[continued from previous message] 
  
 our intelligence community laps up the results. 
  
 3. We should cease all co-operation with the Uzbek Security Services they 
 are beyond the pale. We indeed need to establish an SIS presence here, but 
 not as in a friendly state. 
  
 DETAIL 
  
 4. In the period December 2002 to March 2003 I raised several times the 
 issue of intelligence material from the Uzbek security services which was 
 obtained under torture and passed to us via the CIA. I queried the legality, 
 efficacy and morality of the practice. 
  
 5. I was summoned to the UK for a meeting on 8 March 2003. Michael Wood gave 
 his legal opinion that it was not illegal to obtain and to use intelligence 
 acquired by torture. He said the only legal limitation on its use was that 
 it could not be used in legal proceedings, under Article 15 of the UN 
 Convention on Torture. 
  
 6. On behalf of the intelligence services, Matthew Kydd said that they found 
 some of the material very useful indeed with a direct bearing on the war on 
 terror. Linda Duffield said that she had been asked to assure me that my 
 qualms of conscience were respected and understood. 
  
 7. Sir Michael Jay's circular of 26 May stated that there was a reporting 
 obligation on us to report torture by allies (and I have been instructed to 
 refer to Uzbekistan as such in the context of the war on terror). You, Sir, 
 have made a number of striking, and I believe heartfelt, condemnations of 
 torture in the last few weeks. I had in the light of this decided to return 
 to this question and to highlight an apparent contradiction in our policy. I 
 had intimated as much to the Head of Eastern Department. 
  
 8. I was therefore somewhat surprised to hear that without informing me of 
 the meeting, or since informing me of the result of the meeting, a meeting 
 was convened in the FCO at the level of Heads of Department and above, 
 precisely to consider the question of the receipt of Uzbek intelligence 
 material obtained under torture. As the office knew, I was in London at the 
 time and perfectly able to attend the meeting. I still have only gleaned 
 that it happened. 
  
 9. I understand that the meeting decided to continue to obtain the Uzbek 
 torture material. I understand that the principal argument deployed was that 
 the intelligence material disguises the precise source, ie it does not 
 ordinarily reveal the name of the individual who is tortured. Indeed this is 
 true € the material is marked with a euphemism such as "From detainee 
 debriefing." The argument runs that if the individual is not named, we 
 cannot prove that he was tortured. 
  
 10. I will not attempt to hide my utter contempt for such casuistry, nor my 
 shame that I work in and organisation where colleagues would resort to it to 
 justify torture. I have dealt with hundreds of individual cases of political 
 or religious prisoners in Uzbekistan, and I have met with very few where 
 torture, as defined in the UN convention, was not employed. When my then DHM 
 raised the question with the CIA head of station 15 months ago, he readily 
 acknowledged torture was deployed in obtaining intelligence. I do not think 
 there is any doubt as to the fact 
  
 11. The torture record of the Uzbek security services could hardly be more 
 widely known. Plainly there are, at the very least, reasonable grounds for 
 believing the material is obtained under torture. There is helpful guidance 
 at Article 3 of the UN Convention; "The competent authorities shall take 
 into account all relevant considerations including, where applicable, the 
 existence in the state concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant 
 or mass violations of human rights." While this article forbids extradition 
 or deportation to Uzbekistan, it is the right test for the present question 
 also. 
  
 12. On the usefulness of the material obtained, this is irrelevant. Article 
 2 of the Convention, to which we are a party, could not be plainer: 
  
 "No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat 
 of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be 
 invoked as a justification of torture." 
  
 13. Nonetheless, I repeat that this material is useless € we are selling our 
 souls for dross. It is in fact positively harmful. It is designed to give 
 the message the Uzbeks want the West to hear. It exaggerates the role, size, 
 organisation and activity of the IMU and its links with Al Qaida. The aim is 
 to convince the West that the Uzbeks are a vital cog against a common foe, 
 that they should keep the assistance, especially military assistance, 
 coming, and that they should mute the international criticism on human 
 rights and economic reform. 
  
 14. I was taken aback when Matthew Kydd said this stuff was valuable. 
 Sixteen months ago it was difficult to argue with SIS in the area of 
 intelligence assessment. But post Butler we know, not only that they can get 
 it wrong on even the most vital and high profile issues, but that they have 
 a particular yen for highly coloured material which exaggerates the threat. 
 That is precisely what the Uzbeks give them. Furthermore MI6 have no 
 operative within a thousand miles of me and certainly no expertise that can 
 come close to my own in making this assessment. 
  
 15. At the Khuderbegainov trial I met an old man from Andizhan. Two of his 
 children had been tortured in front of him until he signed a confession on 
 the family's links with Bin Laden. Tears were streaming down his face. I 
 have no doubt they had as much connection with Bin Laden as I do. This is 
 the standard of the Uzbek intelligence services. 
  
 16. I have been considering Michael Wood's legal view, which he kindly gave 
 in writing. I cannot understand why Michael concentrated only on Article 15 
 of the Convention. This certainly bans the use of material obtained under 
 torture as evidence in proceedings, but it does not state that this is the 
 sole exclusion of the use of such material. 
  
 17. The relevant article seems to me Article 4, which talks of complicity in 
 torture. Knowingly to receive its results appears to be at least arguable as 
 complicity. It does not appear that being in a different country to the 
 actual torture would preclude complicity. I talked this over in a 
 hypothetical sense with my old friend Prof Francois Hampson, I believe an 
 acknowledged World authority on the Convention, who said that the complicity 
 argument and the spirit of the Convention would be likely to be winning 
 points. I should be grateful to hear Michael's views on this. 
  
 18. It seems to me that there are degrees of complicity and guilt, but being 
 at one or two removes does not make us blameless. There are other factors. 
 Plainly it was a breach of Article 3 of the Convention for the coalition to 
 deport detainees back here from Baghram, but it has been done. That seems 
 plainly complicit. 
  
 19. This is a difficult and dangerous part of the World. Dire and increasing 
 poverty and harsh repression are undoubtedly turning young people here 
 towards radical Islam. The Uzbek government are thus creating this threat, 
 and perceived US support for Karimov strengthens anti-Western feeling. SIS 
 ought to establish a presence here, but not as partners of the Uzbek 
 Security Services, whose sheer brutality puts them beyond the pale. 
  
 MURRAY 
  
                            *** 
  
 Second Document - summary of legal opinion from Michael Wood arguing that it 
 is legal to use information extracted under torture: 
  
 | From: Michael Wood, Legal Advisor 
  
 [continued in next message] 
  
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