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 others in Latin America, and may threaten ?nationalisation or 
 confiscation of foreign and local businesses?. 
  
 The PPP drew its support from the Indian community, ?including not 
 only poverty-stricken rural and urban workers, but also a 
 considerable number of small businessmen in Georgetown and other 
 centres?, a US intelligence report from March 1961 read. 
  
 In April 1961, at meetings in Washington, the US had proposed to 
 Britain ?ways and means of ensuring that an independent British 
 Guiana was not dominated by Communists?. 
  
 Foreign secretary Douglas-Home said that Britain was ?anxious to do 
 everything possible to make sure that British Guiana developed on the 
 right lines?. 
  
 A group was set up in which US and British officials looked into ?the 
 possibilities of taking action to influence the results of the 
 election? scheduled for August 1961, Douglas-Home noted. 
  
 But despite US pleas Britain refused to cooperate in the US plan 
 actively to prevent Jagan winning the election, arguing that it was 
 better to work with him and steer him away from unacceptable policies 
 through financial and economic aid. 
  
 The PPP won 20 of the 35 seats in the assembly in the 1961 
 elections?45 percent of the vote?against 11 seats won by the People?s 
 National Party, the principal opposition party, under Forbes Burnham. 
  
 After the election the US State Department recommended a programme 
 that combined offering Jagan technical and economic assistance with a 
 covert operation ?to expose and destroy Communists in British Guiana? 
 and to find ?a substitute for Jagan himself who could command East 
 Indian support?. 
  
 Noting that these two goals were in conflict, President Kennedy?s 
 special assistant, Arthur Schlesinger, wrote that ?this means that 
 the covert program must be handled with the utmost discretion?. 
  
 The US policy of assisting Jagan had been agreed with the British, 
 who were still rejecting covert action to oust him. But by October 
 1961 the files show that US planners were questioning its strategy 
 and wanted to review it with the British. 
  
 In February 1962 US Secretary of State Dean Rusk told foreign 
 secretary Douglas-Home, ?I have reached the conclusion that it is not 
 possible for us to put up with an independent British Guiana under 
 Jagan. 
  
 ?The continuation of Jagan in power is leading us to disaster in 
 terms of the colony itself, strains on Anglo-American relations and 
 difficulties for the Inter-American system 
 I hope we can agree that 
 Jagan should not accede to power again. Cordially yours, Dean Rusk.? 
  
 This was too much even for the British. Macmillan wrote that he read 
 Rusk?s letter with ?amazement?, telling Douglas-Home, ?How can the 
 Americans continue to attack us in the United Nations on colonialism 
 and then use expressions like these which are not colonialism but 
 pure Machiavellianism?? 
  
 Douglas-Home replied to Rusk and, referring to his view that ?Jagan 
 should not accede to power again?, countered, ?How would you suggest 
 that this can be done in a democracy?? 
  
 Britain, he said, could also not go back on its promise to grant 
 independence. However, the British government soon acquiesced. 
  
 At a constitutional conference in March 1960 the principle of 
 independence had been conceded and a new constitution agreed. 
  
 It was envisaged that independence would take place in August 1963, 
 two years after the introduction of the new constitution. 
  
 In March 1962 colonial minister Hugh Fraser visited Washington. After 
 meetings with Kennedy and others, Fraser came back talking of an 
 alternative constitution involving proportional representation rather 
 than the present first past the post system. 
  
 But any proposal on this, he wrote, ?must not flow from us but from 
 the demands of the British Guianese themselves?. 
  
 A change in the constitution was necessary since, as a US 
 intelligence report in April recognised, new elections held on the 
 same basis as in August 1961 ?would probably return a Jagan 
 government again?. 
  
 In May Macmillan told cabinet secretary Norman Brook that ?it is 
 surely to our interests [sic] to be as cooperative and forthcoming as 
 we can? towards the US desire for ?a satisfactory solution? in 
 British Guiana. 
  
 His note to Brook asked him to set up a committee to consider the 
 future of the territory?presumably to work on the fixing of the 
 constitution following Fraser?s meetings with the Americans?and also 
 stated that this note was not being copied to any of the ministers 
 concerned. 
  
 At this point some of the British files have been censored, but it 
 seems that Macmillan wrote to Kennedy informing him of a change of 
 British policy?the beginning, in fact, of a British constitutional 
 coup planning to effect regime change. 
  
 The US continued covert planning. ?Here is a paper from Dean Rusk 
 which comes out hard for a policy of getting rid of Jagan,? one US 
 note from July 1962 reads. 
  
 ?Should our covert program succeed, we would wish to be in the 
 position of being able to give the successor regime immediate aid,? 
 Schlesinger told President Kennedy in September 1962. 
  
 It is very unlikely that these plans in a British colony could have 
 been conducted without at least a nod and a wink from Whitehall. 
  
 The CIA helped to organise and fund anti-Jagan protests in February 
 1962, which resulted in strikes and riots, and during which the 
 British sent troops to restore order. 
  
 But the centrepiece of the CIA?s covert operation was funding a 
 general strike, which began in April 1963 and lasted for 80 days. CIA 
 agents gave advice to local union leaders on how to organize and 
 sustain the strike?with a budget of $1 million, they provided funds 
 and food to keep the strikers going. 
  
 This strike was publicly cited by British officials as evidence that 
 Jagan could not run the country. In March 1963 a note from the US 
 consul general in Georgetown, Everett Melby, confirms the agreement 
 between the US and Britain: 
  
 ?That proportional representation (PR) as an electoral system for 
 British Guiana (BG) represents the most practical electoral device 
 for replacing premier Cheddi Jagan and the People?s Progressive Party 
 (PPP) with a more democratic and reliable government.? 
  
 The use of the term ?more democratic? is the facade maintained even 
 in internal communications for what was in effect a coup. Later in 
 the same memo, Melby noted that ?with the existing electoral 
 districting, he [Jagan] would probably win a majority of seats?. 
  
 ?An independent Guyana will be within the US sphere,? Melby noted, 
 adding: 
  
 ?It is not in the national interest to have a Communist government on 
 the mainland of South America. An independent Guyana with Jagan in 
 office represents such a threat, and as such should be removed.? 
  
 Melby then urged the US government formally to decide on PR for the 
 country. 
  
 Finally, he noted that he would shortly present ?an outline of 
 several projects which, after the PPP?s removal, may be effective in 
 discrediting Jagan with some of his supporters?. 
  
 In June, now prime minister Douglas-Home met Kennedy in talks in 
 Britain. The brief for Douglas-Home stated: 
  
 ?If Jagan maintains his hold over the Indians, it is inevitable that 
 in a few years he will lead the government 
 ~ The normal course would 
 be for us to go ahead with independence under the present government. 
  
 ?Were it not for Jagan?s Communist leanings we should have no 
 hesitation. But we are willing to consider with the president the 
  
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 --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05 
  * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)