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 still a British colony. This advisor proposed that an SAS team be sent to 
 Vietnam. Lee said that was unacceptable owing to Britain's position as 
 Co-Chair of the Geneva Agreement but then wrote: 
  
 'However, this recommendation might be possible to implement if the 
 personnel are detached and given temporary civilian status, or are attached 
 to the American Special Forces in such a manner that their British military 
 identity is lost in the US Unit. However the Americans are crying out for 
 expert assistance in this field and are extremely enthusiastic that [one 
 inch of text censored] should join them. He really is an expert, full of 
 enthusiasm, drive and initiative in dealing with these primitive peoples and 
 I hope that he will be given full support and assistance in this task'. 
  
 'These primitive peoples' is a reference to the Montagnards in the highlands 
 of the central provinces of Vietnam. Lee continues: 
  
 'It is clear that there is enormous scope for assistance of a practical 
 nature on the lines of that already being undertaken by the Americans. Thus 
 it is strongly recommended that such British contribution [sic] as may be 
 feasible be grafted onto the American effort in the field, particularly in 
 view of their shortage of certain types of personnel. The ideal solution 
 might be to contribute a number of teams to operate in a particular area 
 fully integrated into the overall American and Vietnamese plan. The civil 
 side could be composed of carefully selected Europeans and Malayans with 
 suitable experience, and the military element could be drawn from the SAS 
 regiment which operated for many years amongst the Aborigines in Malaya. 
 Suitable steps could doubtless be taken to give them temporary civilian 
 status. Although we should have to rely on the Americans to a great degree 
 for logistic support, it might still be possible to provide a positive 
 contribution in this field such as specialised equipment. A less 
 satisfactory solution might be to integrate certain specialists into 
 existing or projected American Special Forces Teams, although the main 
 disadvantage here, particularly on the Aborigine side would lie in the fact 
 that many of the experienced Malayan personnel would not speak English and 
 would have to rely on the British element as interpreters when dealing with 
 the Americans.' 
  
 This team was sent, and was known as the 'Noone mission' under Richard Noone 
 (the figure whose name is censored in these files) and which acted under 
 cover of BRIAM. The covert operation began in summer 1962 and was still in 
 operation until at least late 1963. 
  
 Other covert aid provided by Britain included secret British air flights 
 from Hong Kong to deliver arms, especially napalm and five-hundred-pound 
 bombs. Intelligence support included forwarding reports to the Americans 
 from MI6 station heads in Hanoi while the British monitoring station in Hong 
 Kong provided the US with intelligence until 1975, in an operation linked to 
 the US National Security Agency, whose intercepts of North Vietnamese 
 military traffic were used by the US military command to target bombing 
 strikes over North Vietnam. 
  
 Military escalation, British backing 
  
 A May 1965 Foreign Office brief states that Britain's 'direct involvement in 
 Vietnam is insignificant' but 'that our interests as a non-communist power 
 would be impaired if the United States government were defeated in the 
 field, or defaulted on its commitments'. US prestige was therefore in danger 
 and defeat 'would damage America's standing all over the world'. Similarly, 
 'American abandonment of South Vietnam would cause both friend and foe 
 throughout the world to wonder whether the US might, in future be induced to 
 abandon other allies when the going got tough'. 
  
  The period 1963-6 was marked above all by massive escalation in US 
 aggression. The British files show the degree of secret support Prime 
 Minister Harold Wilson gave President Johnson, at every stage of escalation, 
 often kept private given major British public opposition to the war - a good 
 example, as currently with Iraq, of how the public threat is dealt with by 
 private understandings among elites on both sides of the Atlantic. 
  
  In February 1965, the US took the war into a devastating new phase by 
 beginning the bombing of North Vietnam in its 'Rolling Thunder' campaign. 
 Britain had already promised to give 'unequivocable [sic] support to any 
 action which the US government might take which was measured and related 
 strictly to North Vietnamese and Viet Cong activity'. Two days after the 
 attacks began, Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart told the Washington embassy 
 of the 'military necessity of the action' and informed Wilson that 'I was 
 particularly anxious not to say anything in public that might appear 
 critical of the US government'. 
  
  A Foreign Office brief in March 1965 stated that 'although from time to 
 time we have expressed cautionary views in response to notifications of US 
 plans for attacks against the North, we have at no stage opposed them. Our 
 comments have been mostly on the timing or public presentation of the 
 attacksHMG have at no stage opposed the policy being followed by the US but 
 rather by suggesting minor changes in timing or presentation from time to 
 time, have acquiesced in it'. 
  
  When the US first used its own aircraft in South Vietnam in March 1965, 
 this was also welcomed by the British ambassador, who said that it had 
 'beneficial effects' both on the Vietnamese government and the 'morale of 
 the American pilots'. On 8 March the US landed 3,500 marines in South 
 Vietnam which the Foreign Office said in private was 'in contravention of 
 Article 16 and 17 of the 1954 [Geneva] agreement, but we have not yet 
 received any protests on the subject' - therefore, best keep quiet. Then, in 
 June 1965, the US announced that US ground forces would now be going into 
 combat on a routine basis. One Foreign Office official noted that 'I feel 
 sure we should try to help the US administration, who have now been landed 
 in some difficulty in handling the president's announcement, by implying 
 that the commitment of ground troops is mostly a matter of degree'. 
  
  The British provision of arms to the US for use in Vietnam was done in the 
 knowledge that it breached the Geneva Agreements. In September 1965 the 
 Foreign Office agreed to export 300 bombs intended for the US Air Force 'for 
 use in Vietnam', saying that 'there must be no publicity' and that 'delivery 
 should be in the UK'. The previous month the Foreign Secretary had agreed to 
 provide the US with 200 armoured personnel carriers for use in Vietnam 
 'providing that delivery took place in Europe' and that there was 'no 
 unavoidable publicity'. 
  
 The way out and British interests 
  
 In contrast to the first half of the 1960s, from 1965 onwards British 
 planners were concluding that the war could not be won militarily. A draft 
 Foreign Office report of June 1968 concluded that 'it is very much in our 
 interests that the United States should as soon as possible find a means of 
 escape from her present involvement' in Vietnam. The reason was that the war 
 was imposing 'strains on the world monetary system' which was due to a lack 
 of confidence in the reserve currencies. One reason for this was the US 
 balance of payments deficit caused by spending on the war. A US withdrawal 
 'would have a stimulating confidence effect on the dollar and in [sic] world 
  
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 --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05 
  * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)