervision, 
 some sort of international nuclear research program be established on 
 Iranian soil also. Regardless of what arrangements are arrived at, it has 
 to be recognized by not only the negotiating parties but by the US as well 
  
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