[continued from previous message] 
  
 > and waterways to 'hamper the Communist courier system', along with 
 > 'limited 
 > food control' in some areas. 'If the system works successfully', the 
 > Ambassador noted, 'this provides the main opportunity for killing 
 > terrorists'. Thompson's Delta Plan was also the basis for the US 
 > 'strategic 
 > hamlets' programme, soon to be devised by the US State Department. 
 > 
 > Britain's covert role 
 > 
 > The British government has never admitted that British forces fought in 
 > Vietnam, yet the files confirm that they did, even though several remain 
 > censored. In August 1962, the Military Attache in Saigon, Colonel Lee, 
 > wrote 
 > to the War Office in London attaching a report by someone whose name is 
 > censored but who is described as an advisor to the Malayan government, 
 > then 
 > still a British colony. This advisor proposed that an SAS team be sent to 
 > Vietnam. Lee said that was unacceptable owing to Britain's position as 
 > Co-Chair of the Geneva Agreement but then wrote: 
 > 
 > 'However, this recommendation might be possible to implement if the 
 > personnel are detached and given temporary civilian status, or are 
 > attached 
 > to the American Special Forces in such a manner that their British 
 > military 
 > identity is lost in the US Unit. However the Americans are crying out for 
 > expert assistance in this field and are extremely enthusiastic that [one 
 > inch of text censored] should join them. He really is an expert, full of 
 > enthusiasm, drive and initiative in dealing with these primitive peoples 
 > and 
 > I hope that he will be given full support and assistance in this task'. 
 > 
 > 'These primitive peoples' is a reference to the Montagnards in the 
 > highlands 
 > of the central provinces of Vietnam. Lee continues: 
 > 
 > 'It is clear that there is enormous scope for assistance of a practical 
 > nature on the lines of that already being undertaken by the Americans. 
 > Thus 
 > it is strongly recommended that such British contribution [sic] as may be 
 > feasible be grafted onto the American effort in the field, particularly in 
 > view of their shortage of certain types of personnel. The ideal solution 
 > might be to contribute a number of teams to operate in a particular area 
 > fully integrated into the overall American and Vietnamese plan. The civil 
 > side could be composed of carefully selected Europeans and Malayans with 
 > suitable experience, and the military element could be drawn from the SAS 
 > regiment which operated for many years amongst the Aborigines in Malaya. 
 > Suitable steps could doubtless be taken to give them temporary civilian 
 > status. Although we should have to rely on the Americans to a great degree 
 > for logistic support, it might still be possible to provide a positive 
 > contribution in this field such as specialised equipment. A less 
 > satisfactory solution might be to integrate certain specialists into 
 > existing or projected American Special Forces Teams, although the main 
 > disadvantage here, particularly on the Aborigine side would lie in the 
 > fact 
 > that many of the experienced Malayan personnel would not speak English and 
 > would have to rely on the British element as interpreters when dealing 
 > with 
 > the Americans.' 
 > 
 > This team was sent, and was known as the 'Noone mission' under Richard 
 > Noone 
 > (the figure whose name is censored in these files) and which acted under 
 > cover of BRIAM. The covert operation began in summer 1962 and was still in 
 > operation until at least late 1963. 
 > 
 > Other covert aid provided by Britain included secret British air flights 
 > from Hong Kong to deliver arms, especially napalm and five-hundred-pound 
 > bombs. Intelligence support included forwarding reports to the Americans 
 > from MI6 station heads in Hanoi while the British monitoring station in 
 > Hong 
 > Kong provided the US with intelligence until 1975, in an operation linked 
 > to 
 > the US National Security Agency, whose intercepts of North Vietnamese 
 > military traffic were used by the US military command to target bombing 
 > strikes over North Vietnam. 
 > 
 > Military escalation, British backing 
 > 
 > A May 1965 Foreign Office brief states that Britain's 'direct involvement 
 > in 
 > Vietnam is insignificant' but 'that our interests as a non-communist power 
 > would be impaired if the United States government were defeated in the 
 > field, or defaulted on its commitments'. US prestige was therefore in 
 > danger 
 > and defeat 'would damage America's standing all over the world'. 
 > Similarly, 
 > 'American abandonment of South Vietnam would cause both friend and foe 
 > throughout the world to wonder whether the US might, in future be induced 
 > to 
 > abandon other allies when the going got tough'. 
 > 
 > The period 1963-6 was marked above all by massive escalation in US 
 > aggression. The British files show the degree of secret support Prime 
 > Minister Harold Wilson gave President Johnson, at every stage of 
 > escalation, 
 > often kept private given major British public opposition to the war - a 
 > good 
 > example, as currently with Iraq, of how the public threat is dealt with by 
 > private understandings among elites on both sides of the Atlantic. 
 > 
 > In February 1965, the US took the war into a devastating new phase by 
 > beginning the bombing of North Vietnam in its 'Rolling Thunder' campaign. 
 > Britain had already promised to give 'unequivocable [sic] support to any 
 > action which the US government might take which was measured and related 
 > strictly to North Vietnamese and Viet Cong activity'. Two days after the 
 > attacks began, Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart told the Washington 
 > embassy 
 > of the 'military necessity of the action' and informed Wilson that 'I was 
 > particularly anxious not to say anything in public that might appear 
 > critical of the US government'. 
 > 
 > A Foreign Office brief in March 1965 stated that 'although from time to 
 > time we have expressed cautionary views in response to notifications of US 
 > plans for attacks against the North, we have at no stage opposed them. Our 
 > comments have been mostly on the timing or public presentation of the 
 > attacksHMG have at no stage opposed the policy being followed by the US 
 > but 
 > rather by suggesting minor changes in timing or presentation from time to 
 > time, have acquiesced in it'. 
 > 
 > When the US first used its own aircraft in South Vietnam in March 1965, 
 > this was also welcomed by the British ambassador, who said that it had 
 > 'beneficial effects' both on the Vietnamese government and the 'morale of 
 > the American pilots'. On 8 March the US landed 3,500 marines in South 
 > Vietnam which the Foreign Office said in private was 'in contravention of 
 > Article 16 and 17 of the 1954 [Geneva] agreement, but we have not yet 
 > received any protests on the subject' - therefore, best keep quiet. Then, 
 > in 
 > June 1965, the US announced that US ground forces would now be going into 
 > combat on a routine basis. One Foreign Office official noted that 'I feel 
 > sure we should try to help the US administration, who have now been landed 
 > in some difficulty in handling the president's announcement, by implying 
 > that the commitment of ground troops is mostly a matter of degree'. 
 > 
 > The British provision of arms to the US for use in Vietnam was done in the 
 > knowledge that it breached the Geneva Agreements. In September 1965 the 
 > Foreign Office agreed to export 300 bombs intended for the US Air Force 
 > 'for 
  
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 --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05 
  * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)