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 conversation by Mr. Bush and Mr. Blair about the most serious subjects. At 
 one point, the leaders swapped ideas for a postwar Iraqi government. "As for 
 the future government of Iraq, people would find it very odd if we handed it 
 over to another dictator," the prime minister is quoted as saying. 
  
 "Bush agreed," Mr. Manning wrote. This exchange, like most of the quotations 
 in this article, have not been previously reported. 
  
 Mr. Bush was accompanied at the meeting by Condoleezza Rice, who was then 
 the national security adviser; Dan Fried, a senior aide to Ms. Rice; and 
 Andrew H. Card Jr., the White House chief of staff. Along with Mr. Manning, 
 Mr. Blair was joined by two other senior aides: Jonathan Powell, his chief 
 of staff, and Matthew Rycroft, a foreign policy aide and the author of the 
 Downing Street memo. 
  
 By late January 2003, United Nations inspectors had spent six weeks in Iraq 
 hunting for weapons under the auspices of Security Council Resolution 1441, 
 which authorized "serious consequences" if Iraq voluntarily failed to 
 disarm. Led by Hans Blix, the inspectors had reported little cooperation 
 from Mr. Hussein, and no success finding any unconventional weapons. 
  
 At their meeting, Mr. Bush and Mr. Blair candidly expressed their doubts 
 that chemical, biological or nuclear weapons would be found in Iraq in the 
 coming weeks, the memo said. The president spoke as if an invasion was 
 unavoidable. The two leaders discussed a timetable for the war, details of 
 the military campaign and plans for the aftermath of the war. 
  
 Discussing Provocation 
  
 Without much elaboration, the memo also says the president raised three 
 possible ways of provoking a confrontation. Since they were first reported 
 last month, neither the White House nor the British government has discussed 
 them. 
  
 "The U.S. was thinking of flying U2 reconnaissance aircraft with fighter 
 cover over Iraq, painted in U.N. colours," the memo says, attributing the 
 idea to Mr. Bush. "If Saddam fired on them, he would be in breach." 
  
 It also described the president as saying, "The U.S. might be able to bring 
 out a defector who could give a public presentation about Saddam's W.M.D," 
 referring to weapons of mass destruction. 
  
 A brief clause in the memo refers to a third possibility, mentioned by Mr. 
 Bush, a proposal to assassinate Saddam Hussein. The memo does not indicate 
 how Mr. Blair responded to the idea. 
  
 Mr. Sands first reported the proposals in his book, although he did not use 
 any direct quotations from the memo. He is a professor of international law 
 at University College of London and the founding member of the Matrix law 
 office in London, where the prime minister's wife, Cherie Blair, is a 
 partner. 
  
 Mr. Jones, the National Security Council spokesman, declined to discuss the 
 proposals, saying, "We are not going to get into discussing private 
 discussions of the two leaders." 
  
 At several points during the meeting between Mr. Bush and Mr. Blair, there 
 was palpable tension over finding a legitimate legal trigger for going to 
 war that would be acceptable to other nations, the memo said. The prime 
 minister was quoted as saying it was essential for both countries to lobby 
 for a second United Nations resolution against Iraq, because it would serve 
 as "an insurance policy against the unexpected." 
  
 The memo said Mr. Blair told Mr. Bush, "If anything went wrong with the 
 military campaign, or if Saddam increased the stakes by burning the oil 
 wells, killing children or fomenting internal divisions within Iraq, a 
 second resolution would give us international cover, especially with the 
 Arabs." 
  
 Running Out of Time 
  
 Mr. Bush agreed that the two countries should attempt to get a second 
 resolution, but he added that time was running out. "The U.S. would put its 
 full weight behind efforts to get another resolution and would twist arms 
 and even threaten," Mr. Bush was paraphrased in the memo as saying. 
  
 The document added, "But he had to say that if we ultimately failed, 
 military action would follow anyway." 
  
 The leaders agreed that three weeks remained to obtain a second United 
 Nations Security Council resolution before military commanders would need to 
 begin preparing for an invasion. 
  
 Summarizing statements by the president, the memo says: "The air campaign 
 would probably last four days, during which some 1,500 targets would be hit. 
 Great care would be taken to avoid hitting innocent civilians. Bush thought 
 the impact of the air onslaught would ensure the early collapse of Saddam's 
 regime. Given this military timetable, we needed to go for a second 
 resolution as soon as possible. This probably meant after Blix's next report 
 to the Security Council in mid-February." 
  
 Mr. Blair was described as responding that both countries would make clear 
 that a second resolution amounted to "Saddam's final opportunity." The memo 
 described Mr. Blair as saying: "We had been very patient. Now we should be 
 saying that the crisis must be resolved in weeks, not months." 
  
 It reported: "Bush agreed. He commented that he was not itching to go to 
 war, but we could not allow Saddam to go on playing with us. At some point, 
 probably when we had passed the second resolutions € assuming we did € we 
 should warn Saddam that he had a week to leave. We should notify the media 
 too. We would then have a clear field if Saddam refused to go." 
  
 Mr. Bush devoted much of the meeting to outlining the military strategy. The 
 president, the memo says, said the planned air campaign "would destroy 
 Saddam's command and control quickly." It also said that he expected Iraq's 
 army to "fold very quickly." He also is reported as telling the prime 
 minister that the Republican Guard would be "decimated by the bombing." 
  
 Despite his optimism, Mr. Bush said he was aware that "there were 
 uncertainties and risks," the memo says, and it goes on, "As far as 
 destroying the oil wells were concerned, the U.S. was well equipped to 
 repair them quickly, although this would be easier in the south of Iraq than 
 in the north." 
  
 The two men briefly discussed plans for a post-Hussein Iraqi government. 
 "The prime minister asked about aftermath planning," the memo says. "Condi 
 Rice said that a great deal of work was now in hand. 
  
 Referring to the Defense Department, it said: "A planning cell in D.O.D. was 
 looking at all aspects and would deploy to Iraq to direct operations as soon 
 as the military action was over. Bush said that a great deal of detailed 
 planning had been done on supplying the Iraqi people with food and 
 medicine." 
  
 Planning for After the War 
  
 The leaders then looked beyond the war, imagining the transition from Mr. 
 Hussein's rule to a new government. Immediately after the war, a military 
 occupation would be put in place for an unknown period of time, the 
 president was described as saying. He spoke of the "dilemma of managing the 
 transition to the civil administration," the memo says. 
  
 The document concludes with Mr. Manning still holding out a last-minute hope 
 of inspectors finding weapons in Iraq, or even Mr. Hussein voluntarily 
 leaving Iraq. But Mr. Manning wrote that he was concerned this could not be 
 accomplished by Mr. Bush's timeline for war. 
  
 "This makes the timing very tight," he wrote. "We therefore need to stay 
 closely alongside Blix, do all we can to help the inspectors make a 
 significant find, and work hard on the other members of the Security Council 
  
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