XPost: nyc.general, nyc.politics, nyc.transit 
 From: MisterShooter@ 
  
 > If so, it was negligent not to have upgraded the system before the life 
 > expectancy was exceeded. Plans to do so should have been made well before 
 > then. 
  
  
  
 A comprehensive capital program to replace obsolete equipment is certainly 
 the intent of every Transit Authority (TA) however, there is only so many 
 projects that might fit within an budget envelope that views funding from 5 
 to 10 years out.  The rail wears out as do the rail cars, tunnel leaks often 
 take priority when the budget plan is approved.  If the signal system (and 
 other electrical systems) are reliable they may not be identified for 
 replacement merely for age or obsolescence. 
  
 It's a case of the squeaky wheel getting the grease.  TA managers 
 undoubtedly will be reviewing the replacement of all obsolete signal 
 equipment in the next capital budget cycle and if a comprehensive 
 replacement strategy is approved by the financial partners the equipment can 
 be replaced but even then it would not be perceived as a timely manner. 
 Hopefully the TA's budget priorities incorporate, upgrades, legislated 
 concerns, safety, or state-of-good repair and not politics. 
  
  
  
 > Given the consequences of the fire, I must question these assertions. At 
 > the very least they failed to allow for quick recovery from such a fire, 
 > which means they probably did not plan adequately for all possible events. 
  
  
  
 The TA certainly did not and cannot plan adequately for all possible events. 
 The event that took place would be difficult to envision prior to the event. 
 The same event 100 feet down the track would have had entirely different 
 results.   Typically the TA would plan for flood, fire, smoke, derailment, 
 earthquake, security incidents, tunnel cave-ins and other civil emergencies. 
  
 They typically plan in four major areas: mitigation, preparedness, response, 
 and recovery. 
  
  
  
 In this incident, certainly more could have been done to mitigate the 
 incident.  Critical signal and other rooms that at one time had tower 
 operators nearby should have been reviewed for safety and security.  I would 
 expect that the TA already have such a review immediately underway to 
 prevent such a recurrence. 
  
  
  
 The TA is prepared and trained for almost any incident type.  Outages in 
 areas of the subway utilise turnback, reverse traffic and other strategies. 
 Should the track be impassable the subway section is simply closed. 
 Alternate routings and bus services are other strategies. 
  
  
  
 > What did they do with the revenue from all the fare increases in recent 
 > years? 
  
  
  
 The fare increases were used to offset increased operating costs.  The 
 operating budget is not used to upgrade infrastructure. 
  
 A separate capital budget is in place to finance the major repair and 
 replacement of infrastructure and rolling stock. 
  
  
 > The TA should not have to manufacture anything; they should design their 
 > equipment using standard parts that are available from most 
 > electrical/electronic parts suppliers. Copies of the circuit diagrams 
 > should be kept in a safe remote location as well as on the premesis with 
 > the equipment. 
  
 The signal circuit design are not be electrically compatible with the modern 
 relays currently available from the 2 suppliers. 
 Vital signal relays are special beasties and the old relays are configured 
 differently than the originals relays and circuit prints. 
 The signal design office would be reviewing the reconstruction requirements. 
 It may be far better to start over than reconstruct what was in place 
 before. 
  
  
 "Freedom Fighter"  wrote in message 
 news:KedKd.100444$w62.70963@bgtnsc05-news.ops.worldnet.att.net... 
 > "MisterShooter"  wrote in message 
 > news:s5-dndUq-rHe7GXcRVn-rw@rogers.com... 
 >> "Freedom Fighter"  wrote in message 
 >> news:cSAJd.88378$w62.9559@bgtnsc05-news.ops.worldnet.att.net... 
 >>> As an electronics engineer, it's pretty obvious to me that gross 
 >>> negligence and/or incompetence underlie the long-term consequences of 
 >>> the fire that knocked out the C train and other transit service. 
 >> 
 >> I disagree. 
 >> 
 >> The engineers who designed the subway signal room and system were highly 
 >> competent. 
 >> The design was top notch, state of the art and fail-safe. 
 > 
 > Given the consequences of the fire, I must question these assertions. At 
 > the very least they failed to allow for quick recovery from such a fire, 
 > which means they probably did not plan adequately for all possible events. 
 > 
 >> The cables back then were not low-smoke or fireproof; they are now old 
 >> and were already in need of replacement. 
 >> The room and cable entryways were constructed to the firecode standards 
 >> of the time. 
 >> The equipment would have had a design life of 30-50 years that has been 
 >> exceeded. 
 > 
 > If so, it was negligent not to have upgraded the system before the life 
 > expectancy was exceeded. Plans to do so should have been made well before 
 > then. 
 > 
 >> Adding the ancillary equipment (alarms, ventilation, fire suppression, 
 >> security) supporting the old signal equipment are expensive enhancements 
 >> that add considerable cost to the subway's capital expenditures. 
 > 
 > What did they do with the revenue from all the fare increases in recent 
 > years? 
 > 
 >> The fact is the signal system and cabling had long ago reached the end of 
 >> their normal lifespan but continued to operate reliably. 
 >> Modern replacement systems employ strategies of redundancy, however 
 >> legacy signal systems are not designed with redundancies as the equipment 
 >> was designed and proven to be highly reliable (unlike computers which 
 >> require switchovers to achieve the same reliability). 
 >> 
 >> The transit authority would normally carry 10% spares of any important 
 >> component but could hardly be expected to be in a position to manufacture 
 >> vital signal relays and bases.  The circuit plans would remain in the 
 >> signal offices and the circuitry could be reproduced by the transit 
 >> authority including new cable runs to the field equipment. 
 > 
 > The TA should not have to manufacture anything; they should design their 
 > equipment using standard parts that are available from most 
 > electrical/electronic parts suppliers. Copies of the circuit diagrams 
 > should be kept in a safe remote location as well as on the premesis with 
 > the equipment. 
 > 
  
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